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{ ...Alle intellectuele beroepen bestaan uit het con-
tinue verrichten van dingen die, apart genomen, heel
eenvoudig zijn, na een gigantische voorbereiding. Een
ei bakken op de top van de Mount Everest, dat is het.
{ Denk je? De uitvinder van de telescoop hield twee
vergrootglazen achter elkaar, een voor z'n oog en het
andere met gestrekte arm voor zich uit. Wat een
kolossale uitvinding was dat niet!
{ Maar als je in die tijd een vergrootglas hebben wou,
kon je niet naar een opticien gaan om er een te kopen.
Dan kon je het zelf gaan zitten slijpen. En daar zit
de moeilijkheid. "
| Willem Frederik Hermans
Voor Hilde
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This dissertation is concerned with the empirical determinants of urban growth in
developed countries, and the eects of macroeconomic volatility in less developed coun-
tries, on urbanization and long run income growth. Four chapters are presented.
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with urban population growth in the USA and employment
growth in Germany. In both cases metropolitan areas grow faster if the initial concen-
tration of highly skilled workers is higher. Chapter 2 looks at which city characteristics
lead some cities to attract more skilled workers than others, resulting in a diverging
pattern of skill concentration among cities. The chapter shows that this is not a self-
reinforcing process. One of the more robust ndings is that a personal services sector
is a positive amenity. The number of skilled workers is expected to increase faster in
metropolitan areas where this sector is abundant. The personal services sector is in-
tensive in low-skilled labor which gives a new sound to the popular belief that only a
highly-skilled culture sector will attract more skilled workers. The second chapter shows
that divergence of the concentration of skills and its eect on metropolitan growth is
very similar in Germany. It also shows that there may be positive interaction eects
between similar but dierent skill levels. For example, workers with vocational training
have a larger eect on total employment growth if the local concentration of technical
professionals is high as well.
In Chapter 4 we turn to the developing world. Cities in developing countries have
been growing very fast, but surprisingly also in periods when economic growth to create
manufacturing jobs was absent. Rural-urban migration is modeled as a response to ag-
gregate volatility. Households in rural areas cannot cope with negative shocks and are
forced to move to cities which oer more diverse sources of income, because nancial
markets are incomplete and households have credit constraints. We furthermore show
from country-panel evidence that rural natural resource production (including agricul-
ture) is much more risky than urban manufacturing sectors. Shocks come from natural
causes such as rainfall, and from volatile world resource prices. This mechanism may
be more important than the traditional view which models urbanization as a transitory
process when countries move from an agricultural base to a manufacturing base.
Chapter 5, in collaboration with Frederick van der Ploeg, probes deeper into the
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DOI: 10.2870/18439detrimental eects of aggregate volatility. The high volatility of world prices of natural
resources causes severe volatility of output per capita growth in countries that depend
heavily on them. This has a robust negative eect on long-run growth itself and presents
a new explanation to the natural resource curse. Volatility can fortunately be substan-
tially reduced provided that countries have a sound nancial system to cope with large
and sudden 
uctuations in resource income. The curse can even be turned into a blessing
because we nd evidence for a positive direct eect of natural resource dependence on
growth after controlling for volatility. However, the indirect negative eect of resource
dependence on growth, via volatility, is much larger than any direct positive eect.
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1.1 The rise and fall of cities
The human talent for organization and cooperation is physically re
ected in the cre-
ation of cities. Throughout history, the density of cities has allowed people to interact
frequently to organize defence, religion, politics, order and justice. These institutional
improvements have always served to maximize welfare for their inhabitants or at least
their rulers. They allowed individual specialization and trade, but also had the downside
of war and slavery. However, not every city has become as large, wealthy or powerful
as other cities, and each may have only had a temporary period of relative impor-
tance, growth and prosperity. The city of Rome for example, became the world's largest
metropolis by being the center of politics and trade within a vast empire, only to decline
as its supporting empire vanished. For the centers of political power, success and demise
was often interlinked with their civilization or nation.
From the viewpoint of an economist it is intriguing why within one and the same
country cities can also surpass each other, even though the national institutional and
political arena in which they exist is the same. Why did Boston climb out of the down-
ward spiral experienced by many former heavy industry cities during the last century?
Why was San Francisco able to place itself at the forefront of the modern technology
and services sectors and not Cleveland? Detroit's specialization in car manufacturing
gave it economic might in the rst half of the 20th century, but the same dependence
on the car sector brought decline in the second half. Why was Detroit unable to attract
new sectors? The `Ruhrgebied' in Germany around Essen used to be the 
ourishing
industrial heart. Now, Munich in the South of Germany is by far the wealthiest region.
Why does city size change over time and what determines present-day urban growth,
both in economically successful and less developed countries?
Such questions form the leading thread through this thesis. The aim is not to give
a single denite answer, but all four chapters provide steps in that direction. They
are written as individual articles which can be read independently. The next sections
introduce the main chapters and relate each of them to the main theme. The last chapter
will summarize the arguments.
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1.2 Do modern cities need unskilled workers?
A popular view on urban growth and rejuvenation held by many city councils is due to
Richard Florida (2002 and 2004). In his view cities need to attract the `creative class',
consisting of architects, artists, doctors, musicians, editors, designers, and other skilled
professionals. Tolerance and creativity attract skilled workers and foster invention and
new ideas. Mainstream economists such as Edward Glaeser (see his review, 2002) claim
that cities that score high on the creative class are, at least statistically, undistinguish-
able from cities with a high share of college graduates. The latter is arguably a more
objective measure and a robust cause of urban success. Data on all US metropolitan
areas reveal moreover that the average share of high skilled labor in the total work force
has steadily increased over time but much more in some cities than in others. Figure
1.1 shows the correlation between skills and growth. Cities with a higher share of skilled
labor were likely to experience higher population growth in the subsequent two decades.































































10% 20% 30% 40%
Share with Bachelor’s degree (age 25+) in 1980
All Metropolitan Areas
Figure 1.1: Skilled Cities Grow Faster in the Next 20 Years (Selected MSAs Labeled)
Among several possible explanations there is one which asks whether there is a
role left for unskilled workers in modern fast growing cities. Amenities such as a low-
priced and low-skilled personal service sector might make some cities more attractive.
The supply of amenities, public or private, may be larger in some cities and may be a
reason why they attract more people. The amenity eect is often estimated indirectly
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by assuming that amenities are capitalized in housing rents. If these rise faster than
wages, then quality of life matters. However, if there was a boom in housing prices,
then it would appear as if there was a boom in the appreciation of quality of life. The
usual direct estimates of quality of life include crime, the number of bars & restaurants,
high school drop-outs, and environmental variables, and are likely relevant to the whole
population, and not in particular to the highly skilled. I will look at cultural diversity,
owner-occupied housing, union coverage, and the low-skilled services sector. A low-
skilled service sector is especially important. Human capital is attracted to places with
an abundance of personal services which improve quality of life for highly payed workers
who can aord them, yet who do not want to spend time on `home production'. The
argument is reinforced by data on German metropolitan areas which show a similar eect
of the personal service sector on the growth of the number of highly skilled workers.
It has also been argued that skilled workers attract more skilled workers through a
self-reinforcing eect that makes skilled workers concentrate in larger and more skilled
cities. It could be that new rms hire predominantly skilled workers, which relates to
the increased wage premium for skilled workers. However, the self-reinforcing eect
has been estimated with an upward bias due to the inclusion of a lagged dependent
variable. Fixed eect regressions will actually show a mean reversion of the share of
skilled workers, but this is biased downwards for the same reason. An Arellano-Bond-
type estimator solves this issue. Chapter 2 concludes that the coecient in question is
not larger than one, leaving more room for other explanations for the skill divergence.
A third explanation is that the structure of industry is a possible attractor of a skilled
workforce. Because skilled workers are the carriers and creators of (tacit) knowledge they
should especially benet from any externalities generated by the local industry structure.
This is based on three industry composition structures that maximize externalities:
regional specialization (Marshall-Arrow-Romer), local competition (Porter), and urban
diversity (Jacobs). Signicant eects of these factors have been found on rm location,
employment, and total factor productivity growth. All three may matter. The chapter
tries to add to that literature by focusing, not on total employment eects, but on the
subset of skilled workers.
1.3 Can German data support the urban skills growth con-
nection?
The link between urban growth and the local share of skilled workers is mostly based
on US data. It is generally believed that the US has a more 
exible labor market and a
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geographically mobile population, much more so than most European countries, such as
Germany. If some cities grow faster only because they are able to attract more skilled
workers, then cities have to compete for them. Immobility due to cultural or other
reasons may in eect isolate cities from such competition. This form of transportation
costs might limit agglomeration of skilled workers and therefore limit the eect of skills
on urban growth. It would be interesting if German skilled metropolitan areas also grow
much faster than German cities that are less skilled. This would reinforce the belief that
a concentration of skilled workers causes growth.
The data show that German metropolitan areas have also been diverging in terms of
local human capital concentration. Cities that were very skilled in 1975, such as Munich,
have seen the share of skilled workers increase much more than initially less skilled cities
such as Bremen. Figure 1.2 shows this pattern for West German metropolitan areas
between 1975 and 2001. This observation and the estimated eect on city employment
growth are both remarkably similar to well known ndings for American metropolitan
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Figure 1.2: Change in % Highly Skilled Labor
Chapter 3 will go into more technical detail and question commonly accepted esti-
mates of the magnitude of the eect of skills on growth. The size of the skill-growth
eect for American cities lies around 0.8% for every 10% increase in the share of college
educated workers. We nd the same for West and East German metropolitan areas
(agglomeration of counties based on commuting time). However, regressions in which
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time-invariant unobserved characteristics aect both growth and initial levels (i.e. initial
employment size) lead again to an downward bias in the within-estimate of the initial
employment size coecient, and an upward bias in the OLS estimate. The true value
should lie in between. Using recently developed GMM-IV techniques we show that the
eect is at least 30% smaller for each of two German data sets.
In addition, the chapter questions whether the concentration of college graduates
is the only growth enhancing type of human capital although it is commonly used
as a measure of average local productivity. Also other skilled workers, such as those
with vocational training, may contribute signicantly to agglomerations' employment
growth. There is evidence that cognitive skills rather than motor skills are productivity
enhancing, something which many workers with vocational training may also possess in
a signicant amount. It is therefore not a foregone conclusion that the share of college
graduates is the best indicator of local productivity. Apart from asking how much
human capital is good for growth, the additional question of which combination of skills
is benecial is asked. The evidence shows a positive interaction between workers with
vocational training and graduates from technical colleges. The productivity enhancing
eect of non-technical college graduates is increasing over time, but their presence was
of lesser in
uence to the size of the productivity eect of workers with vocational skills.
1.4 Why do cities in developing countries grow fast, even
when the economic engine has stalled? Aggregate risk
provides an answer.
So far I have assumed that cities only grow if they create employment, in particular
through their skilled workers. If we take a global perspective and compare countries,
then we see that outside the US, Germany and the rest of the highly skilled industrial-
ized world cities grow unrelentingly fast. The level of urbanization (the share of total
population living in cities) has increased by over 5 percentage points per decade out-
side the developed world since 1960. As a result, since 2007 the world will have more
urban inhabitants than rural dwellers. In most parts of the world, rapid urbanization
is accompanied by fast economic growth, however, notably Africa (and Latin America
after 1980) has a dierent experience as shown in Figure 1.3. While growth in GDP per
capita slowed signicantly or even reversed, the rate of urbanization continued its nor-
mal fast pace. Without growth to create jobs or higher wages in cities (such as in East
Asia) it seems puzzling that so many rural dwellers choose to become urban dwellers.
Most people end up in slums which do not necessarily oer better living conditions than
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Figure 1.3: Growth and Urbanization
rural areas for a given income, and the long time period and crowding of public services
should lower the expectations about any income gain from moving to the city. Big city
lights are not always bright. It seems that the continued migration 
ows in some parts
of the world are larger and more persistent than the classic Harris-Todaro model can
explain. An (extreme) illustration is given by Equatorial Guinea, a Sub-Saharan African
country. Between 1990 and 1995 its urban population grew 12% faster than the national
population, yet GDP per capita and manufacturing value added declined by respectively
-9% and -7% per year on average.
Apart from being pulled to the city by a high wage promise people may also be
pushed from the rural area. If living conditions worsen in the countryside because
sources of income decline (by natural causes such as rainfall or con
icts for example)
then people will move to cities even if urban economic growth is absent, because it is the
only place to go with at least some chance of improvement. Even if rural life exhibits
good as well as bad years then people are still pushed o the land and to the city in
bad years, unless they have the nancial means to smooth consumption and `ride out
the bad times'. The more volatile aggregate income shocks are, the more likely it is
that suciently bad years occur, wiping out savings. Natural resource production and
the exogenous prices they fetch on the world market show very volatile behavior and
nancial services to insure against shocks are relatively absent in rural areas. Even local
informal insurance will not work because everyone is hit by a similar (aggregate) shock.
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Sub-Saharan Africa was the most volatile region during the past 45 years and is also
very resource dependent. Our example of Equatorial Guinea did not suer from war or
con
ict in the 1990s, but output growth volatility in the agricultural sector (62% of all
value added) was a worrying 27% and the standard deviation of yearly GDP per capita
growth rates a similarly high 24%! The negative agricultural growth shock of -29% in
1993 (while world food export prices had been declining for three years) may well have
pushed farmers to cities to nd alternative income sources if they could not use nancial
instruments to wait for next year's positive shock of +44%.
Risk was evidently high. Chapter 4 will try to explain urbanization even under nega-
tive growth by including another feature of many developing countries: their dependence
on natural resource production (including agriculture) and consequent shocks to GDP
growth.
1.5 Why is resource wealth a curse? Volatility is again to
blame.
The link between urbanization and macroeconomic volatility leads to an additional hy-
pothesis, albeit farther away from why some cities perform better than others. Chapter
5 explores within the global cross-country perspective whether volatility may also have
an eect on economic growth in the long run. The curse of being endowed with many
natural resources could be that volatility tends to come with it when nancial markets
are underdeveloped. Could it be that volatility is an explanation for rapid urbanization
and slow long-run growth at the same time?
The key determinants of economic growth highlighted in the empirical literature -
institutions, geography and culture - show far more persistence than the growth rates
they are supposed to explain. One candidate to explain the volatility of growth in in-
come per capita is the volatility of commodity prices. This includes not only oil, but
also for example grain and coee prices. What commodity prices lack in trend, they
make up for in volatility. Countries that specialize in commodities with substantial price
volatility have more volatility in their terms of trade, enjoy less foreign direct investment
and experience lower growth rates than countries that specialize in commodities with
more stable prices or countries that are industrial leaders. Countries in the periphery
with volatile commodity prices and undiversied economies fall behind in economic de-
velopment. Also, the long-run volatility of the real exchange rate of developing countries
is approximately three times bigger than that of industrialized countries. The adverse
eect of exchange rate volatility on growth is weaker for countries with well developed
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nancial systems.
Earlier work has estimated the eect of volatility of output per capita growth on long
run growth by including it in a standard cross-country growth regression. Volatility is
based on the errors in a regression that controls for investment, human capital, initial
income, amongst others. The chapter extends this set-up by allowing for the direct
eect of natural resource abundance on growth and, more importantly, the indirect
eect of natural resources on growth performance via volatility, by letting the standard
deviation of the errors simultaneously depend on resource dependence. Also nancial
development, openness, and distance from waterways, are included as the underlying
determinants of volatility. The objective is to test whether any adverse indirect eect of
natural resources on growth performance via volatility of unanticipated output growth
dominates any adverse direct eect of natural resource abundance on economic growth.
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 motivate the hypothesis. The gures show that volatile countries
have lower annual GDP per capita growth rates on average, and that resource-rich
countries are more volatile.
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Figure 1.4: Volatile Countries Have Lower Annual Growth in GDP per Capita
The chapter also provides evidence that economic restrictions and ethnic tensions
play a role. Countries with a large dependence on natural resources and that are land-
locked are typically not very diversied and are vulnerable to highly volatile world com-
modity prices. Natural resource revenues tend to be very volatile (much more so than
GDP), because the supply of natural resources exhibits low price elasticities of supply.
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Figure 1.5: Resource-Rich Economies are More Volatile
Furthermore, Sub-Saharan Africa is most vulnerable to volatility of commodity prices
as it depends so much on natural resources. Dutch Disease eects may also induce real
exchange rate volatility and thus a fall in investment in physical capital and learning,
and further contraction of the traded sector and lower productivity growth. Volatile
resource revenues are disliked by risk-averse households. The welfare losses induced
by consumption risk are tiny compared with those resulting from imperfect nancial
markets. However, a recent dynamic stochastic general equilibrium study of Zimbabwe
highlights the incompleteness of nancial markets and suggests that the observed volatil-
ity in commodity prices depresses capital accumulation and output by about 40 percent.
The chapter gives a prominent role to the quality of nancial markets in understand-
ing how the volatility of commodity prices and natural resource export revenues might
depress growth. Eectively, larger natural resource revenues make it easier to overcome
negative liquidity shocks. We thus show that more volatile commodity prices will harm
innovation and growth.
1.6 Outline
The following chapters explore the agglomeration of human capital and its eect on
urban growth in modern economies. I will ask whether spillovers are large enough to
induce self-reinforcing agglomeration of skilled workers, or whether certain amenities
which improve quality of life are needed to sustain agglomeration. In Chapter three
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data on German cities is used instead and detail on the size of the eect of skills on
growth is given. In Chapter four risk as a determinant of urban growth in developing
economies is looked at, even when cities do not create new jobs. In Chapter ve the
long run macroeconomic eects of aggregate risk are looked at. In both cases aggregate
risk nds its origins in countries' dependence on natural resource production.
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Since 1970 the share of skilled workers in urban populations has steadily
increased in US metropolitan areas, but more so in some cities than in oth-
ers. A higher concentration of skills aects population growth positively,
even when the initial share is instrumented with historical land-grant col-
leges. Skilled cities may attract more skilled workers, but not because they
are more skilled initially: increasing returns are rejected when controlling for
xed eects and bias from inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. Several
amenities such as a low-skilled personal service sector do aect the concen-
tration of skills positively, both in the US and in Germany. There is no
convincing case for an eect of industry structure (specialization/diversity)
on the concentration of college graduates in a city.
2.1 Introduction
From rustbelt to shiny and condent, The Economist celebrated the city of Chicago's
successful deindustrialization and revival, mentioning among others the move to nance,
the right infrastructure, and a growing entertainment sector.1 With the latter they
follow a popular view held by many city councils. However, they do not mention that
more than 30% of the adult population has at least a bachelor's degree. The growth of
Chicago's population is in a large part caused by this fact. Data on all US metropolitan
areas show that the average share of high skilled labor in the total work force has steadily
1A Survey of Chicago, March 18th, 2006.
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increased over time2, but this increase is unequally distributed across cities. Figure 1 in
appendix 2.B repeats the correlation between skills3 and growth also found in Glaeser
and Saiz (2004). Cities with a higher share of skilled labor were likely to experience
higher population growth in the subsequent two decades.
This paper shows that skilled cities have faster population growth by using land-
grant institutions as a strong and valid instrument for the initial share of skilled labor.
Skill divergence can thus help to understand the success and demise of cities. But what
makes some cities attract ever more highly skilled workers while others have trouble
retaining them? We aim to explain the divergence of human capital shares by looking
at three possible explanations.
First, it has been argued that skilled workers attract more skilled workers. Berry
and Glaeser (2005), and Wheeler (2006) argue that there is a self-reinforcing eect that
makes skilled workers concentrate in larger and more skilled cities. The former paper
attributes this to a tendency of new rms to hire predominantly skilled workers, which
relates to the increased wage premium for skilled workers. However, the self-reinforcing
eect is estimated with an upward bias due to the inclusion of a lagged dependent
variable. Fixed eect regressions will actually show a mean reversion of the share of
skilled workers, but this is biased downwards for the same reason, as shown by Nickell
(1981). An Arellano-Bond-type estimator addresses this issue. We conclude that the
coecient in question is not larger than one, leaving more room for other explanations
for the skill divergence.
Second, amenities such as a low-skilled personal service sector might make some
cities more attractive. The supply of amenities, public or private, may be larger in
cities and may be a reason to migrate to certain cities as proposed, among others, by
Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz (2001), Glaeser and Saiz (2004), and Shapiro (2006). Figure
2 shows for example that MSAs with an average January temperature of less then 39.2
degrees Fahrenheit (4 C) have a stronger skill-growth connection. The amenity eect is
often estimated indirectly by assuming that amenities are capitalized in housing rents.
If these rise faster than wages, then quality of life matters. However, if there was a
boom in housing prices in the US, then it would appear as if there was a boom in
the appreciation of quality of life. The usual direct estimates of quality of life include
crime, bars & restaurants, high school drop-outs, and environmental variables, and are
likely appealing to the whole population, and not specically to the highly skilled. This
2From 1970 to 2000 by an average growth rate of 38% per decade.
3Persons of age 25 and over with a Bachelor's degree or higher as a share of the urban population
aged 25 and over.
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paper will add cultural diversity, owner-occupied housing, union coverage, and the low-
skilled services sector, and show that a low-skilled service sector especially matters. This
result runs contrary to the popular view by Richard Florida (2002 and 2004) who claims
that \creative people power regional economic growth, and these people prefer places
that are innovative, diverse, and tolerant" (Florida, 2004, p.34). This chapter claims
that human capital is attracted to places with an abundance of personal services which
improve quality of life for highly payed workers who can aord them, yet whom do
not want to spend time on `home production'.4 Our argument is reinforced by data on
German metropolitan areas which show a similar eect of the personal service sector on
growth of the number of highly skilled workers, even when instrumented for with lagged
values.
Third, the structure of industry is a possible attractor of a skilled workforce. Because
skilled workers are the carriers and creators of (tacit) knowledge they should benet
particularly from any externalities that local industry structure generates. This is based
on three industry composition structures that possibly maximize externalities: regional
specialization (Marshall-Arrow-Romer), local competition (Porter), and urban diversity
(Jacobs). This chapter will build on the work of various authors (Glaeser et al. (1992),
Henderson (1997), Combes et al. (2003), and Cingano, Schivardi (2004)) who nd
signicant eects of these on rm location, employment, and total factor productivity
growth. The survey of Combes and Overman (2004) shows that all three may matter.
This paper attempts to add to that literature by not focusing on total employment
eects, but on the subset of skilled workers.
The next section will discuss the strategy to isolate a causal eect of skills on urban
growth. Section three challenges the view that skilled cities become ever more skilled by
themselves and proposes two new explanations for skill-divergence. Section four reports
the estimation results, after which section ve highlights the characteristics of several
successful cities. Section six concludes.
2.2 Urban population growth and highly skilled labor
Growth of agglomerations is more and more dependent on knowledge intensive industries
and less on transportation costs which have fallen considerably over time (Glaeser and
Saiz, 2004). The concentration of human capital and its induced productivity eect
through spillovers (see Moretti, 2004a for an overview) is more important for overall
4The provision of these services might actually be decreasing in the value of houses if low-skilled
workers in this sector cannot aord to life in the area.
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city growth than the second, broad, explanation of quality of life. Shapiro (2006) nds
that a 10 percent increase in an MSA's concentration of college-educated residents is
directly associated with a 0.8 percent increase in subsequent employment growth, but
that two-thirds is due to productivity eects, and one-third due to quality of life. Wage
growth is also higher in skilled cities. Moretti (2004c) and Glaeser and Saiz (2004)
documented a positive eect on population growth in US MSAs using a proxy (number
of colleges per capita in 1940) for the initial share of skilled workers. Shapiro (2006) and
Moretti (2004c) have used `land-grant' colleges as an instrument for the share of skilled
workers and isolate a causal eect on employment and wage growth. We will show that
also total population growth is causally explained by the initial concentration of skilled
workers.
Our basic specication is given by:
yi;t+10   yi;t = Si;t1 + Xi;t2 + t + i;t (2.1)
where yi;t is (ln) total population, Si;t is the share of skilled workers in the total pop-
ulation, Xi;t are control variables such as the initial total population and the shares of
workers in manufacturing. t and i;t are respectively common shocks to cities and an
error term. In Glaeser and Saiz (2004) 1 is estimated to be of the order 0.5. Even
though observations are observed every 10 years5, it might be that more college grad-
uates settle in cities that are expected to enjoy faster population growth in the next
decade which would make inference on the direction of causality problematic. Further-
more, it is reasonable to believe that quality of life is important enough to attract both
skilled workers and other types of workers. Quality of life is hard to dene and might
partly be contained in the error term. In that case, our estimate of 1 will be incon-
sistent, because S and  are correlated. Even time invariant climate variables may not
be able to capture quality of life in its entirety. Using a good predictor of the share of
graduates which is clearly exogenous to the outcome and any non-negliable unobserved
characteristics should solve this problem and establish causality. We will show that the
eect may be much larger than Glaeser and Saiz (2004) reported.
We will have to make a case for the validity and strength of the instrument to
prove this claim. The instrument has to satisfy several assumptions to be useful for a
consistent estimate of the eect of the concentration of graduates on population growth
rates. First of all, the presence of a land-grant college should be randomly assigned
to cities, and cities with a land-grant should not be systematically dierent from cities
without a land-grant. The land-grant colleges were founded shortly after 1862 when
5See section 2.A for data sources.
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the US Congress passed the Morrill Act to support higher education (Nevins, 1962).
Every state that had remained in the Union (in 1880 this was expanded to southern
states) received a grant to establish colleges in engineering, agriculture and military
science: 73 land-grant colleges and universities were founded, with each state having at
least one. Almost one-fth of all college students were educated through the universities
and colleges that evolved out of the originally technical and agricultural institutions
(Moretti, 2004c). Virtually all the MSA's have colleges and universities, but only 49
of them have one founded by a land-grant.6 If colleges and universities tend to be
located in wealthy areas, densely populated areas, or political centers, the instrument
is not exogenous. Although not directly testable, the act that founded the colleges was
federal, and assured that at least one college was founded in each state, irrespective
of characteristics. Among 288 metropolitan areas the four main Census regions West,
Northeast, South and Midwest have respectively 19.6%, 20.93%, 17.09%, and 11.43%7
of cities with a land-grant institution. Given the agricultural and technical nature of the
colleges, rural areas were just as likely to be awarded the grant as were cities. Small towns
in underpopulated states were just as likely to receive a grant as the more developed parts
of the early settled New England states. Cities that received a grant include Boston,
Massachusetts (MIT); Madison, Wisconsin; Prairie View, Texas; Fairbanks, Arkansas;
Reno, Nevada; Tallahassee, Florida; and Albany, New York.8 Moretti (2004c) shows
that cities with a land-grant and cities without have similar racial and demographic
structures, and workers in these cities have virtually identical (measured by AFQT
scores) ability for similar educational attainment. The strength of the instrument can
be tested, which we will do in section 4, along with the estimation results.
6The state of Wyoming is missing: Laramie (University of Wyoming) is too small to appear in the
sample.
7The share in the Midwest is somewhat smaller due to the fact that many land-grant cities have
populations of less than 100,000 and are excluded from the sample, such as Brookings, SD. Shapiro
(2006) concludes that land-grant institutions are distributed independently from the Census regions
using a Pearson's chi-squared test.
8The following metro-areas have at least one land-grant institution: Albany, NY; Athens, GA; Baton
Rouge, LA; Boston, MA; Champaign-Urbana, IL; Columbia, MO; Columbia, SC; Columbus, OH; Des
Moines, IA; Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN; Fayetteville-Springdale, AR; Fort Collins, CO; Gainesville, FL;
Greensboro, NC; Hartford, CT; Honolulu, HI; Knoxville, TN; Lafayette, IN; Lansing-East Lansing, MI;
Lexington, KY; Lincoln, NE; Macon, GA; Madison, WI; Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI; Nashville, TN;
Pine Blu, AR; Portsmouth-Dover-Rochester, NH-ME; Providence, RI; Raleigh-Durham, NC; Reno,
NV; Richmond, VA; Riverside-San Bernardino, CA; Sacramento, CA; San Francisco, CA; State College,
PA; Tallahassee, FL; Tucson, AZ; Washington, DC-MD-VA and Wilmington, DE-MD (Nevins, 1962).
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2.3 Why some cities become ever more highly skilled
The causal eect of skills on urban population growth forms the motivation to look for
the determinants of the concentration of skilled workers. This section will discuss three
possible reasons for skilled workers to cluster in certain cities: a self-reinforcing pro-
cess, amenities that appeal to skilled workers, and externalities generated by industrial
diversity or specialization.
2.3.1 Bias in the self-reinforcement hypothesis
Based on work by Rauch (1993), Moretti (2004c) nds evidence that wages are higher
in cities with a high concentration of skilled labor controlling for worker's characteris-
tics, even for college graduates themselves. The negative relative supply eect on the
wage of graduates from an increase in college graduates in a city is actually smaller
than the positive spillover eect (given imperfect substitutability between high and low
skill workers). This nding leads Berry and Gleaser (2005) and Wheeler (2006) to es-
timate the eect of the initial concentration of skilled workers on changes in this share
from decade to decade. They nd coecients larger than 1 suggesting a self-reinforcing
process.
However, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable will cause OLS estimates of the
coecient on the lagged dependent variable to be biased upwards if the regressors are
correlated with unobserved xed eects, while within estimators are biased downwards
even when the cross-section dimension is large because the correlation between Si;t
and i;t does not go to zero in the limit (Nickel, 1981). The bias is larger in shorter
panels. Unobserved xed eects are important explanatory variables as cities are very
heterogeneous with respect to time invariant characteristics such as natural resources,
climate, aesthetics and (state) laws. The xed eects can be taken into account by
using the within transformation. This yields the following baseline specication to be
estimated:
Si;t+10 = Si;t1 + Xi;t2 + t + i + i;t (OLS) (2.2)










2 + t + i;t   i (FE) (2.3)
where upper bars denote variable means over time. In Berry and Glaeser (2005) 1
is estimated to be larger than one, but the bias in the coecient is not addressed. If
the bias is large then 1 might actually be smaller than one, while 0
1 would be too
small. To consistently estimate 0
1, the methodology by Arellano and Bond (1991) is
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adopted.9 A twostep dierenced-GMM estimator which includes a correction for nite
sample bias and is robust to heteroskedasticity in the errors should solve this issue. It is
however not possible to do this for all regressions because we need a minimum of three
panels. County-level indstrial data (see section 2.A) could not be collected for 1970 in
a comparable manner to the decades 1980 and 1990.10 It will be shown however that
the bias introduced by the lagged dependent variable is modest in those regressions.
Results where this bias could not be corrected for will be interpreted as a lower bound
where the true value is likely close to the estimated value.11 Furthermore, Philips and
Sul (2004) prove that inclusion of more exogenous regressors decreases inconsistency in
the estimate of the lagged dependent coecient as long as they have a non-zero eect
on the dependent variable.
The results in section 4 will show that 1 is not larger than 1, leaving more room
for other explanations for skill concentration, such as amenities.
2.3.2 Some new amenities which appeal mostly to skilled workers
Amenities make a location attractive for people. The consumer city view (Glaeser,
Kolko, Saiz, 2001) links the attractiveness in consumer amenities directly to population
growth. Estimates of particular amenities (such as bars, restaurants, climate) have
found some positive eects on the location of total population as shown by Glaeser
and Saiz (2004) and Shapiro (2006). However, they have not before been tested on
the location of highly educated workers. The cost of moving people has not declined
much (for example in terms of opportunity costs of valuable time given higher real
earnings) and productivity shifted to knowledge and people intensive services. Growth
of agglomerations is therfore more determined by the preferences of people (Glaeser,
Kohlhase, 2004). We introduce four amenities that should predominantly appeal to
skilled workers: a low-skill personal service sector, the share of owner-occupied housing
units, labor market 
exibility and cultural diversity.
A low-skill personal service sector12 consisting of services from laundry, day care,
9See also Bond (2002).
10County Business Patterns (CBP) data for 1969 exists on ICPSR but is not yet consistent with CBPs
1980 and 1990. See section 2.A for more details.
11The regressions that conrm the link between skill concentration and population growth also contain
a lagged dependent variable, but this is not a variable of main interest. The exact direction and size of
any bias in the other regressors is unclear so it is best to view the results as qualitative, rather than as
the true parameter size.
12Dened as Standard Industrial Codes (SIC codes) 7200 (personal services), 7500 (auto repair ser-
vices), and 7600 (miscellaneous repair services); The percentage of college graduates working in this
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beauty shops, and parking, to car repair and electrical repair services, are the services
that make living in a city more convenient, especially when skill intensive jobs are de-
manding. The higher earnings are, the higher is the opportunity cost of not working,
and in a workforce with a high concentration of similar highly educated workers compe-
tition for jobs may also be higher (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). Having few of these
services around (note for example day care) makes it more dicult for working couples
to manage work and leisure. A city will likely also need less educated workers to per-
form tasks that are equally important for maintaining a productive city. We measure
the personal service sector by the number of establishments and employment size. We
provide additional results using German data based on employment size.
The share of owner-occupied housing units may matter because home-ownership has
two features distinct from rented houses. The high skilled share of the population will
nd it easier to buy a house, because they earn more on average and will nd it easier
to get a mortgage. A second feature addresses mobility. It is more costly to move
to another location from an owned unit relative to moving between rented units13 in
terms of transaction cost such as notary and real estate agent fees, and search costs.
Agents become pickier if they know they commit a large part of their wealth to a home
in a location they cannot easily move out of again. These characteristics do not hold
for renting. The correlations between the share of owner-occupied housing and both
the murder rate and the share of the population that did not move between 1995 and
2000 (which was 52% of the population) are respectively -0.33 and 0.56. Additionally,
this correlation suggests that cities with more owner-occupied houses have generally
somewhat less crime. Having more such units available in a city makes it less likely that
skilled workers move out of a city in response to a negative employment shock.
A 
exible labor market is attractive to skilled labor as they benet in terms of
spillovers from moving between jobs (see next section below), and they are presumably
more prone to adapt to changing environments and need less protection by labor laws
and unions. Glaeser and Alesina (2005) describe evidence that regulation negatively
aects private investment. If unions represent vested interests in keeping an incumbent
employer in business as long as possible without shedding labor, then this might deter
investment14 in new start-ups. Saxenian (1994) attributes the success of Silicon Valley
to job 
exibility and openness. Skilled workers are more likely to start up a company and
sector was 4% in 1980, and 5% in 1990.
13Assuming there is no dierence in the housing supply elasticity between units for sale and units for
rent.
14There is too little data available on venture capital.
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benet from 
exible labor markets. High skill sectors such as software have relatively
low union density rates. We proxy labor market 
exibility by the number of labor
organization establishments per 1000 residents.15
There is some evidence (described in Alesina and La Ferrara (2004)) that cultural di-
versity based on language, life style, and attitudes are positively associated with higher
productivity. Florida (2004) describes positive correlations between measures of toler-
ance and creativity. Glaeser and Alesina (2005) note that immigrants are often more risk
taking than natives but also that public goods provision such as welfare spending is lower
in ethnically more diverse areas. These measures are not perfect as both ethnicity and
language based diversity may over or under estimate cultural diversity. Ottaviano and
Peri (2004) use a dierent measure of cultural diversity based on immigrants' country
of birth. They show it has economic value and is positively associated with both urban
wages for natives and the rental price of housing. To see if there is any eect of cultural
diversity on the location of highly educated individuals we proxy for culture by ethnical
diversity: the inverse of the sum of squared race shares of the population, where races
are: White, African-American, Hispanic, and an `other' group, which includes people
from Asian origin, as dened by the US Census. Diversity based on country of birth is
included as a robustness check.
2.3.3 Are skilled workers attracted by externalities generated by in-
dustrial structure?
Externalities originating from the composition of industry provide a theoretical expla-
nation for city growth. While the literature of this branch has looked mainly at the
location of rms and the benets of externalities for total employment (Combes et al.,
2004) and total factor productivity (Cingano, Schivardi, 2004), it should also be inter-
esting to look at the eects on the location of highly educated workers. As carriers and
creators of knowledge, skilled labor should be able to benet from externalities created
by the composition of industry. For example, diverse and larger cities may oer more
work opportunities for highly specialized knowledge (Duranton and Jayet, 2005).
The rst theory described in Glaeser et al (1992) is due to Marshall (1890), Arrow
(1962), and Romer (1986) (called MAR-externalities, or localization economies) where
externalities occur between rms in the same industry. Firms can learn from each other
by being in close geographical and technological proximity helping growth in that in-
dustry. This theory predicts that local monopoly is better for growth than competition
15Corresponding to SIC code 8630: labor organizations.
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because the 
ow of ideas through imitation, movement, and interaction of highly skilled
labor is internalized fully by the innovator. In contrast, Porter (1990) argues that inno-
vation is induced by local competition. Although highest in specialized, geographically
concentrated industries, competition among rms within their industry induces innova-
tions, because the alternative to innovating is the demise of the company. Externalities
are then maximized in specialized, but competitive, industries. A third branch, by Ja-
cobs (1969), emphasizes that externalities are maximized when industries learn from
technologically close industries outside their own industry. Geographic proximity and
diversity (urbanization economies) increase the opportunities of learning and adopting
new ideas from other industries. The adoption of new ideas will then be faster if local
competition is higher. Moreover, a larger and more diverse pool of rms and labor lowers
risk in the event of negative shocks (Duranton, Puga, 2004) and works thus as a form
of portfolio diversication (Frenken et al, 2004). A greater variety of rms and workers
in close interaction also speeds up the search and matching process between rms and
workers, increasing eciency and productivity.
To test this we include indices that should capture the features of MAR, Porter,
and Jacobs-externalities.16 In addition, following Katz and Murphy (1992) and Moretti
(2004c) we control for national exogenous shocks that shift relative demand of skilled
workers predicted purely by the city industry mix.
2.4 Estimation results
We start with estimation the eect of skills on population growth, before turning to the
determinants of skill concentration in the following subsections.
The rsth and second columns of Table 1 in Appendix C show the highly signicant
eect of skills on population growth with various standard control variables. Indepen-
dent variables are timed at t   10 so that the coecients measure their eect on future
population growth.17 Column 2 also conrms that climate variables have an eect on
population growth.







where i is a MSA subscript and t a time index.
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2.4.1 Causality
Our instrument has one drawback, which is that it is a dummy and cannot be used in
a specication including xed MSA eects, because the within transformation would
absorb the instrument. For this reason the regressions in Table 1 use OLS and 2SLS,
including the observed xed eects: region and time dummies, and the climate variables.
The fth column shows the instrumented eect of the concentration of people with a
bachelor's degree or higher in a city on future population growth: the eect is highly
signicant and actually larger than the uninstrumented case in column 1. There appears
to be no reverse causality and human capital is a strong predictor of city population
growth rates. The standard errors in the equation tend to be somewhat larger than
those of the OLS estimate. A Hausman test cannot reject the null that the estimates
are not systematically dierent from the OLS equation as a group. Note that without
MSA dummies, immigration is actually bad for city growth possibly re
ecting the fact
that many (at least recent) immigrants work in agriculture and manufacturing or other
lower wage jobs, which were not high growth industries between 1970 and 2000.
The third column looks at relevance of the instrument: it signicantly predicts the
share of college graduates and explains a large part of the variance in the share of
college graduates.18 Column four reports the signicant rst stage of 2SLS19, where an
F-test on the instrument is included: the relatively high F-statistic rejects the presence
of weak-instrument bias (Stock and Yogo, 2002). This is reassuring, because even if
there is some correlation with the error through unobserved xed eects, the strength of
the instrument increases consistency of the IV-estimator, and decreases bias due to any
violation of the exclusion restriction. This is important as it is not possible to control
for MSA-xed eects in this setting which might be correlated with the instrument. A
formal Sargan-test of over-identifying restrictions is not possible because the model is
just identied. College graduates signicantly and causally predict future population
growth.
2.4.2 Dynamic panel bias and constant returns
Table 2 reports regressions where we include all the important determinants of the
concentration of skilled workers for which we have at least three time periods.20 In this
18Excluding year dummies and a constant the instrument explains 20% of the variation.
19Included in the rst stage are also the climate variables: although they are found to be positive
determinants of population growth in column 2, they are actually signicantly negatively associated
with the concentration of skills.
20We therefore do not include industry structure indices.
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section we focus on the lagged dependent variable, the initial share of skilled workers.
The rst column reports the OLS estimates with region xed eects, but no MSA
xed eects. The coecient on the lagged share of college graduates is signicantly
positive but has an upward bias. The second column includes MSA xed eects and
employs the within transformation to eliminate unobserved xed city characteristics.
The coecient is signicantly smaller than one, but this estimate is biased downward.
A F-test rejects the hypothesis that the coecient on college graduates is equal to one
in columns 1 and 2.
The last column uses the two-step dierenced GMM Arellano-Bond estimator which
corrects for nite sample bias (Windmeijer, 2005) and eliminates the unobserved xed
eects through rst-dierencing. It uses lagged level values of the explanatory variables
to instrument for variable changes: they are all allowed to be endogenous, except for the
time dummies.21 There are too few time periods for the Arellano-Bond test to test for
autoregression of order 2 in the error term (the error term is AR(1) by construction).
Although we cannot test for this source of correlation between the errors and the lagged
instruments, in regression 2 the estimate of the magnitude of AR(1) in the error of
the within estimator is quite small (0.04) so it is less likely that any AR(2) in the
error is a big problem. Furthermore, as these test are based on so few time periods
they have low power and less interpretive value. Because periods have 10 year intervals
any problematic autocorrelation is unlikely. A Hansen's J-statistic of over-identifying
restrictions (robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorellation) cannot reject that the
instruments are valid so we conclude that the GMM instrument set is well specied.
As expected, the two-step dierenced GMM estimator nds a coecient in-between the
OLS and within estimates. The dierence between the within estimate and the two-
step GMM estimate is statistically small which indicates that the downward bias in the
within estimator is likewise small.
Table 2 nds no evidence for increasing returns in the share of college graduates:
controlling for unobserved time invariant city characteristics there is no evidence that
skilled workers go where skilled workers are. Since the two-step GMM estimate is below
but close to one, there is a better case for constant returns: a F-test cannot reject
21Persistence in the lagged dependent variable actually warrants use of the system-GMM version
(Blundell and Bond, 1998) which also uses lagged rst dierenced equation to instrument the equation
in levels. High persistence may also bias the dierence-GMM estimator downwards, even below the FE
estimate. Unfortunately, these additional instruments did not pass the Hansen test. Nevertheless, it
yielded a coecient of 0.987 (not reported) and the dierence-GMM estimate is well-behaved: it is not
below the FE estimate.
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equality to one (p-value = 0.20).
2.4.3 A low skilled service sector matters
Table 3 uses observations on the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 for all the proposed ameni-
ties and indices. All regressions include a lagged dependent variable, which makes OLS
estimate biased upward, and within-estimates biased downward for this coecient. Ta-
ble 2 shows that the bias downward in the within estimates is probably not very large.
Therefore, within-estimates should be viewed as lower bounds to the true eect, where
in columns 2, 4, 5, and 6, the true coecient is likely to be close to or below one. The
coecients on the other variables should be interpreted preferably as qualitative rather
than an exact measure of the size of the eect since the literature is not clear on the
size and direction of any bias in the other regressors.
The third and fourth columns include seven amenities and the ethnical diversity
index. Clearly insignicant are traditional amenities such as restaurants, museums,
health institutions, and crime (disamenity). There are signicant eects of the other
four variables, which actually become more pronounced when unobserved time invariant
city specic characteristics are included. The concentration of skilled workers in a city
responds positively to a low-skilled service sector, and home ownership. As expected,
labor organizations (proxy for stringent labor markets) aect concentration of skills
negatively, yet ethnical diversity enters the equation negatively also. Ethnical diversity
may be a poor substitute for cultural diversity. Ottaviano and Peri (2004) found positive
cultural diversity eects on wages and rents. To see if our negative result is due to the
wrong proxy used for cultural diversity, we include also their measure based on country
of birth of foreign urban citizens, which changes results very little (not reported). An
explanation could be that the average level of education of immigrants is lower than the
average education of natives, which does not necessarily con
ict with the positive eect
on wages for natives as found by Ottaviano and Peri (2004).
The results of Table 3 are robust to including other signicant controls: unemploy-
ment, housing value (negative), and high school drop-outs.22
Column 6 and panel B investigates the interaction between the low-skill service sector
and the lagged dependent variable. Panel B evaluates the marginal eects at the means
and maximum values of the two variables:
22Other controls as the share of workers in manufacturing or foreign born residents did not change the
results in any way (except for the diversity index based on country of origin, which becomes insignicant
once the share of foreign born is included, as they are highly collinear).
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collegesharei;t = (collegeshare)i;t 10 + (low-skillservices)i;t 10 +
+ 




= b  + b 
(college share) (2.5)
and the corresponding standard error depends on the concentration of college graduates




Var(b ) + (college share)2Var(b 
) + 2(college share)Cov(b ;b 
) (2.6)
Increasing the low-skilled service sector aects the persistence over time of the con-
centration of college graduates positively and signicantly. The direct eect on the
concentration of skilled workers becomes higher, the higher the initial concentration of
skills. Figure 3 plots this relationship. The marginal eect of 1 more low-skill service
establishment per 1000 residents on the future concentration of skills becomes signi-
cant as the initial concentration of college graduates in a city exceeds 19.2%, which is
very close to the median concentration in 1990. For the upper skilled half of cities an
increase of 1 establishment per 1000 residents aects the future concentration of skills
signicantly and more so as the initial concentration is higher. Moreover, this eect
decreases any mean reversion in the concentration of skills by 0.05 percentage points
per extra establishment and brings the coecient closer to constant returns: at the
maximum thickness of this service industry in 1990 the eect of lagged concentration of
skills on itself is close to one. Still, increasing returns are not likely.
Evidence from German cities
Table 4 shows additional evidence of the positive eect of low-skilled services on em-
ployment growth of highly skilled workers in 150 German metropolitan areas. Since we
only have data on employed workers we estimate the slightly dierent equation:
si;t+10   si;t = si;t
1 + pi;t
2 + Xi;t
3 + t + i + i;t (2.7)
where si;t is (ln) total highly skilled employment, Xi;t are control variables such as the
initial total employment, the shares of workers in manufacturing, the average wage per
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worker, and a dummy for former East Germany. pi;t is the initial share of workers in
the personal service sector. t, i and i;t are respectively common shocks to cities,
unobserved city characteristics and an error term. Our main variable of interest is 
2.
OLS and FE estimations in columns 1 and 2 show mixed results. Only when we
control for the i do we nd a positive and signicant eect of the personal service
sector. However, the eect is not robust to controlling for the wage rate and the share
of manufacturing in column 3. Since we also have a lagged dependent variable in this
specication we will use the GMM estimators to correct for this bias to nd out if doing
so also aects the other results.23
Column 4 is able to improve the estimate on the lagged dependent variable: also for
Germany we nd conditional convergence of highly skilled employment. The Hansen test
for the overall instrument set is passed, and the dierence-Sargan test for the additional
instrument set is also passed, showing that all our instruments are uncorrelated with the
errors. Most interesting is that we now nd a signicant and large eect of the initial
share of workers in the personal service sector on growth of the number of highly skilled
workers in German metropolitan areas. Column 5 additionally adds year dummies to
the instrument set to improve eciency. The drawback is that this weakens the power
of the overidentication tests. Even so, we improve the standard errors somewhat.
A low-skilled personal service sector is an important amenity for highly skilled work-
ers, both in the US and in Germany.
2.4.4 Industrial structure does not attract skilled workers
Table 3 also included variables which capture industry composition. The indices on
related variety (Jacobs-externalities) and competition (Porter/Jacobs-externalities) are
positive, but small and not signicant.24 Only unrelated variety (MAR-externalities;
portfolio eect) shows a signicant positive sign, robust to MSA xed eects shown in
the second column, but when including other important controls as in the fth column,
the signicance disappears. Unexpectedly, none of the externality indices on industrial
structure appeal to highly skilled workers in particular. Trying dierent measures for
the related variety index such as using the lower bound in the range given where data
was suppressed on employment only increased standard errors, and using an index based
on 3-digit data changed the coecients very little. Another problem is that the main
23The data is observed yearly from 1975 to 2001, which means that persistence may be a larger
problem in this case. We therefore use the system-GMM variety (see Bond, 2002).
24All regressions include the Katz & Murphy exogenous relative demand shock for skilled labor as a
control.
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industry groups are constructed without an input-output matrix that should measure
industry relations more precisely, and are probably too arbitrary: the indices are sen-
sitive to which industries are classied as being unrelated to others. The means of
the unrelated and related densities decline for unrelated diversity both in the 80s and
90s25. However, related diversity decreases from 1980 to 1990 (means of 1.19 and 1.13
respectively), but increases much more in the 90s.26 This could bias the eect of re-
lated variety, because a rapid increase in diversity between 1990 and 2000 (with means
of respectively 1.13 and 1.45) is not picked up by the regressions. Also changing the
industry main groups to a set of nine, consisting broadly of 1-digit classications only
moderately improves things as cities with higher related diversity attract more skilled
people but this is not robust to within-estimation (Tables available on request). Includ-
ing MSA xed eects shows that cities which increased competition relative to their
mean levels attracted more college graduates. The coecients on the other variables do
not change. This shows how sensitive the indices are to the denition of which indus-
tries are considered unrelated, but also that the indices are not sensitive to measurement
error originating from data suppression due to condentiality. Combes, Duranton, and
Gobillion (2006) nd that wages are determined by individual skills, and by a far smaller
amount due to industry interactions or local endowments. Their benets may accrue
mostly to rm prots and not to wages. If skilled workers hardly see the benets of
local interactions in their wage, then it consistently will also play a small role in their
decision to live in a certain city.
2.5 What do successful cities look like?
The previous section has attempted to uncover the eects of city characteristics on the
future concentration of college graduates. The starting point is the importance of having
a large concentration of skills for future population growth. How did Chicago, IL, and
the most educated cities of Boulder, Colorado, and San Francisco, California, score on
the amenities, and what was their relative importance?
The 15 most educated and seven most populous cities are listed in Table 6 in ap-
pendix C together with the sample mean and median. The rst column reports the skill
level as measured by their share of the population with a bachelor's degree or higher
251980: 1.00; 1990: 0.94; 2000: 0.86
262000 gures are from NAICS classication of industries, but using the same 24 main industry groups:
SIC and NAICS do not compare readily, so 2000 numbers may not be consistent with 1980 and 1990
numbers. In the regressions only 1980 and 1990 were used.
Poelhekke, Steven (2008), Urban Growth Across Three Continents: The Blessing of Human Capital and the Curse of Volatility 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/18439Chapter 2. High-Skilled Metropolitan Growth 27
in 2000, and in the even numbered columns thereafter their 1990 characteristics: levels
of important determinants of the concentration of skills. The levels are multiplied with
the coecient found in the regression analysis to calculate their aggregate eect on next
decade's concentration of skills.27
Chicago does better than average in terms of its skill level. It gained 5.6% compared
to 3.8% sample average, while the 15 most educated cities expanded their skill concen-
tration on average by 6.1%, the latter translating to a population growth rate dierence
of at least 8.0% over the next decade28 (instead of 6.9% if the most educated cities had
attracted only 3.8% extra college graduates). The most educated cities had a 16% larger
than average low-skilled service sector which more than compensates in magnitude for
the relatively high number of labor organizations (less 
exible labor market) in Boulder.
Chicago scores quite well across the board, although it has quite a strong presence
of labor organizations, but also a good low-skill service sector. The city seems set to
attract more highly educated workers, which will be a rich source of future growth.
2.6 Conclusion
A higher concentration of skilled workers leads to faster population growth also if the
initial share is instrumented for. The diverging concentration of skilled workers is not
a self-reinforcing process in contrast to Berry and Glaeser (2005) and Wheeler (2006).
There is a better case for constant returns and a stable process. Cities with more
amenities and in particular a low-skilled personal services sector do tend to gain more
skilled workers, both in the US and in Germany. Other amenities also matter, such as
the owner-occupied housing share (positive), and weakly cultural diversity measured by
both ethnicity and country of birth of immigrants (negative), and labor organizations
(negative). Industry externalities as captures by unrelated diversity (MAR), competition
(Porter), or related diversity (Jacobs) did not work very well.
Skilled workers are important for a city's future growth. They will not come by
themselves to a city, even if a city already has a signicant concentration. City councils
27Note however that the coecients of the regressions cannot be taken as the true eect because they
could not be estimated in the most appropriate way (taking account of the lagged dependent variable),
but if we are willing to believe they are approximately near the true eect, it can at least say something
about the relative performance between cities. Still, it is best not to take the magnitudes too literally.
Furthermore, the regression coecients were obtained through xed eect estimations. This means that
there can still be city-specic characteristics of cities that explain their concentration of skills, and those
characteristics listed in Table 6 are not exhaustive.
28(0:407   0:236)  0:466 = 0:080, using table 2(1).
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can do well if they focus on amenities, including those provided by the lower skilled
workforce.
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Appendicies
2.A Data sources and variable denitions
The main data used are observations on metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) from the
HUD State of The Cities Data System, which oers a sample of 1970, 1980, 1990 and
2000 Census data. We use metropolitan statistical areas as units of observation from
the 1999 Census denition.29 Except in New England states (New England Central
Metropolitan Area (NECMA) is used there) the denition of Primary MSA (PMSA)
along county-based boundaries should capture the standard assumption that a MSA is
a labor pool as it is unclear if the externality eects arise where people work or where
they live. Central MSA's are however considered to be too large and capture more than
a labor region. We only consider MSAs with a population of more than 100,000 in 1999,
which leads to a sample of 288 cities with an average of 650,000 people per city.
The Census data provides a measure of human capital in the form of persons aged
25 and over with at least a Bachelor's diploma, and the number of high school drop-
outs, but unfortunately no further precise measures such as average years of schooling
are available. The County and City Data Books (1994) are used for climate variables,
the County Business Patterns Database for constructing the amenities, and the FBI
National Archive of Criminal Justice Data for murder rates (negative amenity). For these
data, the MSA level gures were obtained by aggregating from county level, using the
Census Bureau 1999 denition. From these sources, almost complete datasets could be
obtained for 1980 and 1990.30 The related diversity index is based on 4-digit industry
level data on employment (or 3-digit if 4-digit was not reported). Unfortunately, public
CBP data requires that no single company's activity level should ever be identiable.
Therefore, if an industry in a county consists of only a few establishment, then data on
employment is suppressed and is replaced by a range: i.e. 0-19, 20-99, or 100-249, etc,
employees. In these cases the range was replaced by the middle of the range: i.e. 10,
60, 175, etc. It was also tried to use the lower bound of the range, and a separate index
was constructed on 3-digit data, which suers much less from this problem. IPUMS
1% samples were used to construct the national skilled worker demand shocks, also
using college graduates or higher as a measure of the skilled labor force, and to construct
the cultural diversity index based on country of birth.
29Denitions by the Oce of Management and Budget, US Census Bureau, 1999: to avoid the endo-
geneity of current denitions to growth.
30The panel dataset is balanced, except for the precipitation variable where data was only missing for
Honolulu, HI.
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2.A.1 Diversity Indices
The most commonly used diversity index is the Herndahl-Hirschman index which sums
the squared labor shares of each industry. However, this is not sucient to distinguish
between diversity at an aggregate level (1 or 2 digit industry codes) and diversity at
a lower level (3 or 4 digit industry codes) within each aggregate industry group and
measure them simultaneously in one regression. Jacobs-externalities are, for example,
highest if all workers are equally distributed over related industries, which means spe-
cialization on the 1- or 2-digit level and simultaneously diversity within this group at
the 3- or 4-digit level. A dierent index, Theil's entropy, provides the right framework
to achieve this.31 The useful feature of this index for diversity is that including both
measures in one regression does not introduce additional collinearity to the regression,
because they are independent. They can therefore be measured simultaneously for their
eect on the location of college graduates.
Theil's (1972) measure of entropy corresponds to the expected information content
of a probability distribution: in this application the distribution of employment in in-
dustries across cities and major industry groups, where the s stand for the probability
to nd a number of workers in a certain city-industry.
Dene Sg;g = 1;:::;24 the major industry groups in city S = 1;:::;288 broadly
based on 1- and 2-digit SIC industry classications32, which represents unrelated diver-
sity, that is industries which are technologically dissimilar. Industries i belonging to
these groups that are dened as technologically similar and are related to diversity be-
cause they belong to only one of the groups Sg. The appendix Table 5 describes in detail
which major industries are included. Each group Sg consists of i industries belonging









workers employed in industry i, city s
all workers (all industries, all cities)
(2.9)
is the probability of nding a number of workers in industry i, in city s,
31See Frenken et al. (2004) for a recent similar application of this measure.
32Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) based on the 1980 and 1990 denitions from the County
Business Pattern data (Census, 1980, 1990).
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and measures the city specic dispersion of workers across major industry groups. Hso
takes its maximum value log(g) = log(24)  1:380 if all workers are distributed equally
across all the major industry groups that exist in the city, and its minimum value if
all workers in city s are found in only one industry group g: log(1=1) = 0. This index
corresponds to unrelated diversity. A low value of this index represents specialization
of a city in a few industries corresponding to a high level of MAR-externalities.










which measures between industry entropy at the lowest digit level, which takes on its
maximum value if all workers in a city are distributed equally across all 4-digit industries
that exist in the city, and its minimum value if all employment in a city is concentrated
in only one 4-digit industry.
Both measures are additive in the following way (see Theil, 1972, for a derivation):
















denes the industrial diversity of the sth MSA within industry group g by employment
distribution across all i 2 Sg.
Finally, Hs   Hso is the average within group entropy, and measures the average
diversity within industries groups in a city s. Hso will be used as an index of un-
related diversity (MAR-externalities), and Hs   Hso as an index of related diversity
corresponding to Jacobs-externalities: a higher value corresponds to a higher level of
Jacobs-externalities. This index is always larger or equal to zero because both sg=s
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and Hsg are non-negative: there can never be more dividedness after grouping than
there was before grouping.
2.A.2 Competition
Following Glaeser et al. (1992) the index of competition is dened as follows:
competition =
establishment in city-industry/employment in city-industry
establishments in national industry/employment in national industry
The more rms there are in an industry per worker, the higher is the level of competition
relative to the national level of competition. If this value is greater than one it means
that an industry is locally more competitive than the national average.33
2.A.3 Exogenous labor demand shock for skilled workers
The index captures exogenous shifts in the relative demand for workers with a bachelor's
degree or higher that is predicted by the mix of industries in a city. The index is based
on nationwide employment growth for college graduates in industries weighted by the





where s indexes the major industry groups, j is the type of worker (here workers with
a college degree or higher), c indexes the MSA, and t stands for the decade after which
the shock takes place (from t to t + 10).  equals the number of employees in industry
s, city c at time t, and the last term measures the log change in employment of type
j workers in national industry s from t to t + 10. The employment shares of skilled
labor in each industry group is estimated from the IPUMS database34, which reports
the educational attainment of workers in each industry in a sample of about one million
individuals per decade.
33Unfortunately, without rm level output gures it is hard to distinguish between more competitive
rms and smaller rms and the number of rms per worker as such might not re
ect competition.
However, since we average the industry major groups instead of 4-digit levels of competition this should
not be of great concern as it is likely that aggregate groups of industries do not consist of only large or
only small rms. In their article, a higher value of this measure is signicantly associated with higher
employment growth in two digit industries in support of both Porter's and Jacob's theories, and as
negative evidence of MAR externalities.
34Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, 1% samples: 1980, 1990, and 2000.
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2.A.4 Data sources for German metropolitan areas
This study uses the factually anonymous IAB Employment Sample (IABS) (Years 1975
- 2001). Data access was provided via a Scientic Use File supplied by the Research
Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB) (see Drews et al., 2006). It comprises a 2% random
sample of employees subject to social security payments from 1975 to 2001 at the county
(`Kreise') level. We group the counties into labor regions or agglomerations. German
labor market regions are dened by Eckey, Kosfeld, and T urck (2006) on the basis
of commuting patterns (maximum commuting time of 45 to 60 minutes depending on
the attractiveness of the center) and have a size of at least 50,000 inhabitants and are
comparable to the US MSAs. This leads to 150 regions consisting of one or more counties
that capture the area where people both work and live. We dene highly skilled workers
as those with educational attainment levels 5 and 6: university degree (`Hochschule') and
technical college degree (`Fachhochschule'). The personal services sector includes, using
the variable `beruf' (profession), categories 3 (gardener), 105 (porter), 106 (servant),
110 (naturopath, masseur, remedial gymnast), 117 (child care), 121 (hairdresser, other
personal care), 125 (domestic services) and 127 (domestic cleaner).
Poelhekke, Steven (2008), Urban Growth Across Three Continents: The Blessing of Human Capital and the Curse of Volatility 
European University Institute
 































































10% 20% 30% 40%
Share with Bachelor’s degree (age 25+) in 1980
All Metropolitan Areas
Figure 2.1: Skilled Cities Grow Faster During the Next 20 Years (Selected MSAs La-
beled)
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Share with Bachelor’s degree (age 25+) in 1980
Cold MSA (january temperature < 4 degrees Celcius)




























































19.2% 10%   30% 40% 50%
Share with Bachelor’s degree (age 25+) in 1990
95% confidence band
Figure 2.3: Low-Skill Services More Important Predictor if Initial Concentration Is
Higher
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Low−Skill Personal Services per 1000 Residents in 1990
Figure 2.4: Low-Skill Personal Services and Future Skill Concentration
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Table 2.1: A Robust Eect: Instrumenting Using Land-Grant Institutions
log(Population) Share Bachelors log(Pop)
Within OLS OLS 1st Stage 2SLS
at t-10 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) .466 .924 1.867
(.165) (.100) (.507)
Land-grant Institution (dummy) .059 .020
(.005) (.004)
ln(population) -.337 -.030 .013 -.040
(.025) (.004) (.001) (.008)
Average heating degree days '61-'90 (coldness) -.002 .014 -.042
(.0004) (.003) (.0150)
Average precipitation '61-'90 -.00003 .009 -.110
(2.04e-06) (.003) (.011)
Share workers in manufacturing .279 -.247 -.125 .023
(.091) (.052) (.019) (.083)
Share workers in professional services .076 -.680 .638 -1.208
(.171) (.118) (.033) (.366)
Share workers in trade .597 .962 -.210 .981
(.220) (.169) (.047) (.213)
Share of Foreign Born Population .487 .059 .083 -.397
(.140) (.081) (.039) (.131)
Year f.e. yes yes yes yes yes
Region f.e. no yes no yes yes
MSA f.e. yes no no no no
F-test on excl. IV (F<10 => weak IV) 30.10
Correlation with Share Bachelor's degree 0.355
Correlation with population growth rate 0.074
Hausman-test, p-value 0.98
H0: OLS more ecient: no endogeneity not rjctd
Obs. 864 861 861 861 861
Number of MSA 288 287 287 287 287
Adj. R-squared .500 .487 .446 .732 .494
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%.
39
Poelhekke, Steven (2008), Urban Growth Across Three Continents: The Blessing of Human Capital and the Curse of Volatility 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/18439Chapter 2. High-Skilled Metropolitan Growth 40
Table 2.2: Bias in the Lagged Dependent Variable
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+)
OLS Within 2step di-GMMy
L.=lag (at t-10) (1) (2) (3)
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) 1.080 .763 .919
(.024) (.035) (.063)
ln(population) .004 .005 .029
(.0006) (.005) (.011)
Share workers in Personal Services -.026 .106 .314
(.024) (.065) (.185)
Share Workers in Business and Repair Services .034 .127 .344
(.061) (.082) (.110)
Share workers in manufacturing .018 -.065 -.131
(.009) (.022) (.039)
Share workers in professional services .050 .058 .438
(.018) (.047) (.130)
Share workers in trade .098 .082 .028
(.024) (.046) (.088)
Share of Foreign Born Population -.049 -.026 .002
(.014) (.041) (.088)
Unemployment rate -.097 -.085 -.110
(.028) (.034) (.060)
Share High School drop-outs (age 25+) -.019 .022 .095
(.009) (.025) (.038)
Owner occupied housing share -.029 .068 .068
(.014) (.024) (.056)
ln Median Family Income (real; 2000$) .007 .013 .050
(.007) (.011) (.028)








Year f.e. yes yes yes
Region f.e. yes no yes
MSA f.e. no yes yes
Estimate of  in error term (AR1) 0.04
Hansen's test (p-value) 0.364
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000
Obs. 864 864 576
Number of MSA 288 288 288
Adj. R-squared .996 .942
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%.
y All regressors were allowed to be predetermined and endogenous, and nite sample bias is corrected for.
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Table 2.3: Explaining Change in the Concentration of Skills: Amenities and Diversity
(a)
Share with a Bachelor's degree (age 25+) at t+10
OLS Within OLS Within Within Within
at t (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share with Bachelor's degree 1.148 .652 1.135 .533 .685 .447
(.014) (.057) (.016) (.053) (.068) (.079)
ln(population) .004 -.006 .005 -.005 .0003 .0007
(.0007) (.006) (.0006) (.007) (.008) (.006)
Unrelated Diversity Index .021 .047 .026
(.009) (.022) (.021)
Related Diversity index .005 .014 .008
(.007) (.012) (.012)
Competition Index .003 .004 .002
(.002) (.003) (.003)
Low-Skill Service * % Bachelor .051
(.012)
Low-Skill Service Estab. /1000 .003 .009 .005 -.007
(.001) (.003) (.002) (.003)
Labor organizations /1000 -.005 -.088 -.085 -.066
(.010) (.035) (.033) (.031)
Owner occupied housing share .004 .085 .091 .084
(.019) (.030) (.033) (.030)
Murder rate per 100,000 pop -.00006 .0004 .0004 .0004
(.0001) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Ethnical Diversity Index -.007 -.027 -.017 -.024
(.002) (.010) (.012) (.010)
Eating and Drinking Estab. /1000 .001 -.002
(.002) (.005)
Museum /1000 pop -.013 .004
(.069) (.089)
Health Institutions /1000 pop -.001 -.003
(.002) (.004)
ln Median House Val. (real; '00$) -.016 -.013
(.005) (.004)
Unemployment Rate -.074 -.139
(.047) (.036)
Share High School drop-outs (25+) .021
(.036)
% Population below Poverty Line -.037
(.059)
Year f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region f.e. yes no yes no no no
MSA f.e. no yes no yes yes yes
Katz & Murphy Index yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 576 576 575 575 576 576
Number of MSA 288 288 288 288
Adj. R-squared .966 .892 .968 .908 .914 .92
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%.
(b) Marginal Eects Corresponding to Regression (6) Above
Share with a Bachelor's degree (age 25+)
using: the mean values the maximum values
L.=lag (at t-10) mean (6): FE maximum (6): FE
L.Share with a Bachelor's degree (age 25+) 0.18 0.573 0.43 0.813
(0.064) (0.070)
L.Low-Skill Service * Share Bachelor's 0.050 0.050
(0.012) (0.012)
L.Low-Skill Service Establishments / 1000 2.47 0.0023 7.19 0.015
(0.0015) (0.003)
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Table 2.4: Low-Skilled Personal Service Labor, German Cities
Growth Rate Highly Skilled Labor
OLS Within Within 2step system-GMMy 2step system-GMMy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln total highly skilled labor -0.073*** -0.353*** -0.347*** -0.146*** -0.135***
(0.012) (0.036) (0.035) (0.046) (0.043)
ln % personal service labor 0.004 0.043** 0.031 0.153** 0.129**
(0.009) (0.020) (0.022) (0.073) (0.057)
ln total labor 0.090*** 0.227*** 0.180** 0.161*** 0.154***
(0.016) (0.068) (0.081) (0.060) (0.056)
average wage -0.002*** 0.003** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln % manufacturing labor 0.067 0.056 0.027
(0.053) (0.047) (0.045)
constant -0.273*** -0.163 0.280 -0.127 -0.332
(0.067) (0.571) (0.720) (0.402) (0.309)
Observations 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252
Adj. R2 0.18 0.30 0.30
cities 150 150 150 150 150
East Germany dummy yes yes yes yes yes
AR(1) test p-value 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test p-value 0.691 0.711
Hansen overid. test p-value 0.1140 0.6613
Di-Sargan overid. test p-value 0.1060 0.9880
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies included.  signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%; 
signicant at 1%.
y All regressors were allowed to be predetermined and endogenous. Standard errors are corrected for nite sample
bias.
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Table 2.5: Major Industry Groups and SIC Industry Content (1980 and 1990)
Major Industry Groups SIC code Description
1 07{ AGRICULTURAL SERVICES,FORESTRY,FISHERIES
2 10{ MINING
3 15{ CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION
4 2000 FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS
5 2100 TOBACCO MANUFACTURES
6 2200; TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS;
2300 APPAREL AND OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS
7 2400; LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS;
2500 FURNITURE AND FIXTURES
8 2600; PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS;
2700 PRINTING AND PUBLISHING
9 2800; CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS;
2900; PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS;
3000 RUBBER AND MISC. PLASTICS PRODUCTS
10 3200 STONE, CLAY, AND GLASS PRODUCTS
11 3300 PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES
12 3400 FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS
13 3500 MACHINERY, EXCEPT ELECTRICAL
14 3600 ELECTRIC AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
15 3700 TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT
16 3800 INSTRUMENTS AND RELATED PRODUCTS
17 3900 MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
18 40{ less 4800 TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER PUBLIC UTILITIES
19 4800 COMMUNICATION
20 50{ WHOLESALE TRADE
21 52{ RETAIL TRADE
22 60{ FINANCE, INSURANCE, AND REAL ESTATE
23 70{ SERVICES
24 99{ UNCLASSIFIED ESTABLISHMENTS
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The Eect of Skills on
Employment Growth: Adjusting




German metropolitan areas with large shares of highly skilled workers
have increased this share more than initially less educated cities between
1975 and 2003, and this has strong implications for urban employment
growth. Conventional estimates show that the share of college graduates
aects growth by the same magnitude as it does in American MSAs. How-
ever, we show that this gure is biased upwards because of endogeneity of
initial employment. Corrected estimates using lagged values as instruments
are closer to 0.5% employment growth for a 10% increase in the concentration
of graduates. The eect is robust to various controls across two data sets.
We additionally question that aggregate productivity growth is solely caused
by college graduates. After distinguishing between 6 dierent skill levels we
nd positive growth eects of high school graduates with vocational training,
especially if the local concentration of technical professionals is high. The
concentration of non-technical university graduates becomes more important
over time, but has less bearing on the marginal growth eects of other skill
groups. City success may thus depend on the `right' combination of skills
rather than college graduates in itself.
45
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3.1 Introduction
German metropolitan areas with large shares of highly skilled workers have increased this
share more than initially less educated cities between 1975 and 2003. Cities that were
very skilled in 1975, such as Munich, have seen the share of skilled workers increase much
more than initially less skilled cities such as Bremen. Figure 3.1 graphs this pattern for
West German metropolitan areas between 1975 and 2001. This observation, which we
call divergence, and the estimated eect on city employment growth are both remarkably
similar to well known ndings for American metropolitan areas (see for example Berry
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% highly skilled labor in 1975
 Fitted Values
Figure 3.1: Change in % Highly Skilled Labor (IAB Sample)
This chapter argues that the magnitude of the eect is however biased upwards,
because common estimators cannot properly control for the initial employment-size eect
when xed eects such as city characteristics correlate with both growth and initial size.
Recently developed GMM-IV techniques reveal that the eect is at least 30% smaller
for each of the two data sets. The chapter further argues that other skilled workers,
such as those with vocational training, also contribute signicantly to agglomerations'
employment growth. We also nd evidence of positive interaction between workers with
vocational training and graduates from technical colleges. The productivity enhancing
eect of non-technical college graduates is increasing over time, but their presence was
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of lesser in
uence to the productivity eect of workers with vocational skills.1
The size of the skill-growth eect for American cities is about 0.8% for every 10%
increase in the share of college educated workers as shown recently by Shapiro (2006).
S udekum (2006) moreover nds the same magnitude for West German counties. It it
therefore less surprising that we nd the same for West and East German metropolitan
areas (agglomeration of counties based on commuting time). However, Nickell (1981)
proved that regressions in which time-invariant unobserved characteristics aect both
growth and initial levels (i.e. initial employment size) lead to an downward bias in the
within-estimate of the initial employment size coecient, and an upward bias in the OLS
estimate. The true value should lie in between. Not correcting for this endogeneity bias
puts too much weight on the initial size eect and therefore also aects the estimation of
other controls, such as human capital. The bias is especially severe if the time dimension
of the panel is small as is typically the case with city employment data. GMM estimators
(Blundell and Bond, 1998) using lagged dierenced equations as additional instruments
can improve estimation and lead to dierent results. Recent versions of these estimators
can solve the weak instrument problem of high persistence in the lagged dependent
variable (see Bond (2002) and Windmeijer (2005)), as is the case with yearly and even
10-yearly urban employment panel data.2
We furthermore question whether college education is the only growth enhancing
type of human capital although it is commonly used as a measure of average local
productivity.3 A city with many college graduates and also a lot of unskilled labor
is not necessarily more skilled than a city with mostly workers with post-high school
vocational training. Bacolod, Blum and Strange (2007) moreover nd evidence that
cognitive skills rather than motor skills are enhanced by urbanization, something which
many workers with vocational training may also possess in a signicant amount. It
is therefore not a foregone conclusion that the share of college graduates is the best
indication of local productivity. Many cities focus on how to attract as many college
1For Germany it is not undisputed whether skill levels diverge or converge between cities (S udekum,
2006) and it seems to depend on what the denition of divergence is. We come back to this issue in
section 4.
2This has for example signicantly improved estimates of the eect of education on democracy
(Bobba, Coviello, 2007).
3Usually the productivity eect of skilled workers is looked upon from the viewpoint of wages (Rauch,
1993; Moretti, 2004) or whether or not workers receive higher wages if they are employed in a city (i.e.
Glaeser, Mar e, 2001). We will focus on the aggregate city productivity eect on city employment.
Employment has been persistently low compared to the labor force in Germany (high unemployment)
for some time.
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graduates as possible although a dierent mix of skills could also be a successful strategy.
In particular we hypothesize that workers with vocational training are more productive
among technical college graduates than among non-technical graduates because their
tasks are more similar. This facilitates better learning than from colleagues with the
same skill levels. The cognitive skills that are more typically found among technical
professionals can have benecial eects on other workers if companies employ them
both. Using average years of schooling would not pick up any skill interaction eects.
Apart from asking how much human capital is good for growth we want to ask the
additional question of which combination of skills is benecial. Our data set allows us
to dierentiate between 6 dierent levels of human capital ranging from no schooling to
university graduates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two adapts an illustrative
model. Section three discusses the econometric challenges and solutions after which
section four describes the data. Sections ve present our results on the size of the skill-
growth connection and section six expands the college graduate productivity measure
to include other skills and interactions. Section seven concludes.
3.2 An estimation framework
This section will brie
y derive the main question of how human capital aects em-
ployment growth. We consider a setting similar to the work by Glaeser et al. (1992)
and Simon (1998) in which each metropolitan area i is a separate small open economy.
They produce one good, which is freely traded nationally under perfect competition,
using labor Lit, and technology Ait at time t, using a production function Ait(Lit)1 ,
where 0 <  < 1. Firms sell the good for a num eraire price of 1. Following Glaeser et
al. (1992) we abstract from capital or land input because we cannot measure dierent
types of technological process with our data. Firms maximize prots taking technology,
prices, and wages wit as given. The wage rate (nominal and real) will thus equal its
marginal product:
wit = (1   )Ait(Lit) ; (3.1)

















As in Combes et al. (2004) we assume that labor is imperfectly mobile such that labor
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Perfect labor mobility would require wage growth to be a constant across cities, while
perfectly immobile labor would disconnect productivity from employment growth and
lead to wage growth instead.4 We could expand this framework to include quality of life
as in Shapiro (2006) and Glaeser et al. (1995). We do not observe quality of life however
and assume implicitly that most of it is captured by the xed eects, which include
important quality of life indicators such as climate and geography. The technology
Ait can have both national (t) and local components, where local components in turn
depend on city characteristics that may be both permanent (i) and time-varying in
nature. We assume that the local time-varying characteristics depend on human capital
Hit and other characteristics included in Xit such as total initial employment to capture
urbanization economies (local demand, labor pooling, interactions). Unobserved shocks






= 1Hi;t 1 + 2Xi;t 1 + i + t + i;t (3.4)









(1Hi;t 1 + 2Xi;t 1 + i + t + vi;t); (3.5)
where =(1 + ) is a positive parameter. The functional form of human capital Hit
is commonly a single variable such as the average or median schooling or the share of
workers with a college degree or higher.5 We will experiment also by including other
skill groups in H as well as interactions between skill groups.
3.3 Bias, endogeneity, weak instruments, and solutions
The common specication for estimating the skill-growth relation is given as follows
(reformulating eq. 3.5):
yi;t = ( + 1)yi;t 1 + Hi;t 1 + i + t + vi;t i = 1;:::;N; t = 1;:::;T (3.6)
where yi;t is lnLi;t, the natural logarithm of total employment in city i and year t.6
The i are (unobserved) city characteristics that do not change over time, such as for
4Imperfect mobility is supported by the nding that regional labor demand shocks trigger much less
migration in Germany than in the US between 1960 and 1987 (Decressin and Fat as, 1995). Moreover,
the gross migration rate between NUTS 2 regions has declined between 1983 and 1990, down to one
percent of the population, below rates for the UK. Also, 60% of migration is between neighboring regions
(Huber, 2004).
5As for example in Glaeser, Scheinkman, Shleifer (1995).
6We could have written yi;t = yi;t 1 + ::: instead.
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example access to a river (geography) or the existence of an airport. These may correlate
strongly with employment growth. vi;t is an error term which captures i.i.d. shocks to
employment growth. We further assume jj < 1 to rule out an explosive process.
Fixed eects such as whether or not a city has a port or if it used to be a mining
town have an eect on employment each year during the sample period. These eects
can also include institutions, culture and even climate. This means that employment is
not strictly exogenous: E[yi;t 1;i] > 0, and for the same reason: E[yi;t 1;vi;t 1] > 0.
Even if current shocks are not correlated with previous period employment size we will
still estimate a positively biased (OLS) coecient  because of the positive correlation
between the xed eects and initial employment. Moreover, this bias does not vanish
if the sample size increases in the time dimension. Nickell (1981) showed that also the
within transformation to get rid of the xed eects does not solve this problem. If we
dene ~ yi;t 1 = yi;t 1  1
T 1(yi1+:::+yi;T 1) and ~ vit = vit  1
T 1(vi2+:::+vi;T 1) and we
regress the transformed employment growth variables on employment and other controls
we will still have a positive correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the
disturbances. This is because the negative correlations between
 yit
T 1 and vit and
 vi;t 1
T 1




vi;t 1) < 0 ) (3.7)
E[~ yi;t 1; ~ vit] < 0 (3.8)
unless t ! 1
and therefor plimN!1 ~ Within <  and we estimate  with an downward bias. This
problem has not been addressed in the papers by Shapiro (2006) and Simon and Nar-
dinelli (2002), nor by Berry and Glaeser (2005) and Wheeler (2006) in the context of
employment growth of highly skilled labor in a panel setting.
A commonly used solution is to use rst-dierences of the system of equations to get
rid of the i and use lagged equation as instruments as in Arellano and Bond (1991).7
To do this the errors should not be serially correlated (E[visvit] = 0 for s 6= t), we need
predetermined initial conditions (E[yi1vit] = 0 for t = 2;:::;T) and E[i] = E[vit] =
E[ivit] = 0.8 A serious problem with this method is that  might be close to zero. In
our case this means that a city's employment size does not change much from year to
year and is thus very persistent.  then contains little predictive information about next
7We refer to this method as dierence-GMM (DGMM).
8AR(1) is introduced by construction. Note also that we do not require the initial conditions to be
strictly exogenous which would require E[yi1vit] = 0 8t. Strict exogeneity of all variables would result
in a consistent within estimate for large N and T.
Poelhekke, Steven (2008), Urban Growth Across Three Continents: The Blessing of Human Capital and the Curse of Volatility 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/18439Chapter 3. German Metropolitan Areas 51
year's employment size and is too weak as an instruments for employment growth, even
if it is exogenous. In nite samples this problem is even more severe and may bias the
estimate of the lagged dependent variable's coecient downward and even below the
Within estimate as we will demonstrate empirically further down. This important issue
is not always acknowledged in the context of urban employment growth. See for example
the similar dierence-GMM approach taken by Blien, S udekum and Wolf (2006), on local
sector employment growth, and Combes, Magnac, Robin (2004), on France, whom both
use very persistent yearly employment data. Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed to
expand the instrument set by including additional moment conditions by using lagged
rst-dierenced equations.9 With time dummies this additionally assumes that mean
employment evolves in a common way over time for all cities in the sample.
E[yi;t 1;(i + vit)] = 0 for t = 3;:::;T (3.9)
All these assumptions can be tested with common Sargan over-identication tests.
Windmeijer (2005) provides corrected standard errors for the twostep version of System-
GMM, which are otherwise too small.10
A further attractive feature of this method is that we have many instruments. Strong
and valid instruments are rare which makes solving the endogeneity issue dicult in
general. Our dynamic panel approach is to assume that lagged levels and lagged rst
dierenced equations are not correlated with the current period disturbances. This
means that the past concentration of skilled workers has no in
uence on the current shock
to employment growth after controlling for xed eects and other controls including the
current concentration of skills. Since the time length of our sample is long enough (> 3
periods) we have many instruments and the system is over-identied. Common Sargan
tests can tell us if the assumption of predetermined initial conditions is valid. There is
one pit-fall with having many instruments. If the set of instruments is much larger than
the number of cities (the N dimension) there is a risk of `over-tting' the data which
decreases the power of the Sargan tests. On the other hand, using more instruments
makes more ecient use of the available data. In general, if increasing the number of
instruments does not move the lagged dependent's estimatied coecient towards the
Within-estimate, then over-tting should not be a problem. See for example Bowsher
9We refer to this method as system-GMM (SGMM).
10Both DGMM and SGMM have one- and two-step versions which refers to the method of estimating
the weight matrix for GMM. One-step requires the assumption of homeskedastic vit disturbances, but
two-step estimation tends to de
ate the standard errors. We use the identity matrix as an initial guess
for the covariance matrix of idiosyncratic errors as in Blundell and Bond (1998). See Bond (2002) for
an overview.
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(2002).
3.4 German employment data
We need employment data on the very disaggregated level of counties.11 Two sources
provide such data: the German Statistical Agency (DESTATIS), publishes a `Statistik
Regional' (SR) database (2005), which provides consistent data on all 439 (East and
West) German counties from 1995 to 2003. These include all employed workers, ex-
cluding civil servants and the self-employed, subject to social security payments. This
data set is supplemented with educational attainment data of workers counted at place
of work from the Federal Oce for Building and Regional Planning (`Bundesamtes f ur
Bauwesen und Raumordnung', BBR) as well as local unemployment rates. These data
come from their DUVA database and follow the same denition as the DESTATIS data.
It distinguishes three levels of human capital. Employment of highly skilled labor is de-
ned as those with a degree of a specialized upper secondary school, specialized college
of higher education, or institution of higher education. Middle skilled workers are those
with apprenticeship or training on the job, qualication at a full-time vocational school
or at a trade or technical school. Lowest skilled workers are those without occupational
qualication. The highly skilled resemble the widely used measure of those with a bach-
elor degree or higher for US studies, but are likely slightly higher educated than the US
highly skilled and form a smaller share of employment.
A second source is the factually anonymous IAB Employment Sample (IABS) (Years
1975 - 2001). Data access was provided via a Scientic Use File supplied by the Research
Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for
Employment Research (IAB) (see Drews et al., 2006). It comprises a 2% random sample
of employees subject to social security payments.12 Although it has the drawback that
it is only a sample, it provides a long time series from 1975 to 2001 and distinguishes
between more distinct levels of human capital. In both data sets we observe that the
share of skilled workers has increased the most in those cities that were already ranked
as highly skilled at the start of the sample period: both from 1975-2001 and from 1995-
11These `Kreise' and `Kreisfreiest adte' (NUTS III regions) measure on average a quarter of the surface
size of US counties.
12We select a cross-section of individuals at date June 30th of each year, which corresponds to the
cross-section date of the SR sample, and aggregate (or average) variables within counties, which are
then aggregated (or averaged if applicable, with a weight by employment size) to metropolitan areas.
Other details: employment is counted as those with main employment (to prevent double counting),
with regional observations and those who are not apprentices.
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2003. However, we nd that the coecient of variation (=standard deviation/mean)
decreases over time as also reported in S udekum (2006) at the level of German counties.
The average skill level increases faster than the standard deviation rises across cities. He
labels this patterns as convergence. We dene divergence as an increase in the standard
deviation to stay close to Berry and Glaeser (2005) and because the share of skilled
workers in a city ultimately matters for its employment growth, rather than its relative
share to the country mean.13
Several German employment studies have used administrative boundaries rather
than economic agglomerations because statistical oces do not readily provide data
on the level of agglomerations.14 Since we want to measure urban human capital and
estimate its eect on urban employment growth we need to group the counties into
labor regions or agglomerations. By doing so we stay close to the commonly used US
statistical metropolitan area denition and circumvent bias arising from possible spatial
dependence. German labor market regions are dened by Eckey, Kosfeld and T urck
(2006) on the basis of commuting patterns (maximum commuting time of 45 to 60
minutes depending on the attractiveness of the center) and have a size of at least 50,000
inhabitants. This leads to 150 regions consisting of one or more counties that capture
the area where people both work and live.





The mean and standard deviation of the ratio of employed workers counted at place
of work over place of residence is 0.98 and 0.34 for the German counties, while only 0.96
and 0.07 for the labor regions, which is clearly an improvement in precision if we rely
on employed workers to measure a city's human capital.15
13Own calculations using data from the US Census reveals that the coecient of variation for skill
shares (bachelor's degree or higher) among US metropolitan areas has also decreased over time, from
.36 in 1970 to .30 in 2000 (the respective means (standard deviations) being 11% (4%) in 1970 and 24%
(7%) in 2000).
14See for example S udekum (2006) and Blien, S udekum and Wolf (2006).
15The city of Munich for example becomes a labor region of 12 counties. Similarly, the cities of Cologne
and Bonn really form only one agglomeration. Single county labor regions are mostly low density rural
areas. The labor regions are smaller than the NUTS II (`Bezirke') and NUTS I (`L ander': states) regions:
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Tables 2 to 5 provide descriptive statistics for the two data samples and the denition
for 6 skill groups in the IAB sample, where the units of observation are metropolitan
areas. Employment growth since 1995 has been distinctly lower than before and even
negative on average. The tables also show that there are important dierences in the
data between the former East and the former Western agglomerations. For example, the
East reports higher formal education levels yet worse growth performance. However, the
focus of this paper is not on dierences between East and West, but the statistics are
provided because the Eastern agglomerations enter the data in 1991 (IAB sample) and
1995 (SR sample) and thus show their relative weight in the data. The tables also show
that manufacturing has continued to be an important employer and has even expanded
as a share of employment in the former East. A competition index (see the next section)
larger than one means that there is more competition than on average nationally. The
diversity index (see also the next section) reaches its minimum at 0 and its maximum
at 2.77 (=  ln(1=16), 16 industry groups).
Table 3.2: Sample Employment Growth Rates
West East
mean sd mean sd
IAB Employment Growth (75-01) 1.5% 4.1% -1.1% 3.9%
SR Employment Growth (95-03) -0.1% 1.6% -2.7% 2.0%
We start the analysis with the Statistik Regional (SR) sample with population data
on all German counties from 1995 to 2003. Figure 3.2 shows that divergence of human
capital levels is also clear from this data source although only in West Germany. East
German skill levels are high compared to the West. Before unication it was standard
to acquire at least medium skills in the former East. Unemployment did not exist be-
cause each worker was assigned a job. The resulting over-employment and closure of
inecient plants led to sudden unemployment of many workers, while party members
also lost their job: many of which were highly skilled.16 The latter presumably had an
easier time to nd new employment (in the private sector) while medium skilled workers
likely moved West or waited for new employment opportunities. If the out-migration
of mainly medium skilled workers had been going on for some time prior to 1995, then
that might explain the relatively high share of high skilled workers in the East. We
will therefor include an East Germany dummy and experiment with an interaction term
these areas are administrative rather than economic in nature.
16Thanks to Matthias Hertweck for pointing this out to me.
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Table 3.3: SR Sample Descriptive Statistics
SR Sample 1995 (West) 2003 (West) 1995 (East) 2003 (East)
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
% highly skilled 5.4% 2.1% 7.3% 2.8% 9.9% 2.8% 10.6% 3.0%
% medium skilled 69.9% 3.3% 71.0% 3.6% 79.4% 3.0% 78.2% 3.5%
% lowest skilled 24.6% 3.5% 21.6% 3.0% 10.7% 1.4% 11.2% 1.4%
Total employment 195599 239145 195167 242877 164019 256398 134645 219147
% Manufacturing 30.2% 8.5% 28.4% 9.2% 11.7% 3.5% 15.2% 5.6%
Competition 1.34 0.46 1.26 0.44 0.79 0.27 1.10 0.39
Rel. % Pop. 25-35 1.03 0.05 1.02 0.07 0.92 0.05 0.93 0.07
Rel. % Pop. 35-45 0.98 0.04 1.01 0.04 1.07 0.04 0.98 0.05
Rel. % Pop. 45-60 0.99 0.06 0.98 0.03 1.03 0.04 1.07 0.03
Note: Manufacturing includes WZWG C to D (`Wirtschaftszweig', Industrial classication):
manufacturing and mining (no reliable separate series were available). Age distributions are
relative to the national average.
Table 3.4: IAB 2% Sample Descriptive Statistics
1975 (West) 2001 (West) 2001 (East)
mean sd mean sd mean sd
% level 6 1.2% 0.8% 4.6% 2.2% 7.1% 2.3%
% level 5 1.2% 0.5% 3.1% 0.9% 4.7% 0.9%
% level 4 0.6% 0.3% 5.5% 1.9% 4.5% 0.9%
% level 3 0.3% 0.2% 1.3% 0.7% 1.0% 0.5%
% level 2 57.0% 5.1% 69.4% 4.8% 75.5% 4.3%
% level 1 39.7% 5.8% 16.1% 2.8% 7.2% 1.2%
Total employment 3183 4056 4378 5261 3414 4586
% Manufacturing 46.2% 10.4% 32.9% 9.0% 19.9% 6.2%
Diversity 2.36 0.27 2.45 0.14 2.51 0.10
Average Age 34.1 1.1 39.2 0.5 40.0 0.4
Note: Manufacturing includes WZWG 2 to 6 (`Wirtschaftszweig', Industrial classi-
cation): (consumer) goods manufacturing, steel, machines, metal, transportation
manufacturing, processed foods. Total employment is a sample of individuals. Age
is averaged over metropolitan areas.
between Eastern agglomerations and the eect of skills on growth. Table 3.6 estimates
the eect of the concentration of highly skilled labor on total employment growth with
controls for initial employment (the lagged dependent variable), a dummy for the former
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Table 3.5: Skill denitions (IAB Sample)
Level Denition
6 University Degree (`Hochschule')
5 Technical college degree (`Fachhochschule')
4 High school degree and vocational training (`Abitur mit Berufsausbildung')
3 High school degree (`Abitur')
2 Vocational training (`Volks-,Haupt-,Realschule mit Berufsausbildung')
1 no degree (`ohne Berufsausbildung')
Note: A high school degree of the `Abitur' level qualies for university and technical college,
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Figure 3.2: Change in % Highly Skilled Labor (SR Sample)
Eastern agglomerations, and time dummies, as in equation (5).17 OLS estimates  to
be close to zero which means that employment is very persistent, although the within
transformation which accounts for city xed eects nds a rate of convergence of 8.2%
per year. The latter is biased downward and seems implausibly large in magnitude.
We do conrm that a 10% increase in the share of skilled labor leads to 0.8% more
employment growth, consistent with Shapiro (2006), while keeping in mind that initial
17Fixed eects regression furthermore control implicitly for density, because the initial employment
size coecient can be interpreted as the eect of a change in employment size relative to its period city
average for a constant city surface area. This change is perfectly correlated to a change in density.
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Table 3.6: SR Sample, 1995-2003
Yearly % total employment growth
OLS Within DGMM1 DGMM2 SGMM1 SGMM2 SGMM2r
At t-1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln % highly skilled labor .006 .084 .239 .223 .160 .175 .175
(.003) (.015) (.065) (.020) (.050) (.018) (.071)
ln total employment -.0009 -.082 -.283 -.269 -.065 -.077 -.077
(.001) (.017) (.085) (.021) (.022) (.009) (.032)
East Germany Dummy -.029 -.126 -.130 -.130
(.002) (.032) (.012) (.044)
Obs. 1200 1200 1050 1050 1200 1200 1200
AR(1) test, p-value .0007 3.85e-07 .001 2.05e-07 3.25e-07
AR(2) test, p-value .506 .748 .194 .043 .067
AR(3) test, p-value .489 .366 .592 .228 .235
Sargan over-id. test, p-val. .84 .0008 .999 .0001 .0001
Di-Sargan test, p-value .386 .213 .213
Adj. R2 .561 .503
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.  signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant
at 1%. Time dummies included. Column 7 uses the Windmeijer (2005) robust standard errors and the last digit
in the column names refers to 1- and 2-step estimation.
employment size is endogenous. The third column uses lagged level equations as instru-
ments and assumes homoskedasticity (Dierence-GMM, one-step). Also allowing for
heteroskedastic errors (two-step) does not perform well as  is now even much smaller,
while the true value should lie in between the OLS and Within estimate. We clearly have
a weak instrument problem. the fth and sixth columns therefore employ also lagged
dierenced equations. These perform much better. The errors in column 6 are too small
but correcting them in column 7 still yields signicant estimates. The Dierence-Sargan
(D-Sargan) test for exogeneity of the additional System GMM moment conditions (see
equation 3) is passed with condence. However, the overall Sargan test fails and we
cannot properly identify . This means that also the coecient on highly skilled labor
may be biased. Moreover, this regression does not capture other possible determinants
of employment growth, such as the industrial mix. Next, we control for such omitted
variable bias.
Table 3.7 adds more controls (and hence also more instruments). Centers of man-
ufacturing may have had a dierent growth experience while possibly attracting less
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Table 3.7: Robustness SR Sample, 1995-2003
Yearly % total employment growth
OLS Within SGMM2r
At t-1 (1) (2) (3)
ln % highly skilled labor .005 .088 .043
(.002) (.018) (.013)
ln % Highly skilled  East Dummy .001 .006
(.005) (.024)
ln % medium skilled labor .008 -.038 -.040
(.015) (.062) (.093)
ln total employment .0004 -.186 -.018
(.001) (.020) (.006)




% pop. age 25-35 .010
(.041)
% pop. age 35-45 -.057
(.066)
% pop. age 45-60 -.137
(.061)
East Germany Dummy -.016 -.011
(.012) (.057)
Obs. 1039 1039 1187
AR(1) test, p-value .0002
AR(2) test, p-value .09
AR(3) test, p-value .104
Sargan over-id. test, p-val. .301
Di-Sargan test, p-value .882
Adj. R2 .624 .558
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.  signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at
1%. Time dummies included. Column 3 uses the Windmeijer (2005) robust standard errors and 2-step estimation.
highly skilled labor. Competition is added to capture the eect of local industry struc-
ture. There is a long-standing debate fueled by Glaeser et al. (1992) and Henderson et
al. (1995) as to whether an industry grows faster if the local environment is competi-
tive, diverse, specialized, or a combination of those three.18 We do not observe enough
industry information in the SR sample to include diversity or specialization save for the
share of manufacturing. We measure competition as the local average number of em-
ployees per rm divided by the national average number of employees per rm. The age
distribution of employees (relative to the national average) might be relevant because
the education level reported is based on the highest acquired degree. With progressive
18See Duranton, Puga (2004) for an extensive overview of this literature.
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advancement of technology it might be that a worker with a recent degree is actually
more skilled than a worker with a degree from 30 years earlier. Young employees might
thus be more productive. Medium skilled workers contain workers with a level of ed-
ucation that could be considered of equivalent to college level in the US (trade and
technical schooling). These controls improve identication as column 3 shows. We nd
a plausible rate of conditional employment convergence of 1.8%, and a positive eect
of highly skilled labor, which is however now smaller at 0.4% for a 10% increase in the
concentration skilled workers (which is not dierent in the former East). The Sargan
and dierence-Sargan tests are passed at standard condence levels. Since we nd some
weak evidence for AR(2) we only use lags 3 and up as instruments. The competition
variable did not aect our results. Cities with a higher share of persons between 45 and
60 years of age do tend to grow slower. Omitting the age variables would have given us
a high skilled workers eect of 0.36%, which is only slightly smaller.
Table 3.8 repeats the exercise for the longer IAB sample, covering the years 1975-
2001. S5+6 refers to skill levels 5 and 6 (see Table 3.5 in the previous section) which
is equivalent to highly skilled labor in the SR sample. S2+3+4 refers to middle skilled
labor. The IAB sample allows us to add a measure of local industry diversity as a
control to account for the possibility of diversity or specialization being benecial to
growth. We dene diversity as minus the natural logarithm of the sum of 16 squared










where S = 1;:::;16 is our set of 16 industries in city i at time t. This Herndahl-type
index is very similar to the diversity indices used in Glaeser et al. (1992) and Combes,
Magnac and Robin (2004), except that we focus on city employment growth rather
than industry employment growth. The IAB sample unfortunately does not contain
representative information at the county level on the number of rms. We include the
average age of employees within a city to account for the possibly negative age eect.
The same basic patterns holds. After correcting for endogeneity of initial employ-
ment in columns 3 and 6 (with more controls) we conclude that the eect of highly
skilled labor on employment growth is smaller than previously reported. A 10% higher
share of skilled labor leads to 0.43% more employment growth. The initial employment
size variable now lies between the OLS and Within estimates and the Sargan tests are
passed meaning that the GMM estimator is well specied. Diversity enters with a neg-
ative sign, which means that less diverse cities tend to grow faster in Germany, as do
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Table 3.8: IAB Sample, 1975-2001
Yearly % total employment growth
OLS Within SGMM2r OLS Within SGMM2r SGMM2r
At t-1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln S5+6 -.0008 .003 .059 .002 .006 .043 .025
(.002) (.004) (.017) (.001) (.004) (.018) (.013)
ln total employment -.003 -.035 -.030 -.0009 -.042 -.003 -.019
(.0007) (.008) (.007) (.0005) (.008) (.006) (.017)
ln S2+3+4 .008 .036 .236 .106
(.008) (.020) (.061) (.051)
ln % manufacturing .004 -.012 .033 .008
(.002) (.012) (.013) (.031)
Diversity index -.0007 -.027 -.076 -.012
(.002) (.008) (.024) (.017)
Average worker age -.005 .002 -.016 .0003
(.0005) (.001) (.004) (.004)
East Germany Dummy -.028 -.061 -.024 -.030 -.045
(.002) (.011) (.002) (.013) (.025)
Obs. 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252
AR(1) test, p-value 3.61e-20 1.42e-19 1.24e-19
AR(2) test, p-value .415 .773 .69
Sargan over-id. test, p-val. .419 .593 -
Di-Sargan test, p-value 1.000 1.000 -
Adj. R2 .721 .729 .729 .731
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.  signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant
at 1%. Time dummies included. Columns 3 and 6 use the Windmeijer (2005) robust standard errors and 2-step
estimation. Column 7 uses all available instruments.
cities with an increasing share of manufacturing.19 As in the SR sample we nd that
an older work force tends to lead to less employment growth. Recently acquired de-
grees seem to be more important than experience. We also nd evidence that middle
skilled workers aect employment growth positively and strongly, which warrants fur-
ther investigation in the next section. Lastly, we include column 7 where we appeal to
the eciency argument and use all the information available. We include all lags of the
variables in the instrument set so that we have 1975 instruments for 150 agglomerations.
At the downside, the Sargan tests are now unavailable due to over-tting (the lagged
dependent variable's coecient has moved in the direction of the within estimate), so
we cannot test the validity of the instruments. The skill eects are still there but are
19Blien, S udekum and Wolf (2006) nd a positive eect of diversity on industry employment, and
a lagged negative eect. Our negative eect is robust to using their diversity measure (the measures
correlate by 0.81; coecient of -0.12*** in that case, available on request). It appears that employment
in metropolitan areas benets from overall specialization, even though industries may benet from
surrounding diversity on a smaller geographical scale. Since we use metropolitan areas as observations
instead of counties and industries these results should be seen as complementary.
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slightly smaller.
3.5 Growth and skill interactions
This section explores whether or not the share of college graduates is the most appro-
priate skill denition to capture education's aggregate productivity eect. Figure 3.3
graphs the average share of skilled workers across all agglomerations over time, for 6
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Figure 3.3: Change in Skill Concentration Over Time (IAB Sample, West Germany)
also issue Master's degrees. The dierence with a university (which provides other dis-
ciplines) is that they do not award PhDs. There is furthermore no clear dierence in
educational level between levels one and three, except that `Abitur' allows a student
to enter schools of levels ve and six. By far the largest shares are taken up by the
lowest two schooling levels (upper two lines in the graph), of which the share of workers
without a degree is steadily decreasing over time. The left scale is in logs, so the fastest
relative increase in education was among level four: high school + vocational training
(dotted line).
Table 3.9 dierentiates between more than two skill levels. Unskilled labor is the
20Because reporting of skill levels about their workers is done by companies themselves there are some
inconsistencies. We used imputation method IP3 as described in Fitzenberger, Osikominu and V olter
(2005) to make sure that the highest attained degree did not decrease over time for the same worker.
This may overreport the skill level but it yielded more similar skill levels compared to the SR sample
for the years 1995-2001 than other imputation methods or the raw data.
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Table 3.9: Skill Interactions (IAB Sample, 1975-2001)
Yearly % total employment growth (SGMM2r estimator)
interactions with: S5+6 S5 S6 S5+6 & time trend
At t-1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln S5+6 .063 .160 -.025 .013
(.014) (.042) (.019) (.038)
ln S5 .060 .013
(.045) (.010)
ln S6 .017 .077
(.008) (.032)
ln S2+4 .073 1.008 1.119 .928 .143 -.015
(.048) (.235) (.284) (.219) (.064) (.308)
ln S3 -.017 -.018 -.046 -.027 .037 .038
(.005) (.020) (.030) (.019) (.007) (.007)
ln total employment -.023 -.025 -.014 -.015 -.038 -.037
(.006) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.009) (.009)
ln S5+6 * ln S2+4 .250 .007
(.060) (.080)
ln S5+6 * ln S3 -.001
(.007)
ln S5 * ln S2+4 .240
(.063)
ln S5 * ln S3 -.009
(.007)
ln S6 * ln S2+4 .190
(.048)
ln S6 * ln S3 -.003
(.005)
ln S56 * time trend .003
(.0007)
ln S5+6 * ln S2+4 * time trend -.003
(.0009)
time trend .007 .0003
(.002) (.001)
Obs. 3207 3207 3204 3204 3207 3207
AR(1) test, p-value 5.19e-19 9.84e-18 4.59e-19 1.30e-18 2.82e-18 3.35e-18
AR(2) test, p-value .72 .666 .839 .791 .063 .055
Sargan over-id. test, p-val. .407 .332 .34 .361 .227 .215
Di-Sargan test, p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
ln Sx denotes the ln of the share of workers of skill level(s) x. Windmeijer (2005) robust standard errors in
parentheses (two-step estimation).  signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%. East
Germany dummy included, and time dummies in columns 1 to 4..
reference skill level as it is the only level that has decreased over time. All other shares
have increased but unequally so across cities, leading to various growth experiences.
We group levels two and four together because both list vocational training as tertiary
education. Column 2 nds a positive interaction eect between high skilled labor and
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workers with vocational training (ln S5+6 * ln S2+4) and no interaction eect with high
school graduates. The marginal eect of vocationally trained workers on employment
growth depends on the share of skilled workers in a city:21
@yit
@ln S2+4
= 1 + 2  ln S5+6 (3.11)
The standard errors follow as:
s.e. =
q
V ar(^ 1) + (ln S5+6)2 + V ar(^ 2) + 2(ln S5+6)Cov(^ 1; ^ 2) (3.12)
where we estimate yit = yi;t 1+1ln S2+4i;t 1+2ln S5+6 * ln S2+4i;t 1+controls+
i + vit and ^ 1 = 1:008 and ^ 2 = :25. Using this calculation for all the sample values of
ln S5+6 we nd that the eect of workers with vocational training is signicant across
all observed values of the share of highly skilled workers, although it nears insignicance
as the share of skilled workers becomes high in the sample. Columns 3 and 4 show
that the positive interaction between the highly skilled and workers with vocational
training is stronger for graduates of technical colleges than for university graduates.
Presumably the former two are closer in terms of knowledge which facilitates better
learning and hence larger productivity eects on employment growth. Columns 5 and
6 show that the eect of highly skilled labor interacts positively with a time trend,
indicating that the eect of highly skilled labor is increasing over time. Moreover, the
interaction between the trend and the ln S5+6 ln S2+4 interaction term shows that
the spillovers on workers with vocational training decreases over time. This is consistent
with our nding that the productivity eect of these workers nears insignicance as the
share of skilled workers becomes high. These eect are robust to including controls for
the local industry structure and age of the work force (see Table 3.10 in the appendix).
As a second robustness test we exclude those workers that are in training. Many of
the vocational training school include `on the job' training which might increase the
measured share of this human capital group while their eect on productivity might be
lower in reality. Comparing Table 3.5 and Table 3.11 shows that some workers without
formal education (level 1) and those with only high school (level 3) were in training while
at their job. However, Table 3.12 in the appendix does not nd qualitatively dierent
results.
21By the same reasoning the marginal eect of ln S5+6 will now depend on the sample values of the
other skill groups and cannot be interpreted directly.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper has shown that well known estimates of the size of the skills-growth eect are
biased because endogeneity of the initial employment size is not suciently accounted
for when xed eects matter for both growth and initial city characteristics. Adjusting
the estimates using two data-sets on German metropolitan areas and recently improved
dynamic panel GMM techniques shows that the eect is signicant but 30% smaller.
We have also demonstrated that other skill groups matter for growth, namely those
with vocational training. We nd robust evidence that technical college graduates such
as engineers interact positively with workers with vocational training and reinforce the
latter's positive eect on employment growth. This eect is slightly decreasing over time
however, while non-technical university graduates are becoming more important. City
success may depend on the right combination of skills and not only on the percentage
of college graduates. Micro-data at the rm level may shed more light on this link in
the future.
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Appendicies
3.A Robustness
Table 3.10: Skill Interactions with Additional Controls (IAB Sample, 1975-2001)
Yearly % total employment growth (SGMM2r estimator)
interactions with: S5 S6 S5+6 & time trend
At t-1 (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln S5 .043 .025
(.055) (.013)
ln S6 .023 .072
(.010) (.039)
ln S2+4 1.932 1.418 .323 -.466
(.398) (.300) (.075) (.355)
ln S3 -.096 -.048 .038 .036
(.033) (.025) (.007) (.006)
ln total employment -.013 -.017 -.031 -.030
(.007) (.006) (.009) (.009)
ln S5 * ln S2+4 .390
(.086)
ln S5 * ln S3 -.025
(.008)
ln S6 * ln S2+4 .265
(.059)
ln S6 * ln S3 -.012
(.007)
ln S5+6 * time trend .006
(.001)
time trend .015 .005
(.002) (.002)
ln S5+6 * S2+4 * time trend -.007
(.001)
ln S5+6 * ln S2+4 -.124
(.092)
ln % manufacturing -.010 .012 .087 .074
(.023) (.023) (.026) (.022)
Diversity index -.106 -.082 -.032 -.049
(.030) (.027) (.030) (.030)
Average worker age -.015 -.010 .0005 -.0005
(.005) (.004) (.003) (.003)
Obs. 3204 3204 3207 3207
AR(1) test, p-value 5.86e-19 3.87e-18 1.58e-17 1.46e-17
AR(2) test, p-value .739 .819 .075 .068
Sargan over-id. test, p-val. .374 .371 .176 .169
Di-Sargan test, p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
ln Sx denotes the ln of the share of workers of skill level(s) x. Windmeijer (2005) robust standard errors in
parentheses (two-step estimation).  signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%. East Germany
dummy included, and time dummies in columns 1 and 2.
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Table 3.11: Skill Shares Without Workers in Training (IAB Sample)







Note: 2001 includes East Germany.
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Table 3.12: Without Workers in Training (IAB Sample, 1975-2001)
Yearly % total employment growth (SGMM2r estimator)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln S5+6 .052 -.057 .043
(.017) (.024) (.048)
ln S5 .374 .046
(.071) (.019)




ln S2+4 1.815 1.118 .521 .572
(.456) (.288) (.102) (.407)
ln S3 .144 .094 .064 .070
(.035) (.024) (.007) (.008)
ln total employment -.005 -.025 -.025 -.035 -.041
(.006) (.009) (.008) (.012) (.012)
ln S5+6 * ln S2+4 .092
(.106)
ln S5 * ln S2+4 .353
(.100)
ln S5 * ln S3 .034
(.009)
ln S6 * ln S2+4 .193
(.058)
ln S6 * ln S3 .022
(.006)
ln S5+6 * time trend .006
(.001)
time trend .013 .0007
(.003) (.002)
ln S5+6 * S2+4 * time trend -.006
(.002)
ln % manufacturing .033 .037 .055 .091 .089
(.014) (.024) (.022) (.026) (.025)
Diversity index -.072 -.077 -.056 -.045 -.060
(.026) (.041) (.036) (.035) (.040)
Average worker age -.016 -.012 -.009 -.006 -.005
(.003) (.007) (.007) (.004) (.004)
Obs. 3250 3115 3115 3117 3117
AR(1) test, p-value 3.43e-15 1.57e-16 5.32e-07 1.53e-15 7.20e-15
AR(2) test, p-value .670 .943 .671 .077 .068
Sargan over-id. test, p-val. .605 .481 .695 .186 .165
Di-Sargan test, p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
ln Sx denotes the ln of the share of workers of skill level(s) x. Windmeijer (2005) robust standard errors in
parentheses (two-step estimation).  signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%. East Germany
dummy included, and also time dummies in column 1.




Urban Growth, Uninsured Risk,
and the Rural Origins of
Aggregate Volatility
Synopsis
The proportion of the population living in urban areas has increased by
over ve percentage points per decade outside the developed world since
1960. Rapid urbanization was accompanied by fast economic growth and
job creation in most parts of the world. However, Africa (and Latin America
after 1980) has had a notably dierent experience: while growth in GDP
per capita slowed signicantly or even reversed, the rate of urbanization
continued its fast pace. This paper aims to explain this by introducing an
aggregate risk dierential between the countryside and the city. Uninsur-
able expected risk will lead to rural-urban migration as a form of ex-ante
insurance if households are liquidity constrained in incomplete markets and
cannot overcome adverse shocks. Macroeconomic volatility nds its origins
in risk-prone natural resource production including agriculture and has a
robust positive eect on urban growth, especially when economic growth is
slow. The eect exists in addition to the transitional view on urbanization
of economies shifting from an agricultural to an industrial base.
4.1 Introduction
The level of urbanization has increased by over ve percentage points per decade outside
the developed world since 1960. As a result, sometime this year the world will have more
urban inhabitants than rural dwellers. Rapid urbanization was accompanied by fast
economic growth in most parts of the world. However, Africa (and Latin America after
1980) has had a notably dierent experience (Fay, Opal, 2000) as is shown in Figure
4.1. While growth in GDP per capita slowed signicantly or even reversed, the rate
of urbanization continued its normal fast pace. Table 4.1 ranks regions by the growth
dierential between national and urban population. Given the low GDP per capita
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growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is surprising that it comes on top in terms of the pace
of urbanization. Without growth to create jobs or higher wages in cities (such as in East
Asia) it seems puzzling that so many rural dweller choose to become urban dwellers.
Most people end up in slums which do not necessarily oer better living conditions than
rural areas for a given income (UN-Habitat, 2006). The long time period and crowding
should lower the expected income gain from moving to the city. Big city lights are not
always bright. It seems that the continued migration 
ows in some parts of the world are
larger and more persistent than the classic Harris-Todaro (1970) model can explain. An
illustration is given by Equatorial Guinea, a Sub-Saharan African country. Between 1990
and 1995 its urban population grew 12 percent faster than the national population, yet
GDP per capita and manufacturing value added were declining on average by 9 percent
and 7 percent per year respectively.
Apart from being pulled to the city by a higher income promise, people may also be
pushed from the rural area. If living conditions worsen in the countryside because sources
of income decline (for example by natural causes such as rainfall or con
icts) then people
will move to cities even if urban economic growth is absent, because it is the only place
to go with at least some chance of improvement. Even if rural life exhibits good as well
as bad years then people are still pushed o the land and to the city in bad years, unless
they have the nancial means to smooth consumption and `ride out the bad times'. The
more volatile shocks are, the more likely it is that suciently bad years occur that wipe
out savings. Natural resource production and the exogenous prices they fetch on the
world market show very volatile behavior (Deaton, 1999). Financial services to insure
against shocks are relatively absent in rural areas (Collier, Gunning, 1999). Return
migration in good years is limited by population growth, but also because good years
oer more urban employment. Sub-Saharan Africa was the most volatile region during
the past 45 years and also very resource dependent, as Table 4.1 shows.1 Our example
of Equatorial Guinea did not suer from war or con
ict in the 1990s, but output growth
volatility in the agricultural sector (62% of all value added) was a worrying 27 percent
and the standard deviation of yearly GDP per capita growth rates a similarly high 24
percent! The negative agricultural growth shock of 29 percent in 1993 (while world food
export prices had been declining for three years) may well have pushed farmers to cities
to nd alternative income sources, if they could not use nancial instruments to wait
for next year's positive shock of 44 percent. Risk was evidently high.
This paper will try to explain urbanization occurring even under negative growth,
by including another feature of many developing countries: their dependence on natu-
1See appendix section 4.A for data sources.
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ral resource production and consequent shocks to GDP growth. Figure 4.2 shows the
dependence of four regions on resource exports over time. Notably Africa and Latin
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Figure 4.2: Resource Dependence
Table 4.1: Economic and Urban Growth by Region (yearly %, 1960-2005)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP/capita % Population growth Nat. resource % Urban
growth exp. value/GDP
mean sd urban total (3)-(4) mean 1960 2005
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.85 6.93 5.25 2.54 2.71 17.37 13.50 36.25
South Asia 2.40 2.70 3.97 2.12 1.85 5.05 13.00 23.92
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 2.98 4.54 2.84 1.30 1.53 3.83 32.85 60.50
East Asia & Pacic 3.39 4.13 3.31 1.84 1.48 16.04 42.62 64.31
Middle East & North Africa 1.78 5.75 3.96 2.84 1.12 11.48 42.27 65.17
Latin America & Caribbean 1.44 4.11 3.10 2.00 1.10 13.96 42.16 66.10
Western Europe 2.78 2.52 1.22 0.57 0.65 7.54 59.35 75.53
North America 2.28 1.88 1.53 1.17 0.36 5.82 69.55 80.45
Note: Ordered on column 5. Means (or standard deviations) are calculated as the within-region cross-country
unweighed average (or standard deviation) of country-time-period average growth rates (or standard deviations).
Recent work has explained the dierent African experience by using rainfall data
(Barrios et al., 2006) and shown that low rain fall (low agricultural productivity) is
associated with a higher contemporary level of urbanization. Fay and Opal (2000) and
Davis and Henderson (2003) identify government policy resulting in `urban bias' and
articially high urban wages as an important cause for high levels of urbanization, in
combination with urban poverty. Other explanations are ethnic tensions, democracy
(more regional autonomy, so less urban bias), less than average agricultural yield (which
is related to rainfall), and changes in the ve-year average ratio of producer prices of
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wheat, rice, and maize to the country's CPI (which is often used as a proxy for rural to
urban terms of trade), and to the world prices. We will add to this literature by focusing
on volatility in output (standard deviation of GDP per capita growth), and volatility in
the value of natural resources. We believe that the uncertainty associated with shocks
around ve-year means is more important than average changes themselves. We will
show that these shocks originate mostly from rural (resource) sectors rather than urban
(manufacturing) sectors and that the resource sector tends to be more risky. Figure
4.3 shows cumulative density functions for four resources, and general price indices
for industrial countries and the world. The x-axis shows the size of yearly standard
deviations in percentage monthly price index changes. It is clear for example that a
country with a high dependence on food products faces much more volatile prices than
the average industrial country which typically trades in manufactures. Moreover, food
prices are almost as volatile as oil prices. This prompted large price stabilization schemes
in the 1970s which had many pitfalls and adverse side eects as studied in Newbery and
Stiglitz (1981). Figure 4.4 plots the same resource price indices over time in levels.
There are clearly very volatile periods and periods in which the price is much more
stable. The volatility of output shocks is primarily caused by volatility in non-urban
sectors, such as the natural resource sector. We will furthermore primarily focus on the
speed of urbanization rather than the level and hypothesize that urban growth is faster
in more volatile periods, especially if average growth is low. Shocks around a low or
negative growth rate are probably worse than shocks around a high and positive growth
rate.
Stark and Levhari (1982) rst noted the role of uncertainty and risk as a motive
to migrate (for some family members). Daveri and Faini (1999) have estimated this
motive for Italian migrants within Italy and internationally, and conclude that risk is
a signicant determinant, driven by risk aversion. Dustmann (1997) similarly models
the duration of migration as it is determined by risk at home and abroad, and the
(intertemporal) covariance of labor market shocks in addition to a wage dierential. For
example, a temporary migrant may diversify risk if the covariance of shocks is negative.
We will try to link this motive to a country's natural resource dependence and income
risk in rural and urban sectors to explain fast rates of urban growth.
The next section describes the means by which households may cope with risk and
how successful they are. Section three models households' migration behavior in re-
sponse to shocks and section four discusses the estimation strategy. Sections ve and
six describe the results and assess their robustness, after which section seven concludes.
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Figure 4.4: Price Index Plots (Monthly, Labels at January of Each Year)
4.2 Households and risk insurance
In industrialized countries households can deal with risk by buying nancial services
such as a savings and checking accounts, (unemployment) insurance, pensions, bonds,
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and loans, allowing them to smooth consumption over time. Most of these services are
however beyond the reach of most people in developing countries, especially outside the
urban environment where few if any of these services are provided. Even inside cities
a dual economy exists, the formal and the informal one, both in terms of labor and
in terms of housing (see i.e. Temple, 2005). Slum dwellers will nd it much harder
to smooth consumption because they cannot provide collateral or a credit history. We
are therefore in a situation of incomplete markets which aect not only households' (ex
post) income, but also their (ex ante) behavior.
Insurance may partly be obtained by various informal means, as described in Besley
(1995). We distinguish ex post risk sharing which usually happens at the village level
among households. It takes the form of (cross-sectional) transfers which pool risk and
income and provide insurance against idiosyncratic shocks but requires strong informa-
tion and enforcement institutions within the community (Udry, 1990). However, the
larger the covariance of shocks among households, the less scope there is for this form of
insurance. Aggregate community shocks can not be insured against. Townsend (1994)
and others2 nd that Pareto ecient risk pooling is often not achieved. Transfers across
time may provide additional insurance, but Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) nd
that this is also limited because of credit constraints. Moreover, it leads households to
choose less risky investment projects with a lower return, which has an adverse eect on
productive eciency.3 Accumulation of buer stocks, often in the form of bullocks, may
also be used to smooth consumption (Deaton, 1991), but this may also aect produc-
tion if these assets are used in production (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993) and is thus a
sub-optimal insurance method.
Households can also cope with risk by changing their behavior in such a way that
they minimize the chance of bad shocks hitting them in anticipation of risk. This is
referred to as ex ante insurance and takes the form of conservative investment decisions,
such as postponing adoption of new risky technology, crop diversication, crops of lower
yields but faster growth cycles, diversifying family members among dierent income
activities, or sharecropping. It is also related to remittances and risk diversication by
means of assigning family members to work in a dierent area, country or sector such
as in Stark and Lucas (1988), although we do not believe that this alone can account
for the high speed of urbanization. The relative importance of ex ante risk insurance is
2See Bardhan and Udry, 1999.
3Risk usually commands a higher return because otherwise the project would never be started, but
in a rural development country setting risk might be high even with low return if social and nan-
cial constraints limit the ability to change predetermined investments, such as being born on a family
(subsistence) farm.
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shown by Elbers et al. (2005). They use micro data to quantify the ex post and ex ante
eects of risk on capital accumulation and nd that two-thirds of the detrimental eect
of risk is due to the ex ante type which in
uences households behavioral decisions.
Since we focus on aggregate shocks which are uninsurable by the local informal ex
post methods we assume that ex ante risk insurance is an important response to, for
example, world resource price shocks. We hypothesize that migration is the link between
risk and urban growth because it is the ex ante response to aggregate rural income risk.
4.3 Model of ex-ante risk insurance
The theoretical reason to look at volatility as an explanation for urbanization is derived
as follows. Representative workers are either employed in an urban manufacturing sector
M, the urban informal sector I or in the rural resource sector R.4 The resource sector
may produce agriculture, mining or plantation products such as coee, and is assumed to
be the only source of income and employment outside the city. The national composition
of output in these sectors is also translated into output growth volatility (its standard
deviation). We will show that output volatility originates to an important extend from
shocks to the exogenous world prices for exports including manufactures and natural
resources, the latter of which are more volatile. The more total GDP depends on resource
export earnings, the higher will be the covariance between GDP growth shocks and
resource prices. Shocks are larger and more frequent in the rural resource sector than
in the urban manufacturing sector.5 Furthermore, the urban sector typically has better
access to nancial services to insure against shocks, while the rural agricultural sector
is additionally aected by weather shocks. It is therefore reasonable to assume that
production and employment in the rural sector is inherently more risky than employment
in the urban manufacturing sector even though its return is not necessarily higher.
Some periods are more volatile than others and a country's development over time may
change the dependence on resources and its ability to cope with external shocks. A time
dimension is therefore also important. The goal of this model is to analyze the eect of
a risk dierential on workers' location choice.
A representative worker6 faces a migration choice every period and simultaneously a
4The `sector' of subsistence farming is not explicitly modeled because it is aected mostly by weather
shocks, rather than by price shocks.
5Unfortunately, we will not be able to distinguish between urban and rural GDP growth and shocks,
we only observe changes in aggregate GDP. We assume instead that manufactures are produced exclu-
sively in cities and agriculture and resources outside cities.
6We will not distinguish between migration of a single worker or of a household since we rely on
aggregate data.
Poelhekke, Steven (2008), Urban Growth Across Three Continents: The Blessing of Human Capital and the Curse of Volatility 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/18439Chapter 4. Urban Growth & Uninsured Risk 77
choice between sectors.7 Household face a liquidity constraint every period because we
assume that nancial markets are underdeveloped, especially in the rural and informal
urban sectors. Lack of collateral or a credit history (and incomplete markets) prohibits
borrowing such that in every period the value of assets At plus expected income yt
should be larger than consumption ct and the optional cost of migration  (which is
positive only if a household decides to move, zero otherwise).
At + yt   ct   t  0 (4.1)
Income yt depends on the previous period's `portfolio' choice (zt 1 2 f0;1g) of the
household which corresponds to a choice of sector and hence of location.8 We call
z = 1 rural and z = 0 urban. Because each location has a perfectly competitive sector
people can always nd either formal or informal employment in the city.9 We assume
additionally that each sector faces a dierent degree of aggregate (multiplicative) income
risk. Income is therefore a function of exogenous shocks taking place in the rural sector
t  N(1;2
) with unit mean and variance 2
 and in the urban sector t  N(1;2
),
with known joint density function f(;). Income thus also depends on the previous-
period location choice zt 1: yt = y(zt 1;t;t). Income is increasing in the size of
the shocks: @yt=@t > 0 if zt 1 = 1 and, 0 otherwise; and @yt=@t > 0 if zt 1 = 0,
and 0 otherwise.10 Income is increasing in the choice of the rural sector when rural
times are good (@2yt=@t@zt 1 > 0), but decreasing if the urban sector enjoys good
times (@2yt=@t@zt 1 < 0). It is therefore crucial to form expectations on the relative
riskiness of both sectors to make a choice of location. We assume that the urban sector
is less risky such that 2
 < 2
.
Households maximize a discounted 
ow of expected utility from consumption subject







s:t: At+1 = (1 + rt)(At + yt   ct   ) (4.3)
7This section builds heavily on a standard risk and insurance model with a precautionary savings
motive (as in Mirrlees, 1965; Deaton, 1991), see Bardhan and Udry (1999). In these models households
make choices between dierent investments with dierent risk and return. Here we add the possibility
that location is a choice and that each location promises a dierent stream of income.
8We could also make this choice continuous. In that case the household chooses its distance to the
nearest city and thus access to an external market with means of diversication, but this would not
change our main results. See for example Brueckner and Zenou (1999) for an urbanization model with
a land market.
9We abstract from any unemployment benets.
10This is only if rural and urban shocks are uncorrelated. If they are imperfectly positively correlated
then a rural shock might also aect urban income, but less so than an urban shock of equal magnitude.
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Households are risk averse so u0 > 0, u00 < 0 and limx!0 u0(x) = +1. Households
therefore aim to smooth consumption over time. The corresponding period t value
function is given by:
Vt(At + yt) = max
ct
fu(ct) + EtVt+1[(1 + rt)(At + yt   ct   )
+ y(zt;t+1;t+1)] + t(At + yt   ct   )g (4.4)
where t is the multiplier associated with the liquidity constraint. The current value
of assets and income equals the maximum of current utility from consumption plus the
discounted value of future assets and income. Maximization yields:
u0(ct) = EtV 0
t+1[(1 + rt)(At + yt   ct   ) + y(zt;t+1;t+1)] + t (4.5)
The household also chooses the location one period before as a form of ex-ante risk














If the liquidity constraint 4.1 never binds (t = 0), the location is chosen such that there






but if it does bind and t > 0 households chose zt 1 such that (rewriting eq. 4.7)








The last inequality holds only when the liquidity constraint binds, which is when either
shock is negative (meaning smaller than 1) but not equal to each other. We look at
the short run eects of large shocks rather than the long run eects when shocks are
expected to be at their mean of 1. Volatility is then interpreted as a higher chance of
receiving a shock that is so large that all savings are diminished. Households will want to
avoid being put in that situation. If the household lives and works in the city (zt 1 = 0)
and the shock is suciently bad (t << 1) such that the liquidity constraint binds we
have that @y=@zt 1 > 0. Households could improve utility by moving to the countryside
if they expect the constraint to bind, which is where  Et 1t
@y
@zt 1 < 0. Conversely, if
zt 1 = 1 (rural) and t << 1 (bad rural year) we have that @y=@zt 1 < 0 and thus that
 Et 1t
@y
@zt 1 > 0. In that case the urban sector would be better if households expect
the constraint to bind. If both shocks are of equal size they cancel, and we are back in
the situation of equation 4.8 where there is no incentive to move.
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Three insights arise: the more likely it is that the liquidity constraint binds, the
more likely households will be able to improve consumption and utility by migrating to
the area where they expect shocks to be smaller. Second, since the variance of shocks
to the rural sector was assumed to be larger than the variance of shocks to the urban
sector, we have that rural households are more likely to suer an adverse shock that
is large enough to hit the liquidity constraint. They will migrate to the urban area.
Without modern sector job growth this leads to an increase in the informal sector (for
given wages) and a lower expected urban wage which is the balancing force. Third, if
both shocks are equal in size we have that @y=@zt 1 = 0. Then no improvement can be
gained from migrating, even if households hit a liquidity constraint. This is the case if
the covariance of both shocks equals one.
In our three sector model we can write household income yt as:
yt(zt 1;t;t) = zt 1wR;tt + (1   zt 1)(etwM;t + (1   et)wI;t)t (4.10)
where the wj (j = R;M;I) are sectoral wage rates and et is the share of urban labor
employed in the modern sector, which are all taken as given by the household. The wage
rate in the modern sector is higher than the wage in the informal sector. This may be
due to for example minimum wage legislation, trade unions, eciency wage or the need
for specic human capital in the modern sector, but is not modeled explicitly.11 Excess
labor supply in the urban area is absorbed by the informal sector. The expected urban
wage (second element in equation 4.10) is therefore the probability-weighted income of
the informal and the modern sector.
With a non-binding liquidity constraint (4.8) becomes:
Et 1V 0
t+1()(wR;tt   (etwM;t + (1   et)wI;t)t) = 0 (4.11)
which is satised if the expected rural wage equals the expected urban wage and cor-
responds to a classic Harris-Todaro (1970) equilibrium migration equation. If however
shocks are adverse enough to exhaust all assets such that the liquidity constraint binds,
we have that:
Et 1V 0
t+1()(wR;tt   (etwM;t + (1   et)wI;t)t) = (4.12)
  Et 1t(wR;tt   (etwM;t + (1   et)wI;t)t) R 0 if t Q t
If t < t and smaller than 1 it follows that the rural wage is smaller than the expected
urban wage, corresponding to a negative marginal income to the location choice. The
11See for example Temple (2005) for an overview.
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household could have improved income by decreasing zt 1: that is, moving to the urban
sector. If however t > t and t < 1, the reverse holds, and if both shocks are equally
adverse we are back in the equilibrium setting. Within our assumption that the rural
sector is more risky (2
 < 2
), it follows that rural households are expected to face more
severe shocks than urban households. Rural households can expect the liquidity con-
straint to bind in such volatile periods. The net direction of migration should therefore
be from rural to urban areas. A crucial reason for this is the lack of nancial instru-
ments to insure against aggregate shocks (except some saving in the form of livestock
for example). If such markets are available at all they will be more prevalent in urban
areas (Collier, Gunning, 1999). Urban households will thus be better equipped to face
downturns than their rural counterparts which reinforces the hypothesized direction of
migration and hence urbanization. Urban growth due to migration should thus be pos-
itively in
uenced by volatility. Furthermore, the larger the urban informal sector, the
lower urban growth because it depresses the expected urban wage. Positive wage growth
in the urban modern sector will still induce faster urban growth.
The role of migration costs lies in the fact that risk aversion would induce a household
to move independently from liquidity constraints. The premium a household would
be willing to pay to get rid of risk depends on the functional form of utility, but is
positive for risk averse households. Lower migration costs should induce more migration
independently of shocks if they fall below the utility costs of risk. In long-run equilibrium
when shocks are of mean size and no one has an incentive to move this means that the
cost of migration is equal to the risk premium. We therefore include proxies such as the
density of the road network, a decolonization dummy, and the polity index to capture
changes in costs and migration restrictions in the regressions. Furthermore, if households
have to sell o assets such as land to aord migration, they may be locked in when they
arrive in cities (or slums) until they have accumulated enough assets again.
4.4 Estimating the eect of risk on urban growth
Our work builds on Brueckner (1990) who species a monocentric-city model with rural-
urban migration. He nds an important positive eect of the urban to rural income ratio
on both urban population levels and growth rates but is limited to a cross-section of
24 developing countries, as are Becker and Morrison (1988). Moomaw and Shatter
(1996) estimate a larger panel sample of countries. The most robust nding is that
countries with a higher share of industrial labor are more urbanized, supporting that
view that urbanization takes place as a country transitions from an agricultural to
an industrial base. If technological progress drives city growth through the industrial
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sector as simulated in Kelley and Williamson (1984), then urban income may continue
to outpace rural income. Davis and Henderson (2003) estimate a ve year panel from
1960 to 1995 and nd that a shift from agriculture to industry, and the policies that
aect this, lead to urbanization. For example, planned economies such as China tend to
restrict migration, and policy may aect the sectoral composition through, for example,
import substitution programs.
The above mechanisms form plausible explanations for city growth but rely implicitly
on economic growth of the urban manufacturing sector to generate a rural-urban income
gap and sectoral transition. Why would some countries still urbanize if growth is absent?
We add to the literature by focusing on risk and the hypothesized migration reaction of
rural households and include macroeconomic volatility as an explanatory variable. We
also extend the panel to 2005 and update the estimation techniques (see section 6).
As a starting point we take the specication in Davis and Henderson (2003) based
on Brueckner (1990). In equilibrium the national urban population Lu
it for country i
and year t (5-year intervals) is given by:
lnLu
it = 0 lnLit + 1Xit + 
i + eit (4.13)
where L is total population. The Xit include measures that should capture the country's
state of development, rural-urban dierences in public service provision, democracy and
infrastructure, which may aect migration costs; urban cost of living which is aected by
local population and level of development; and ideally measures of the expected urban
and rural wages. The 
i capture xed unobserved country characteristics and the eit is
the error term which may be autocorrelated within countries due to the high persistence
of our variables.
However, we will not assume that countries are in equilibrium every ve years and
rather focus on changes. Our core message is that volatility is a strong destabilizing force
which in
uences the speed of urbanization rather than the level. Volatile countries are
not necessarily more or less urbanized, but volatile periods will induce more rural-urban
migration. Our main specication is therefore given by:
lnLu
i;t+1   lnLu
i;t = 0(lnLi;t+1   lnLit) + 1Zit + 3it + 
i + eit (4.14)
where the Zit contain the (ln) initial urbanization rate as a measure of the state of
development (which is also highly collinear with initial (ln) GDP per capita), plus allows
urbanization to in
uence itself if migration leads to more migration. 3it denotes the
eect of output per capita growth volatility and is our core variable of interest. We
assume that households form expectations at the beginning of every period t on the
volatility between t and t+1, and decide to move or not at time t. Average GDP
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per capita growth is included to capture the eects of economic development and the
transition process (including changes to the urban-rural wage gap if growth, as is often
assumed, originates in cities). An interaction term between volatility and average growth
is added to see if the eects of risk are higher when growth is negative. Negative growth
should make shocks worse for credit constrained households. In robustness tests we
will also include an index of democracy and authoritarian rule (polity index), the state
of infrastructure (road density), a dummy for independence because colonialism also
limited migration, and change in average rainfall as a proxy for changes in agricultural
productivity. Financial development (as proxied by domestic credit as a percentage
of GDP) captures the extend to which markets are complete and the degree to which
households have access to nancial services: the higher this number, the less likely it
is that credit constraints ever bind, and the less volatility should aect urban growth.
The panel structure of our data allows us to let all variables change over time and
moreover to control for country xed eects. We observe the level of urbanization and
thus urban population growth only every 5 years, but are able to regress this on level
country characteristics at the start of the period, and changes which happen during the
5 year period. See the appendix for detailed variable denitions and their sources.
A caveat is that we introduce a lagged dependent variable by regressing urban pop-
ulation growth on the initial level of urbanization.12 Equation 4.2 can be rewritten as
lnLu
t+1 = 1  lnLu
t + 1 lnLu   (1 + 2)lnL + 2 lnLt+1 + ::: + 
i + eit. Nickell (1981)
showed that the coecient 1 is in this case measured with bias in both OLS and FE
regressions if initial urban population is correlated with the country xed eects. Esti-
mators such as Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) should be able
to solve for this bias by rst dierencing the system to get rid of the xed eects and
using lags as instruments. Davis and Henderson (2003) used these methods as a form
of IV. Recent developments have made the estimators more reliable, see for example
Windmeijer (2005) and Roodman (2006).
4.5 Estimating the eect of resource production on aggre-
gate volatility
The drawback is that we have to rely on aggregate data to estimate the eect of volatility
on urban growth. Although we would have liked to use shocks to rural versus urban GDP,
no such data exists, so we have to extend the estimation with aggregate explanatory
variables for aggregate output per capita shocks. We will show that volatility originates
12This also occurs in Brueckner (1990) and Fay and Opal (2000) but is not addressed.
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mostly in rural activities such as export of natural resources, including food, and in
shocks to value added in the agricultural sector. We estimate the following equation




it + Rit + ~ eit (4.15)
where 
GDP=cap:
it is the ve-year standard deviation of output per capita growth rate re-
gressed on resources
it , the ve-year standard deviation of growth rates in natural resource
export values; and Rit, a control matrix with initial dependence of GDP on resource
exports at time t and possible other correlates with 
GDP=cap:
it such as rainfall shocks,
nancial development, a civil war dummy which happened all too often in many African
countries, a measure of remoteness and openness to trade which allows export diversi-
cation to absorb sectoral shocks. Rainfall volatility allows us to distinguish between
value added and export value shocks which incorporate price shocks, and nature shocks.
We can never use the world price indices for resource exports directly because they
consist of a basket of export products. The weights of each product does not correspond
to the composition of our export variables for every country. We assume instead that
supply is very inelastic and changes slowly because mines or plantations cannot be
expanded in the short run. Shocks to changes in export value should then be interpreted
as price shocks rather than quantity shocks.
Because resource exports are exported through ports (through cities), one could
object and question whether much of the price movement actually aects the non-urban





it + Rit + ~ eit (4.16)
where 
sector growth
it is the ve-year standard deviation of growth rates in various sectors.
We assume that the manufacturing sector is a purely urban activity, while the agricul-
tural sector (and the mining sector) are purely rural activities. We will show that shocks
to the agricultural sector do aect aggregate volatility, while shocks to manufacturing
have much less eect.
4.6 Panel evidence from 1960 to 2005
4.6.1 Urban growth and volatility
We start our estimation by performing simple OLS and FE regressions on our baseline
equation 4.14 presented in Table 4.2. For a sample of 108 countries from 1960 to 2005 we
nd that volatility signicantly aects urban population growth, even after controlling
for xed (country) unobservable covariates, and the level of development as captured by
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initial urbanization13, average growth rate of GDP per capita, and population growth
during the same period. The errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by
country because we nd signicant autocorrelation in the errors.14
In the third column we test for an interaction term between volatility and average
GDP/capita growth. The size and signicance of the resulting marginal eect of volatil-
ity cannot be read from the table because it depends on average growth and covariances.
We represent the eect graphically in Figure 4.5, which clearly shows that the marginal
eect of volatility on urban growth is signicant for negative average economic growth
rates. This conrms our hypothesis that shocks to income have an important eect
on rural-urban migration, especially when economic growth is slow or negative which
is when liquidity constraints bind more often. A country such as Brazil for example,
with average GDP per capita growth rate of only -0.5% per year between 1980 and 1985,
could have had negative urban growth rate as jobs disappear. However, volatility during
this period was 4.8% leading to fast urban growth of 5.6% over the period. In Niger
during the same period urban growth was even 7.9%, although GDP per capita growth
was declining at 3.4% per year! Volatility in this case was also 7.9%. This may explain
continued urbanization even without economic growth.
4.6.2 Volatility, agriculture and natural resources
Next we explore the source of macroeconomic volatility by looking at natural resource
exports and 
uctuations in sectoral value added growth rates. Note that this constrains
our sample size and, for example, excludes the 1960s. The rst two columns in Table
4.3 regress ve yearly observations of volatility on the standard deviation of resource
export value growth rates, and in column two with controls for initial dependence. The
agricultural eect seems much weaker than the eect of fuels and ores. However, when
we add interactions between initial dependence and subsequent ve-year volatility we
see that there is a strong eect of agricultural products. Countries with high volatility
in food and agricultural materials export values have also more aggregate volatility if
their GDP depends on these export earnings, making them more risky.
Columns four and ve instead focus on three sectors: manufacturing, which we as-
sumed is an urban activity, and agriculture (including plantations) and mining, which
13We experimented also with initial ln GDP/capita instead but this gave worse ts and was often
insignicant in addition to being highly collinear with the initial level of urbanization.
14We deleted 4 outliers which had average GDP/capita growth rates of a staggering 18% per year or
more during a 5 year interval (Haiti '65-'70, Ghana '65-'70, Equatorial Guinea '95-'05). The sample of
countries included is listed in Table 4.4. Small island nations did not introduce bias into the results.
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are large employers outside cities.15 The last column shows that countries with rela-
tively large agriculture and mining sectors are more volatile. Controlling for the relative
importance of each sector in the economy we nd that mainly 
uctuation in the growth
rate of value added of agriculture leads to aggregate shocks. The eect is twice as large
as a shock to manufacturing sector growth. This conrms that rural sectors are more
risky than urban sectors. It may well be that risk from rural production leads to ag-
gregate risk which is positively associated with rural-urban migration. The export data
explains less of the variation in aggregate volatility. It is likely the case that most nat-
ural resources are exported through ports in cities and exporting rms may have more
access to external nance. Fluctuation in the value added of sectors may better re
ect
the inherent risk of these sectors and have larger eects on aggregate risk because it also
includes producers for the local market.
The next section will test the robustness of these results and try to tackle the bias
in the lagged dependent variable and endogeneity issues.
4.7 Endogeneity and robustness
4.7.1 Robustness: volatility and urban growth
There are strong reasons to believe that the regressions in Table 4.2 suer from omitted
variable bias. First of all it might be that volatility really consists of shocks around a
positive growth rate instead of re
ecting positive as well as large negative shocks. One
large positive shock might cause urban growth by itself and have less to do with risk.
We therefore replace the volatility measure with one that is based on only those yearly
periods where average growth was positive.16 The higher this measure, the larger were
the positive growth rates. It has no eect, while its converse, based on negative growth
rates has a strong negative eect as expected.17
In the second column we add changes in average rainfall. Barrios et al (2006) found
a strong correlation between rainfall and levels of urbanization, but we cannot conrm
that it has any eect on urban growth. The polity index which is increasing in de-
mocratization and decreasing in authoritarian rule has no impact, although Davis and
Henderson (2003) did nd political eects on primacy (the degree to which urban pop-
15We also observe sector data for the categories transport, construction, retail, and 'other' which
includes many services. However, only for the three used can we make a plausible distinction between
urban and rural activities. The mining variable never works well, probably because it also includes
utilities, which are urban rather than rural.
16This requires a minimum of two positive growth rates within each 5 year period.
17We reported only the positive measure because the negative measure is a much smaller sample
requiring at least two negative growth rates within each 5 year period.
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ulation is concentrated in one city). Infrastructure investments, which also decrease
migration costs by unlocking remote areas, as captured by the length of the road net-
work as a share of country surface area, have a positive but insignicant eect. The
independence dummy is signicant: independence from colonial powers lifted old bans
on migration and led to urban growth (Barrios et al., 2006). Including nancial devel-
opment improves the precision with which we measure the eect of volatility on urban
growth but has no direct eect. Our main result that volatility aects urban growth is
signicant, even in this smaller sample and with all our robustness checks.18
Columns three to six explore heterogeneity in the eect of volatility on urban growth
by dividing countries along the lines of their 1965 level of development, fuel and mining
dependence, and 1965 level of nancial development. As expected, urban growth in
OECD countries is not aected by volatility: they are too developed, even though the
standard error re
ects some heterogeneity within the OECD.19 The 1965 level of devel-
opment (as measured by quartile of GDP per capita) does not change the signicant
eect of volatility on urban growth. Fuel exporting countries also do not urbanize more
than other countries in response to volatility, but mining dependent countries urbanize
much faster than non-fuel and non-mining dependent countries in volatile times (mea-
sured by top decile of average dependence). Households in countries such as Zambia,
where up to half of GDP consists of copper exports, appear to be much more vulnerable
to risk outside cities: they migrate to urban centers. Finally, the least nancially devel-
oped countries urbanize much faster than other countries in volatile periods, which, for
instance, is also consistent with lack of nancial instruments for insurance. We always
nd an eect of volatility on urban growth, even after dividing countries along these
lines.
Endogeneity and lagged dependent variable bias
Table B.5 aims to tackle two problems at once. First we have to deal with the lagged
dependent variable bias in the initial level of urbanization, by rst dierencing the
equation to get rid of the xed eect and using lagged levels as instruments. Table 4.2
already predicted that the true value should be in between the OLS estimate which is
biased upwards and the FE estimate which is biased downwards. This yields a range of
-0.063 to -0.117 (Nickell, 1981). Secondly, we follow Davis and Henderson (2003) and
use the dierence GMM estimators (see further down) as an IV strategy.
18We did not include time dummies because this would assume shocks to urban growth common to
all one-hundred countries which we consider to be unlikely.
19For example, an interaction between Mexico and volatility yields a positive but insignicant inter-
action term.
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There are several assumptions that have to be met before we can use lagged equations
as valid instruments for current dierenced equations. According to Arellano and Bond
(1991)20 the errors should not be serially correlated of order two or more (E[eiseit] = 0
for s 6= t), and we need predetermined initial conditions (E[lnLu
i1eit] = 0 for t = 2;:::;T)
and E[
i] = E[eit] = E[
ieit] = 0.21 We use lagged initial urbanization as an instrument
for current urbanization while assuming that passed levels have no direct eect on cur-
rent growth rates. In eect we will use lags of order three or more meaning that variables
dated 15 years earlier are used as instruments. A serious problem with this method is
that 0 might be close to zero. This means that the urban population changes relatively
slowly from year to year and is thus very persistent. 0 then contains little predictive
information about next year's urban size and is too weak as an instruments for urban-
ization, even if it is exogenous. In nite samples this problem is even more severe and
may bias the estimate of the lagged dependent variable's coecient downward and even
below the FE estimate. Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed to expand the instrument
set by including additional moment conditions, that is, lagged rst-dierenced equations
with the following additional assumption:22
E[lnLu
i;t 1;(
i + eit)] = 0 for t = 3;:::;T: (4.17)
All these assumptions can be tested with common Hansen/Sargan over-identication
tests. Windmeijer (2005) provides corrected standard errors for the twostep version of
system-GMM, which are otherwise too small.23
Columns two and three use dierence GMM and show that both one and two step
versions perform poorly: the lagged dependent coecient is close or even below the
FE estimate, although the two-step version improves precision of the volatility aect.24
Column four is more successful in treating the weak instrument problem by expanding
the instrument set. Both the Hansen and the Sargan tests are passed: one for the
overall instrument set and one for the additional assumptions of SGMM. Since we found
AR(2) in the errors we used the third and fourth lags as instruments. These may
20We refer to this method as dierence-GMM (DGMM).
21We do not require the initial conditions to be strictly exogenous which would require E[lnL
u
i1eit] = 0
8t. Strict exogeneity of all variables would result in a consistent within estimate for a large N and T.
22We refer to this method as system-GMM (SGMM).
23Both DGMM and SGMM have one- and two-step versions which refers to the method of estimating
the weight matrix for GMM. One-step requires the assumption of homeskedastic eit disturbances, but
two-step estimation tends to de
ate the standard errors. We use the identity matrix as an initial guess
for the covariance matrix of idiosyncratic errors as in Blundell and Bond (1998). We always cluster the
errors by country to allow for autocorrelation within countries and perform a small sample correction.
See Bond (2002) for an overview.
24All estimations treat all regressors as endogenous but predetermined, except for changes in rainfall
and the independence dummy.
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be weaker instruments and have more trouble with predicting current volatility. Even
so, the eect of volatility has become stronger and remains signicant. Column ve
replaces the average aggregate growth rate with average growth rates in value added of
agriculture and manufacturing as a control to test for the sector shift out of agriculture
which is often the explanation for urbanization as in Davis and Henderson (2003). They
both have the expected sign: growth of the manufacturing sector leads to urban growth
and rural growth to urban decline, but they only slightly aect the volatility variable.
Since these are unfortunately imperfect substitutes for rural and urban GDP they do
predict urban growth imprecisely, in addition to restricting the sample which explains
why many standard errors have increased.
Volatility has a signicant and robust positive eect on urban growth even when
instrumented with lagged values. An economy with more risk seems to induce larger

ows of migration towards cities. It is in cities that there lies hope of improving living
conditions because they oer a more diverse demand for labor. More importantly, risk
and large shocks may force households leave the countryside if such shocks exhaust their
buer savings. In the next section we show that aggregate shocks originate mostly from
the agriculture sector and non-urban natural resource exports.
4.7.2 Robustness: explaining volatility
We turn to the origins of volatility and use a similar strategy as above except that we
do not have to worry about a lagged dependent variable. We rst look at natural re-
source export value and shocks therein. In Table 4.7 we split resource exports into four
categories and look at both dependence and shocks to (ln) changes in export receipts.
Furthermore, we control for other likely determinants of volatility, such as nancial de-
velopment. More nancially developed countries have more means to deal with shocks
such as through insurance or futures contracts, and liquidity constraints bind less of-
ten. Openness and access to waterways25 allows diversication into less volatile sectors,
cushioning the aggregate eect. Civil war and rainfall shocks are added as other suitable
and exogenous candidates to explain aggregate volatility in income. The results are that
shocks to fuel prices are most signicantly important, but shocks to export receipts of
food products have a much larger eect. Among the controls only openness matters
in this short-run panel. There might be too little time variation in the other variables
to yield signicant eects. These variables however allow for a smaller sample and we
explain less variance in volatility than with sectoral data, which we use next.
25The average distance in a country to the nearest coast or waterway is the most robust geographical
determinant of aggregate per capita output volatility in Malik and Temple (2005).
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The rst column in Table 4.8 provides a better t of the variation in volatility (where
R2 is adjusted for the number of variables). We nd a signicant eect of shocks to value
added growth in agriculture, even while controlling for initial agriculture dependence,
the average growth rate and natural rain shocks. Column two furthermore controls for
xed unobserved country eects which do not aect the results much. We have also
added shocks to changes in government spending, as this may be heavily in
uenced by
export earning through taxation, even though it is essentially a choice variable. It has
a large impact on aggregate volatility, but the direction of causality may be the other
way around. Also shocks to the terms-of-trade exert a signicant eect. Adding the
mining sector in column three does not matter: it is mostly risk in agriculture, most
clearly a rural activity, that leads to aggregate volatility. We now do nd some evidence
of civil war leading to aggregate volatility in this case. Columns 4 and 5 perform one
and two-step versions of the dierence-GMM estimator (Arellano-Bond, 1991) where
the two-step version's standard errors are corrected for nite sample bias.26 One-step
assumes homoskedasticity of the errors and yields almost identical results compared
to relaxing this assumption in column ve. Using a set of lagged level instruments
for the equation in rst dierences shows the robustness of the eects of the shocks
to government spending volatility, terms-of-trade shocks and agricultural value added
growth shocks. The Hansen tests conrm exogeneity of the instruments. Unfortunately,
this IV strategy limits the sample we can work with and as a consequence the standard
errors have increased somewhat. System-GMM can use more information which indeed
yields a better estimate in column six.
We can conclude that the determinants of aggregate volatility originate in the agri-
cultural sector even after controlling for a broad set of possible covariates. Shocks to the
manufacturing sector have little eect on aggregate volatility. This shows that the rural
sector is much more risky than the urban sector, lending support to our explanation
that such a risk dierential induces rural-urban migration.
4.8 Conclusion
This paper addresses the fact that many countries urbanize surprisingly fast even though
economic growth is slow or negative. Negative growth is unlikely to create urban jobs,
it does not raise urban wages nor does it increase earlier migrants' 
ow of remittances,
which could all be powerful urban-pull factors from the perspective of poor rural house-
26Using system-GMM would not give us an advantage in this case because we do not have to deal
with a lagged dependent variable. In both estimations all regressors are treated as endogenous and
predetermined except rainfall volatility and the civil war dummy.
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holds. We solve this puzzle by acknowledging that push factors are at least as important,
especially when the economic circumstances are such that households cannot cope with
negative shocks to income. Periods of aggregate volatility turn out to be strong predic-
tors of urban growth, especially when GDP per capita growth is negative. The source
of volatility lies in rural activities such as agriculture and natural resource production
which are much more risky sectors than urban manufacturing. World resource prices are
highly volatile (which is more important than rainfall), and nancial instruments such
as credit to deal with aggregate risk are all but absent in the countryside. Aggregate
risk may be more important than a sectoral shift from agriculture to manufacturing and
the parallel transition to urbanization for countries with poor economic performance.
Unable to save or insure eectively, households are forced to migrate to cities to avoid
being hit by large negative shocks as an ex-ante response to expected risk, because large
shocks may easily wipe out any buer savings.
We realize that many countries with very large cities, and slums, view urbanization
as a problem. If that is justied in itself then rural development of credit institutions
could decrease migration pressure on cities. On the other hand, it might also be that
agglomeration economies can bring opportunities to fast urbanizing countries if these
centers can be made attractive enough for start-ups and foreign investment. Future
research using micro data should shed more light on these issues.
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Appendicies
4.A Data Sources
Category Variable Denition Source
Population urban population
growth





ln (total urban population / total population) idem
av. national popu-
lation growth rate
5 year average of yearly total population growth rates WDI (2006)
GDP volatility
GDP/cap. growth
5 year standard deviation of yearly GDP per capita
growth rates (PPP, 2000 USD)
PWT 6.2 from He-
ston et al. (2006)
volatility of posi-
tive shocks
idem, for those periods with at least 2 positive growth





5 year average of yearly GDP per capita growth rates




F.o.b. value of exports as a percentage of GDP. Fuels
corresponds to SITC section 3 (mineral fuels). Ores
and Metals: SITC divisions 27, 28, and 68 (nonfer-
rous metals). Agricultural Raw Materials: SITC
section: 2 (crude materials except fuels) excluding di-
visions 22, 27 (crude fertilizers and minerals excluding
coal, petroleum, and precious stones), and 28 (met-
alliferous ores and scrap). Foods: SITC sections: 0
(food and live animals), 1 (beverages and tobacco),
and 4 (animal and vegetable oils and fats) and SITC











exp. av. growth 5-year average yearly (ln) changes by export group idem
price indices yearly standard deviation of monthly price changes UNCTAD (2007)
Sectors sector % total va Value added (value of output less the value of inter-
mediate consumption) of sector as a % of total value
added. Manufacturing: section D Manufacturing.
Agriculture: Section A Agriculture, hunting and
forestry and Section B Fishing. Mining: Section C
Mining and quarrying, Section E Electricity, gas and











5 year volatility of yearly growth rate of total value
added per sector.
idem
Geography % change in aver-
age rainfall




volatility of rainfall 5 year standard deviation of yearly rainfall data. idem
road density Roads (km) / land (km2) International Road
Federation and
WDI (2006)
distance to coast or
waterway (100km)
minimum distance in km, xed eect CID, General Mea-
sures of Geography,
(1999)
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Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) WDI (2006)
openness dummy open to trade = 1 Wacziarg and
Welch (2003)
Other civil war dummy
next 5 years
dummy =1 if a country is in civil war during any year




5 year standard deviation of yearly (ln) changes in
government spending
PWT 6.2 from He-
ston et al. (2006)
volatility in terms-
of-trade




Table 4.2: Urban Growth and Volatility, 1960-2005
Dependent variable: (1: OLS) (2: FE) (3: FE) sample means
5-year urban population growth 18.15%
volatility GDP/cap. growth 0.317** 0.254** 0.221* 3.93%
(0.126) (0.125) (0.121)
log urban population share -0.063*** -0.117*** -0.117*** -1.08 = log(.34)
(0.007) (0.018) (0.018)
Average GDP/capita growth 0.309** 0.160 0.536*** 1.76%
(0.151) (0.118) (0.165)
av. national population growth rate 1.168*** 1.029*** 1.031*** 9.96%
(0.074) (0.083) (0.078)
constant -0.021** -0.061*** -0.064***
(0.009) (0.021) (0.020)
volatility * average GDP/cap. growth -5.308**
(2.318)
Observations 861 861 861
Adj. R2 0.64 0.43 0.45
countries 108 108 108
Robust and country-clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Average yearly GDP/capita growth (5 year panel)
 marginal effect 95% confidence band
Figure 4.5: Marginal Eect of Volatility on Urban Population Growth for Given Av-
erage Growth Rates, 1960-2005
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Table 4.3: Volatility and Natural Resources (Exports and National Value Added)
Dependent variable: (1: OLS) (2: OLS) (3: OLS) (4: OLS) (5: OLS)
5-year volatility of GDP/capita growth (exports) (sectors)
volatility of fuel and ores exp. growth 0.094* 0.107* 0.110*
(0.055) (0.054) (0.056)
volatility of food and agr. exp. growth 0.496** 0.295 0.161
(0.217) (0.206) (0.156)
% fuel and ore export value/GPD 0.063*** 0.079***
(0.017) (0.028)
% food and agr. export value/GPD 0.034 -0.023
(0.024) (0.027)
fuel and ore volatility * dependence -1.066
(1.339)
food and agr. volatility * dependence 6.180***
(2.292)
volatility of agri. va growth 0.073*** 0.082***
(0.020) (0.019)
volatility of mining va growth 0.016 0.009
(0.010) (0.008)
volatility of manuf. va growth 0.073*** 0.041**
(0.026) (0.020)
agriculture % total va 0.062***
(0.013)
mining % total va 0.086***
(0.018)
manuf. % total va -0.004
(0.016)
constant 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.014*** 0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Observations 632 593 593 731 731
Adj. R2 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.27
countries 99 99 99 105 105
Robust and country-clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Table 4.4: Countries Included in the Sample of Table 4.2
Algeria Congo, Dem. Rep. Haiti Mauritius Senegal
Argentina Congo, Rep. Honduras Mexico Singapore
Australia Costa Rica Hong Kong, China Morocco South Africa
Austria Cote d'Ivoire Iceland Mozambique Spain
Bangladesh Cyprus India Namibia Sri Lanka
Barbados Denmark Indonesia Nepal Sweden
Belgium Dominican Republic Iran, Islamic Rep. Netherlands Switzerland
Benin Ecuador Ireland New Zealand Syrian Arab Republic
Bolivia Egypt, Arab Rep. Israel Nicaragua Tanzania
Botswana El Salvador Italy Niger Thailand
Brazil Equatorial Guinea Jamaica Nigeria Togo
Burkina Faso Ethiopia Japan Norway Trinidad and Tobago
Burundi Fiji Jordan Pakistan Turkey
Cameroon Finland Kenya Panama Uganda
Canada France Korea, Rep. Papua New Guinea United Kingdom
Cape Verde Gabon Lesotho Paraguay United States
Central African Republic Gambia, The Luxembourg Peru Uruguay
Chad Ghana Madagascar Philippines Venezuela, RB
Chile Greece Malawi Portugal Zambia
China Guatemala Malaysia Puerto Rico Zimbabwe
Colombia Guinea Mali Romania
Comoros Guinea-Bissau Mauritania Rwanda
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Table 4.5: Robustness, Urban Growth, Volatility and Heterogeneous Eects
Dependent variable: (1: FE) (2: FE) (3: FE) (4: FE) (5: FE) (6: FE)
5-year urban pop. growth
volatility of positive shocks 0.159
(0.192)
volatility GDP/cap. growth 0.477** 0.512** 0.287** 0.246** 0.344***
(0.206) (0.211) (0.125) (0.122) (0.115)
OECD countries * volatility -0.600**
(0.266)
min 1965 quart. GDP/cap. * volatility 0.364
(0.323)
top 1965 quart. GDP/cap. * volatility 0.142
(0.123)
top dec. av. fuel exp. * volatility -0.241
(0.256)
top dec. av. ores exp. * volatility 0.730***
(0.262)
min 1965 quart. n.dev. * volatility 0.681**
(0.334)
top 1965 quart. n.dev. * volatility -0.317
(0.198)
log urban population share -0.117*** -0.150*** -0.148*** -0.150*** -0.151*** -0.145***
(0.019) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Average GDP/capita growth 0.022 0.428*** 0.423*** 0.417*** 0.399*** 0.432***
(0.123) (0.138) (0.137) (0.136) (0.133) (0.132)
av. national population growth rate 1.037*** 1.146*** 1.151*** 1.195*** 1.193*** 1.284***
(0.091) (0.082) (0.084) (0.117) (0.114) (0.150)
nancial development 0.008 0.006 0.010 0.008 0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
% change average rainfall -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.003 -0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
polity index 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
road density 0.022 0.019 0.022 0.019 0.022
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
independence index 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
constant -0.052** -0.148*** -0.143*** -0.153*** -0.151*** -0.158***
(0.020) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025)
Observations 796 522 522 522 522 522
countries 108 100 100 100 100 100
Adj. R2 0.41 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.56
Robust and country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. `65 quart. = quartile range in 1965; dec. av. =
decile range in 1965 of variable's long term average export share of GDP.
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Table 4.6: Robustness, Urban Growth and Volatility
Dependent variable: (1: FE) (2: DGMM) (3: DGMM) (4: SGMM) (5: SGMM)
5-year urban pop. growth one-step two-step two-step two-step
volatility GDP/cap. growth 0.477** 0.441** 0.400** 0.529** 0.549*
(0.206) (0.220) (0.200) (0.209) (0.284)
log urban population share -0.150*** -0.165*** -0.144*** -0.075*** -0.101***
(0.028) (0.039) (0.043) (0.024) (0.025)
Average GDP/capita growth 0.428*** 0.223 0.238 0.246*
(0.138) (0.158) (0.168) (0.134)
av. national population growth rate 1.146*** 1.088*** 1.168*** 1.266*** 1.233***
(0.082) (0.177) (0.129) (0.202) (0.155)
nancial development 0.008 -0.016 -0.010 -0.011 0.003
(0.011) (0.023) (0.028) (0.020) (0.016)
% change average rainfall -0.006 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.011
(0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
polity index 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
road density 0.022 0.056 0.024 0.011 0.015
(0.024) (0.054) (0.051) (0.014) (0.009)
independence index 0.026*** 0.001 -0.003 0.009 0.014
(0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009)
av. growth agriculture va -0.023
(0.071)
av. growth manuf. va 0.047
(0.074)
constant -0.148*** -0.062* -0.095**
(0.027) (0.037) (0.038)
Observations 522 419 419 522 462
countries 100 92 92 100 98
Adj. R2 0.55
Hansen overid. test p-value 0.7643 0.7643 0.5193 0.6356
Di-Sargan overid. test p-value 0.306 0.370
Robust and country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Two-step GMM regressions include Windmeijer (2005) corrected s.e.
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Table 4.7: Robustness, Volatility and Natural Resource Exports (Value Share of GDP)
5-year volatility of GDP/capita growth (1: OLS) (2: OLS) (3: OLS)
volatility of food and agr. exp. growth 0.348
(0.217)
food export growth volatility 0.489** 0.776*
(0.238) (0.400)
agr. r.m. export growth volatility -0.103 -0.075
(0.086) (0.126)
volatility of fuel and ores exp. growth 0.071
(0.065)
fuel export growth volatility 0.060*** 0.065**
(0.021) (0.027)
ores export growth volatility 0.036 -0.046
(0.045) (0.063)
% fuel and ore export value/GPD 0.063***
(0.020)
% fuel export value/GDP 0.060*** 0.058***
(0.015) (0.012)
% ore and metal export value/GDP 0.087* 0.066
(0.046) (0.057)
% food and agr. export value/GPD 0.032
(0.023)
% food export value/GDP 0.064** 0.047
(0.031) (0.035)
% agricultural r.m. export value/GDP -0.055* -0.008
(0.029) (0.031)
nancial development -0.007* -0.004
(0.003) (0.004)
openness dummy -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
distance to coast or waterway (100km) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
civil war dummy next 5 years -0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004)
volatility of rainfall -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
constant 0.029*** 0.017*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Observations 470 581 461
Adj. R2 0.17 0.13 0.21
countries 88 99 88
Robust and country-clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Table 4.8: Robustness, Volatility and Natural Resources (National Value Added)
Dependent variable: (1: OLS) (2: FE) (3: FE) (4: DGMM) (5: DGMM) (6: SGMM)
5-year volatility GDP/cap. growth one-step two-step two-step
agriculture % total va -0.023 -0.048 -0.045 0.060 0.057 0.028
(0.015) (0.029) (0.036) (0.062) (0.073) (0.034)
volatility of agri. va growth 0.042** 0.046** 0.050** 0.051* 0.046* 0.080**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.027) (0.033)
av. growth agriculture va 0.003 -0.014 -0.027 0.052 0.039 -0.020
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.059) (0.064) (0.048)
manuf. % total va -0.038* 0.038 0.053 -0.025 -0.020 -0.002
(0.020) (0.030) (0.035) (0.095) (0.111) (0.050)
volatility of manuf. va growth 0.021 0.007 0.008 0.015 0.024 0.014
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.026)
av. growth manuf. va 0.014 0.046* 0.038 -0.044 -0.029 0.045
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.059) (0.058) (0.047)
nancial development -0.001 0.003 0.006 0.015 0.013 0.011
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011)
openness dummy -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005)
civil war dummy next 5 years 0.005 0.009 0.009* 0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
volatility of rainfall -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
volatility of government spending 0.208*** 0.196*** 0.197*** 0.194*** 0.195*** 0.212***
(0.039) (0.048) (0.048) (0.057) (0.063) (0.047)
volatility in terms of trade 0.035** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.049** 0.051** 0.016
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023)
distance to coast or waterway 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
constant 0.016** 0.007 -0.002 -0.006
(0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015)
mining % total va 0.060
(0.040)
volatility of mining va growth -0.006
(0.008)
av. growth mining va 0.026
(0.021)
Observations 538 538 528 442 442 538
Adj. R2 0.47 0.38 0.39
countries 95 95 93 94 94 95
Hansen overid. test p-value 0.4668 0.4668 0.5782
Di-Sargan overid. test p-value 0.201
Robust and country-clustered standard errors in parentheses in all regressions.
Two-step D-GMM includes Windmeijer (2005) corrected s.e.
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1





and the Natural Resource Curse
With Frederick van der Ploeg
Synopsis
Cross-country evidence is presented on resource dependence and the link
between volatility and growth. First, growth depends negatively on volatil-
ity of unanticipated output growth independent of initial income per capita,
the initial investment share, initial human capital stock, trade openness, the
national income share of natural resource exports, and population growth.
Second, the adverse eect of resources on growth operates primarily through
higher volatility. The direct eect of resources on growth is positive, but
can be swamped by the indirect negative eect through volatility. Third,
with well developed nancial sectors, the resource curse is less pronounced.
Fourth, landlocked countries with ethnic tensions have higher volatility and
lower growth. Fifth, restrictions on the current account lead to higher volatil-
ity and lower growth, but capital account restrictions lower volatility and
boost growth. These eects are especially strong in resource-rich countries.
We also present IV-estimates to correct for the endogenous nature of invest-
ment rates and panel estimates to allow for possible changes in explanatory
variables over time. Our key message is that volatility is a quintessential
feature of the resource curse.
5.1 Introduction
The key determinants of economic growth highlighted in the empirical literature - insti-
tutions, geography and culture - show far more persistence than the growth rates they
are supposed to explain (Easterly, et al, 1993). One candidate to explain the volatility
of growth in income per capita is the volatility of commodity prices. This includes not
only oil, but also for example grain and coee prices. What commodity prices lack in
trend, they make up for in volatility (Deaton, 1999). A recent detailed examination of
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the growth performance of 35 countries during the historical period 1870-1939 led to the
following conclusions (Blattman, Hwang and Williamson, 2007). Countries that special-
ize in commodities with substantial price volatility have more volatility in their terms
of trade, enjoy less foreign direct investment, and experience lower growth rates than
countries that specialize in commodities with more stable prices or countries that are
industrial leaders. Countries in the periphery with volatile commodity prices and undi-
versied economies fall behind in economic development. Also, the long-run volatility of
the real exchange rate of developing countries is approximately three times bigger than
that of industrialized countries (Haussmann, et al, 2004). Another study employs data
for 83 countries over the period 1960-2000 and also nds robust evidence for a strong
and negative link between real exchange rate volatility and growth performance after
correcting for initial output per worker, enrolment in secondary education, trade open-
ness, government consumption, in
ation, and even banking or currency crises (Aghion,
et al, 2006). Furthermore, the adverse eect of exchange rate volatility on growth is
weaker for countries with well developed nancial systems.
The pioneering work of Ramey and Ramey (1995) takes a dierent approach. It
investigates the link between volatility of unanticipated output growth (rather than
volatility of the terms of trade) and growth performance. It uses the Heston-Summers
data to provide cross-country evidence for a negative link between volatility and mean
growth rates controlling for initial income, population growth, human capital, and phys-
ical capital. Interestingly, this study nds evidence for this negative link regardless of
whether one includes the share of investment in national income or not. It also esti-
mates the relationship between volatility and growth in a panel model that controls for
both time and country xed eects. To allow for the time-varying nature of volatility,
a measure of government spending volatility is used that is correlated with volatility of
output across both time and countries. The negative link between volatility and growth
seems robust to a large set of conceivable controls that vary with time period or coun-
try.1 Another study shows that, for a cross-section of 91 countries, policy variability
in in
ation and government spending exerts a strong and negative impact on growth
(Fat as and Mihov, 2005).
Our main objective is to extend Ramey and Ramey (1995) by allowing for the direct
eect of natural resource abundance on growth and, more importantly, the indirect ef-
fect of natural resources on growth performance via volatility. We thus follow Blattman,
1However, Imbs (2006) shows that growth and volatility correlate positively across sectors. Within
the context of a mean-variance portfolio setup, it is understandable that volatile sectors command higher
investment rates and thus higher growth rates.
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Hwang and Williamson (2007) and allow for the role of natural resources on macroe-
conomic volatility. We allow natural resources, nancial development, openness and
distance from waterways to be the underlying determinants of volatility. They may be
viewed as exogenous proxies for the volatility of the real exchange rate and thus of GDP
growth. We also shed new light on the evidence for the resource curse given by Sachs and
Warner (1997) and many others.2 Our objective is to test whether any adverse indirect
eect of natural resources on growth performance via volatility of unanticipated output
growth dominates any adverse direct eect of natural resource abundance on economic
growth. Inspired by Aghion, et al (2006), we test whether the adverse eect of natural
resources on volatility and growth is weakened if there are well developed nancial in-
stitutions. We also test whether being landlocked, ethnic tensions, or restrictions on the
current account boost volatility and curb growth and whether restrictions on the capi-
tal account or exchange controls reduce volatility and boost growth. To avoid omitted
variable bias, we control for initial income per capita, population growth, investment
rates, and primary schooling on growth.
Our econometric tests on the importance of volatility for the paradox of plenty are
motivated by Figures 1-3 and by the data on average yearly growth and its standard
deviation by country groups for the period 1970-2003 presented in Table 1. These data
suggest ve stylized facts that are essential for a new and improved understanding of
the natural resource curse.
 First, volatile countries with a high standard deviation of yearly growth in GDP
per capita have on average lower growth in GDP per capita. Figure 1 illustrates
this partial correlation while Ramey and Ramey (1995) show that this relationship
holds even after controlling for initial income per capita, population growth, human
capital and physical capital.
 Second, developing countries suer much more from volatility in output growth
than developed countries. Whereas Western Europe and North America have
a standard deviation of, respectively, 2.33 and 1.90 percentage-points of yearly
growth in GDP per capita, the gures for Asia are 4.4 to 5 percentage-points and
for Latin America & Caribbean 4.54percentage-point. Most striking is that Sub-
Saharan Africa and the Middle East & North Africa have the highest volatility.
Their standard deviations of average growth in GDP per capita are, respectively,
2The windfall resource revenues lead to appreciation of the real exchange rate and a decline of the
nonresource export sectors. If there is substantial loss in learning by doing in the non-resource export
sectors, there will be a fall in total factor productivity growth as in Sachs and Warner (1995). Natural
resources may also invite rapacious rent seeking and thus hamper growth.
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6.52 and 8.12 percentage-points.
 Third, countries with poorly developed nancial systems are much more volatile.
Countries in the bottom quartile of nancial development have a standard de-
viation of annual growth in GDP per capita two percentage-point higher than
those in the top quartile. North America and Western Europe have well devel-
oped nancial systems while Eastern Europe & Central Asia, and especially South
Asia and Middle East & North Africa, have poorly functioning nancial systems.
Resource-rich and landlocked economies have less developed nancial systems than
resource-poor countries.
 Fourth, countries that depend a lot on natural resources are much more volatile
than countries without natural resources. Countries with a share of natural re-
source exports in GDP greater than 19 percent (the top quartile) have a stag-
geringly high standard deviation of output growth of 7.37 percentage-point. For
countries with a natural resource exports share of less than ve percent of GDP
(the bottom quartile), the gure is only 2.83 percentage-point. Figure 2 also
indicates that resource-rich countries have bigger macroeconomic volatility than
resource-poor countries. Figure 3 shows that world commodity prices are ex-
tremely volatile and are the main reason why natural resource export revenues
are so volatile. Crude petroleum prices are more volatile than food prices and
ores and metals prices. The volatility of raw agricultural product prices is less,
but still substantial. Monthly price deviations of ten percentage-points from their
base level (year 2000) are quite normal.
 Fifth, landlocked countries suer much more from volatility than countries with
easy access to waterways. Indeed, countries that are less than 49 kilometres from
the nearest waterway have a standard deviation of growth in GDP per capita that
is 1.6 percentage-point lower than countries that are more than 359 kilometres
from the nearest waterway. Empirical work also nds that remote countries have
less access to markets, less diversied exports, and greater volatility of output
growth (Malik and Temple, 2006).
Although these stylized facts are suggestive, they are merely partial correlations and
do not permit any causal evidence. Hence, we perform a proper multivariate econometric
analysis and control for all potential factors aecting the rate of economic growth. We
also face the thorny issue of the endogenous nature of explanatory variables.
The sophisticated statistical decomposition analysis performed in Koren and Ten-
reyro (2007) suggests four possible reasons why poor countries are so much more volatile
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than rich countries: poor countries specialize in more volatile sectors; poor countries
specialize in fewer sectors; poor countries experience more frequent and more severe
aggregate shocks (such as from macroeconomic policy); and macroeconomic 
uctua-
tions in poor countries are more highly correlated with the shocks of the sectors they
specialize in. The evidence suggests that, as countries develop their economies, their
productive structure shifts from more to less volatile sectors. Also, the degree of spe-
cialization declines in early stages of development and increases a little in later stages
of development. Furthermore, the volatility of country-specic macroeconomic shocks
falls with development. This decomposition analysis sheds interesting light on why poor
economies are more volatile than rich economies. Our multivariate econometric analysis
provides complimentary evidence on the factors aecting volatility.
We argue that crucial and strongly related sources of macroeconomic volatility and
poor growth performance include a lack of a sophisticated nancial system, natural re-
source dependence, and whether a country is landlocked or not. We also provide evidence
that economic restrictions and ethnic tensions play a role. Countries with a large depen-
dence on natural resources and that are landlocked are typically not very diversied and
vulnerable to highly volatile world commodity prices. Natural resource revenues tend to
be very volatile (much more so than GDP), because the supply of natural resources ex-
hibits low price elasticities of supply. Furthermore, as documented in Bloom and Sachs
(1998) and indicated by Figure 4, Sub-Saharan Africa is most vulnerable to volatility
of commodity prices as it depends so much on natural resources. Dutch Disease eects
may also induce real exchange rate volatility, and thus a fall in investment in physical
capital and learning; and further contraction of the traded sector and lower productivity
growth (e.g., Gylfason, et al, 1999; Herbertsson, et al, 2000). Volatile resource revenues
are disliked by risk-averse households. The welfare losses induced by consumption risk
are tiny compared with those resulting from imperfect nancial markets. However, a
recent dynamic stochastic general equilibrium study of Zimbabwe highlights the incom-
pleteness of nancial markets and suggests that the observed volatility in commodity
prices depresses capital accumulation and output by about 40 percent (Elbers, et al,
2007).
Our paper gives a prominent role to the quality of nancial markets in understanding
how the volatility of commodity prices and natural resource export revenues might
depress growth. We adapt the liquidity shock arguments put forward by Aghion, et al
(2006). Eectively, larger natural resource revenues make it easier to overcome negative
liquidity shocks. We thus show that more volatile commodity prices will harm innovation
and growth.
In section two we discuss why volatility may harm output growth, especially in
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countries with poor nancial systems. Since there are also reasons for volatility to boost
growth, the issue needs to be settled empirically. In section three we discuss our econo-
metric methodology. In section four we present our cross-country estimates and test their
robustness in section ve to a sample with OECD countries and a panel specication.
In section six we use our preferred estimates to perform a counterfactual experiment
comparing resource-rich and landlocked Africa with the Asian Tigers. Section seven
concludes.
5.2 Why volatility of natural resource revenues might ham-
per growth
5.2.1 Economic arguments
Aghion, et al (2006) shows that macroeconomic volatility driven by nominal exchange
rate movements may stunt innovations and thus depress growth in economies with poorly
developed nancial institutions and with nominal wages which do not react immediately
to changes in prices. We adopt this argument to show that volatility in natural resource
revenues, induced by volatility in primary commodity prices, curbs growth in economies
with badly functioning nancial systems. We assume the law of one price holds, so
that the price level Pt simply tracks the nominal exchange rate St. In other words,
Pt = StPt where the foreign price level Pt is normalized to unity. Nominal wages
are pre-set not knowing the realization of the price level, that is Wt = AtE[Pt] =
AtE[St], where At denotes productivity and  < 1 is a constant. Output follows from
the production function Yt = At
p
lt, where lt denotes employment. Prots are t 
AtSt
p
lt   AtE[St]lt. The value of innovations the next period is Vt+1 = V Pt+1At+1,
where next period's productivity is given by At+1 = 
At with 
 > 1 if entrepreneurs
have sucient funds to innovate and At+1 = At otherwise. Firms have sucient funds
(prots plus resource revenues Qt) to innovate if they have enough cash 
ow to cope
with adverse liquidity shocks, i.e., (t+StQt) > zPtAt where  is a measure of nancial
development and z is a random liquidity shock. If liquidity shocks z are i.i.d. across







Higher prots or natural resource revenues and a more developed nancial system imply
that more rms are able to overcome liquidity shocks and thus that the probability of
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so that higher productivity, a lower expected price level (i.e., a lower wage), and a higher



































Aghion, et al (2006) make the assumption that the cumulative density function F(:)
is concave, so that E[F(c)]  F(E[c]). The cumulative density functions of standard
deviations of commodity prices given in Figure 3 are indeed concave (and close to the
normal cumulative density functions). It follows that more exchange rate volatility
stunts innovations and curbs growth, especially if the degree of nancial development
is weak. Moving from a peg to a 
oat thus leads to a lower rate of economic growth.
Here we are more interested in the eect of commodity prices on growth performance.
A high and stable level of resource revenues eases liquidity constraints and thus boosts
innovations and economic growth. However, for a given expected level of natural resource
revenues, more volatility in commodity prices and resource revenues harms innovation
and growth, especially if nancial development is weak.
IMF data on 44 commodities and national commodity export shares, and monthly
indices on national commodity export prices for 58 countries during 1980-2002 indicate
that real commodity prices aect real exchange rate volatility (Cashin, et al, 2002).
Since we have seen that real exchange rate uncertainty exacerbates the negative eects
of domestic credit market constraints, this gives another reason why volatility of com-
modity prices curbs economic growth. Also, many resource-rich countries suer from
poorly developed nancial systems and nancial remoteness, and thus suer from big-
ger macroeconomic volatility (Aghion, et al, 2006; Rose and Spiegel, 2007). Given the
high volatility of primary commodity prices and resource revenues and thus of the real
exchange rate of many resource-rich countries, we expect resource-rich countries with
poorly developed nancial systems to have poor growth performance.
With complete nancial markets, long-term investment is counter-cyclical and miti-
gates volatility. However, if rms face tight credit constraints, investment is pro-cyclical
and amplies volatility. Of course, there may be other reasons why volatility may de-
press economic growth (Aghion, et al, 2005). Learning by doing and human capital
accumulation is increasing and concave in the cyclical component of production (Martin
and Rogers, 2000). In that case, long-run growth should be negatively related to the am-
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plitude of the business cycle.3 This explanation does not require uncertainty and holds
for predictable shocks as well. With irreversible investment, increased volatility holds
back investment and thus depresses growth (Bernanke, 1983; Pindyck, 1991; Aizenman
and Marion, 1991). The costs of volatility come from rms making uncertainty-induced
planning errors (Ramey and Ramey, 1991). These costs arise if it is costly to switch
factors of production between sectors (Bertola, 1994; Dixit and Rob, 1994). However,
if rms choose to use technologies with a higher variance and a higher expected re-
turn (Black, 1987), or if higher volatility induces more precautionary saving and thus
more investment (Mirman, 1971), there may be a positive link between volatility and
growth. If the activity that generates productivity growth is a substitute to production,
the opportunity cost of productivity enhancing activities is lower in recessions and thus
volatility may boost growth (Aghion and Saint Paul, 1998). Ultimately, the question of
whether anticipated or unanticipated volatility harms or boosts growth thus needs to
be settled empirically.
In economies where only debt contracts are available and bankruptcy is costly, the
real exchange rate becomes much more volatile if there is specialization in traded goods
and services and the non-resource traded sector is small (Hausmann and Ribogon, 2002).
Shocks to the demand for non-traded goods and services - associated with shocks to nat-
ural resource income - are then not accommodated by movements in the allocation of
labour but by expenditure switching. This demands much higher relative price move-
ments. Due to bankruptcy costs, interest rates increase with relative price volatility.
This causes the economy to specialize away from non-resource traded goods and ser-
vices, which is inecient. The less it produces of these goods and services, the more
volatile the economy becomes and the higher the interest rate has to be. This causes
the sector to shrink further until it vanishes. Others stress that resource revenues are
used as collateral and encourage countries to engage in `excessive' borrowing at the ex-
pense of future generations, which can harm the economy in both the short and long
run (Mansoorian, 1991).
Volatility is bad for growth, investment, income distribution, poverty, and educa-
tional attainment (e.g., Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Aizenman and Marion, 1999; Flug et
al, 1999). To get around such natural resource curses, the government could resort to
stabilization and saving policies and improve the eciency of nancial markets. It also
helps to have a fully diversied economy, as then shocks to demand in the non-traded
sector can be accommodated through changes in the structure of production rather
3They nd that for industrialized countries and European regions a higher standard deviation of
growth and of unemployment tends to depress growth rates.
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than expenditure switching. This is relevant for ineciently specialized countries such
as Nigeria and Venezuela, but less so for diversied countries like Mexico or Indonesia,
or naturally specialized countries such as some Gulf States. Unfortunately, resource-rich
economies are often specialized in production and thus tend to be more volatile.
5.2.2 Political arguments
Natural resource bonanzas reduce the critical faculties of politicians and induce a false
sense of security. This can lead to investment in `white elephant' projects, bad policies
(e.g., import substitution or unsustainable budgetary policies), and favours to political
clientele, which cannot be nanced once resource revenues dry up. Politicians loose
sight of growth-promoting policies, free trade and `value for money' management. Dur-
ing commodity booms countries often engage in exuberant public spending as if resource
revenues last forever. This carries the danger of unsustainable spending programmes,
which need to be reversed when global commodity prices collapse and revenues dry up.
Encouraged by the Prebisch hypothesis (i.e., the secular decline of world prices of pri-
mary exports), many developing countries have made the mistake of trying in vain to
promote state-led industrialization through prolonged import substitution using taris,
import quota and subsidies for manufacturing in an attempt to avoid resource depen-
dency. These policies may have been a reaction to the appreciation of the real exchange
rate and the decline of the traded manufacturing sectors caused by natural resource
dependence. The natural resource wealth may thus have prolonged bad policies, which
eventually had to be reversed. The resulting policy-induced volatility harms growth
and welfare. Table 1 indicates that resource-rich countries indeed have a relatively high
volatility in the national income share of government.
Political scientists have also argued that states adopt and maintain sub-optimal poli-
cies (Ross, 1999). Cognitive theories blame policy failures on short-sightedness of state
actors who ignore the adverse eects of their actions on the generations that come after
the natural resource is exhausted, thus leading to myopic sloth and exuberance. These
cognitive theories highlight a get-quick-rich mentality among businessmen, a boom-and-
bust psychology among policy makers, and abuse of resource wealth by privileged classes,
sectors, client networks and interest groups.
5.3 Estimation methodology
Consider a dataset with N countries and a sample period of T years. Ramey and Ramey
(1995) specify the following econometric model for growth in GDP per capita:
log(yit) = i + Xi70 + it; it s N(0;2
i ); i = 1;:::;N; t = 1;:::T; (5.5)
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where yit is GDP per capita in country i for year t, i is the standard deviation for
country i of the residuals it, Xi70 is a vector of control variables for country i and
the year 1970, and  is a vector of coecients assumed to be constant across countries.
The residuals it are the deviations of growth from the predicted values based on the
controls. The variances of these residuals do not depend on time, but do vary for each
country. The standard controls included in Xi70 are initial log of GDP per capita,
average share of investment in GDP, initial human capital (proxied by average years
of schooling for those older than 25 years in 1970 taken from Barro and Lee (1993))
and the average annual rate of population growth over the sample period. Ramey and
Ramey (1995) then nd statistically signicant estimates for  of -0.211 for a sample of
92 countries and -0.385 for the OECD countries. There is thus a negative relationship
between volatility and conditional growth performance. In terms of the magnitude of
the economic impact, volatility ranks third after the investment share and initial income
per capita in the sample of 92 countries, and second after initial income per capita for
the OECD sample. We will also test whether natural resource dependence, openness,
and nancial development exert additional eects on growth.
We also probe into the black box of (5) and try to explain volatility (that is, the
standard deviation of the yearly error in the growth equation) in terms of degree of
nancial development, resource dependence, and the distance from the nearest navigable
river or the coast. We collect these variables aecting volatility in the vector Zi70 and
estimate the cross-country regressions:
log(yit) = i + Xi70 + Zi70 + it; 2
i = exp(Zi70
 + c) and (5.6)
it s N(0;2
i ); i = 1;:::;N; t = 1;:::T:
Average volatility i is assumed constant over time, but dierent for each country de-
pending on the initial country characteristics captured in Zi70. If countries are similar
in terms of the Zi70, they are also predicted to have similar volatility. The vector of
parameters 
 measures the average across-country eect of factors like resource depen-
dence, nancial development and distance from waterways on volatility. We also allow
for direct eects of these variables on growth ().
We estimate parameters ,,
















where the covariance matrix is dened by t;ii = 2
i = exp(Zi70
 + c), i = 1;:::;N,
t = 1;:::;T, and t;ij = 0, i 6= j, t = 1;:::;N and t  (1t;:::;Nt)0 with it  log(yit) 

i  Xi70 Zi70, t = 1;:::;T. The method of econometric estimation is analogous to
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that of an autoregressive conditional-heteroskedasticity in mean (ARCH-M) estimation
(Engle, Lilien, Robins, 1987). The variances are conditional, but time invariant. The
error terms are uncorrelated across countries.4
5.4 Is volatility the quintessential feature of the natural
resource curse?
The stylized facts discussed in the introduction suggest that natural resources play a key
role in understanding macroeconomic volatility and growth prospects. Once account is
taken of the negative eect of cross-country variations in volatility on the rate of eco-
nomic growth, the level of resource dependence may exert a positive eect on growth.5
From a policy perspective, it is important to know whether any adverse negative indirect
eect of natural resources on growth performance via volatility of unanticipated output
growth dominates any adverse positive direct eect of resource dependence on growth
and whether the adverse eects are weakened if there are well developed nancial insti-
tutions. Furthermore, we test whether landlocked countries experience higher volatility
and lower growth. To get meaningful results, we control for initial income per capita,
population growth, investment rates, and primary schooling on growth.
5.4.1 Explaining volatility by country and regional dummies
Table 2 provides cross-country empirical evidence on how much volatility of unantici-
pated output per capita growth depresses average annual growth in GDP per capita.
The appendix gives the denition of all the variables and their source of origin. The
positive coecients on the average investment share and initial human capital suggest
countries that invest a lot in physical and human capital enjoy a higher growth rate in
income per capita, albeit that the coecient on human capital is not very signicant.
Similarly, countries with very high population growth rates tend to have worse growth
performance. Also, of course, the signicant negative coecient on initial GDP per
capita indicates that poor countries which start o with a low level of income per capita
catch up and grow faster ceteris paribus (that is, conditional convergence). Regression
one is our benchmark regression, which indicates that volatility of unanticipated output
4Allowing for non-zero covariances as in Cerme~ no and Grier (2005) would increase the number of
parameters to be estimated too much to be identied for the large country panel we work with.
5In fact, if the explanatory variable is natural resource abundance (proxied by natural resource wealth
including the net-present value of subsoil assets, forest resources, protected areas and agricultural land)
rather than natural resource dependence, there appears to be a positive eect on growth performance
(e.g., Ding and Field, 2005; Alexeev and Conrad, 2005; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2007). From our
point of view, this does not seem surprising as natural resource wealth is much less volatile than natural
resource export revenues and more likely to boost the rate of economic growth.
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growth negatively aects growth in GDP per capita. This conrms for our sample the
results of Ramey and Ramey (1995). However, regression two indicates that there is
some evidence for serial correlation in growth in income per capita. Regression three
tests whether there is any evidence for a natural resource curse along the lines of Sachs
and Warner (1995).6 We only nd support for a negative coecient for point-source
natural resource dependence on economic growth.7 In contrast to much of the existing
empirical literature, nancial development, openness to international trade8 and various
interactions terms are insignicant explanatory factors of cross-country variations in
growth in GDP per capita. One possible explanation of this is that the eects of these
variables are picked up by the eect of volatility on growth performance. We return to
that in section 5.4.2.
In order to get an initial understanding of the sources and origins of volatility, regres-
sion four explains volatility by regional block dummies instead of country dummies. It is
interesting that Sub-Saharan African and to a lesser extent the Middle-East and North
Africa are much more volatile and thus suer much more from bad growth prospects.
If Sub-Saharan Africa would have the same volatility as East Asia and the Pacic, its
average annual growth rate would be 0.96%-point higher.9 Regression four also indicates
that, controlling for all traditional factors explaining cross-country dierences in growth
performance, there is no evidence of a traditional resource curse as the share of point-
source or diuse natural resource exports in total exports is insignicant.10 However,
regression ve does indicate that point-source natural resource rents (i.e., net of explo-
ration costs)11 exert a negative eect on growth in GDP per capita even after allowing
for the eects of volatility on growth. Regression 5 also shows signicant interaction
terms with openness and nancial development at the one percent-level. This suggests
that the resource curse is less pronounced for countries open to international trade and
with well functioning nancial systems. For very open countries with a high degree of
nancial development, the resource curse can even be turned into a blessing.
6To allow for the fact that the errors in our explanation of growth in GDP per capita are not
independent within countries, we cluster the standard errors by country in regressions 2 and all further
regressions.
7These include oil, gas, ores and minerals, which are typically produced in concentrated locations.
8We use the openness variable of Sachs and Warner (1997) as expanded by Wacziarg ad Welch (2003).
Instead of `years open to trade' we use initial openness to minimize reverse causality concerns.







10Diuse natural resources include agricultural raw materials and foods such as livestock, coee,
bananas or tobacco, which typically are produced throughout the country.
11The resource rents data are not necessarily superior, since extraction costs are available for much
fewer countries than resource revenues and are often proxied by regional/continental rather than local
costs.
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Clearly, the regional block dummies leave out information that is in the parsimonious
country dummies. The resulting omitted variable bias is why the coecient on volatility
is bigger, since it forces countries within each region to have similar volatility.
5.4.2 Opening the black box: Underlying determinants of volatility
and the resource curse
To better understand the eects of natural resource dependence on growth, we need to
dig deeper into the determinants of volatility. Regression 6a in Table 3 does exactly that
and allows for an autoregressive error structure. It still nds that investment in physical
and human capital boost economic growth while population growth depresses growth in
income per capita. There is also again evidence for conditional convergence, so that poor
countries catch up. Interestingly, there is now evidence of a signicant positive direct
eect of point-source natural resources on economic growth. There is no evidence for a
signicant eect of openness on growth. There is evidence for a signicant direct eect
of nancial development on economic growth, but unfortunately it is negative. More
important, volatility of unanticipated growth exerts a powerful and negative eect on
growth of GDP per capita. As expected, volatility itself increases with the GDP share
of point-source resources and to a lesser extent with the GDP share of diuse resources.
Volatility also decreases with the degree of nancial development and openness of a
country to international trade, which supports the hypothesis put forward by Aghion et
al (2006) and Rose and Spiegel (2007). In line with Malik and Temple (2006), we nd
that volatility increases with the distance from navigable coast or rivers, which is their
strongest predictor of output volatility.
5.4.3 Dealing with the endogenous nature of investment shares
Growing countries attract more investment, so the direction of causality may go either
way. Even though we control for openness and nancial development, we probably do
not capture enough of the institutional eects on growth and investment. We therefore
look for an exogenous variable that strongly predicts the investment share, but does not
aect growth or correlate with other important unobserved characteristics. We choose to
instrument the investment share with an index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. This
index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given coun-
try will not belong to the same ethnic group (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a).12
The rationale is that trust, ability to communicate and social cohesion are essential pre-
12They base their data on the World Christian Encyclopedia. They argue that fractionalization is a
poor predictor of civil war compared to ethnic polarization. We are therefore more condent that there
is no eect of fractionalization on growth via the link of con
icts.
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requisites for successful investment. Fractionalized countries have lower levels of trust,
more corruption, less transfers, subsidies and political rights (Alesina et al, 2003). These
factors should lower the investment rate, since they increase uncertainty about returns
and expropriation.13 We also assume that ethno-linguistic fractionalization is randomly
`assigned' to countries and mostly historically determined. Countries should also not
have systematically dierent growth rates depending on their degree of ethnic fraction-
alization. We suspect that this is the case given the very dierent growth experiences of
countries among the top-ten of ethnic fractionalization, i.e., Canada, Senegal, India and
Mali. In the bottom-ten of least fractionalized countries are Norway, Japan, Tunisia,
and Greece. We also include two geographical variables: whether a country is land-
locked or not, and a climate variable. Investment opportunities may be lower if it is
more dicult for a country to diversify and export. Alesina et al (2003) also nd strong
correlations between ethno-linguistic fractionalization and geographical variables. This
allows us to isolate the eect of fractionalization on investment and most importantly to
conduct a Hansen over-identication test for exogeneity of the instruments. Regressions
(6b), (6c), and (6d) of Table 3 report the rst and two second stages of this IV exercise
and conrm the detrimental eect of volatility on growth. Regression (6c) uses all the
instruments in the rst stage, while (6d) uses only the ethno-linguistic fractionalization
index, for reasons explained below. Although the positive eect of the investment share
on growth is now larger, the qualitative results are similar to the ML estimates presented
in regression (6a). An interesting feature of the second-stage regressions (6c) and (6d)
is that the (weak) evidence for a positive direct eect of natural resources on growth
has disappeared. The rst stage (6b) of the IV regressions shows a large and signicant
positive correlation between natural resource dependence and the investment share. We
cannot claim that this corresponds to a causal eect, but it further explains the posi-
tive (although insignicant) direct eect of natural resource dependence on growth after
controlling for volatility.
These conclusions are supported by several statistical tests which measure the quality
of the IV-strategy. The rst stage (6b) conrms that ethno-linguistic fractionalization
has a strong negative eect on the investment share. The F-test on the excluded in-
struments is unfortunately below 9.08 (5% critical value for three instruments) which
13Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b) argue that ethnic polarization aects investment but not
growth, while fractionalization aects growth directly as in Easterly and Levine (1997), but not invest-
ment. However, these growth regressions do not control for population growth or volatility. If we run
regression 6a with ethnic fractionalization and polarization using their ethnicity data, we nd no growth
eects of these two variables. Adding polarization to the rst stage yields no eect of polarization, but
still gives a signicant negative eect of fractionalization on investment. Taking the eect of volatility
into account seems to have important eects on the link between ethnicity and growth, and should be
seen as complementary. Regressions available on request.
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means that the relative bias of using these instruments is larger than 10 percent of the
inconsistency of regression 6a. This means that there is still some bias in the equation
(Stock and Yogo, 2002). However, if we repeat the IV regressions with only ethnic frac-
tionalization in column (6d) we achieve an F-test value of 11.85. Ethnic fractionalization
is therefore a strong predictor of investment. Using only this instrument improves the
precision of several important estimates (rst-stage not reported). On the other hand,
using all three instruments allows us to test for their exogeneity because in this case the
equation is over-identied. The Hansen test14 is passed with condence in column (6b)
and implies that our instruments are exogenous.15
Figure 5 shows, on the basis of regression 6a, the marginal eect of resource depen-
dence on growth.16 This eect depends on the volatility of unanticipated output growth
because the standard deviation of unanticipated output growth impacts the mean equa-
tion while the variance equation explains the logarithm of the variance of unanticipated
output growth.17 Natural resource dependence is thus a curse for very volatile coun-
tries, but a boon for countries with relatively stable unanticipated output growth. In
fact (based on regression 6a), if  exceeds 0.071 (i.e., 2*0.050/(0.871*1.621), resource
dependence curbs growth and otherwise it boosts growth. However, after correcting for
the endogeneity of the initial investment share in regression 6c we do not nd a positive
resource eect anymore and  only has to exceed 0.046 (=2*0.036/(0.937*1.657)) to
decrease growth.18 We see from Figure 5 that for the less volatile OECD (including
Norway) and Asian Tigers, resource dependence is a boon for growth, while for volatile
landlocked Africa (especially Zambia) it is a curse. For resource-rich Africa the positive
direct eect of resource dependence is more or less canceled out by the indirect eect
through volatility. In later regressions we nd a negative direct eect of resource depen-
dence on growth, in which case the line in Figure 5 lies below the horizontal axis. The
14Robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
15A complicating factor is that the predicted investment share in regression 6c is a generated regressor
(Pagan, 1984), which causes standard errors to be too small (although coecients are consistently esti-
mated). A common solution is to block bootstrap the standard errors, which resamples every replication
from within each cluster (each country) to allow errors to be correlated within countries, but indepen-
dent between countries. Since it is very dicult to achieve convergence of the log likelihood function for
every replication, we use the fact that block bootstrapping is asymptotically equivalent to panel robust
sandwich standard errors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The latter correction of the standard errors is
what we use in all regressions, including 6c, to allow for within-country correlation of the errors. We
can therefore directly interpret the results.
16Note: RR. Africa = resource-rich Africa; LL. Africa = Landlocked Africa; Asian T. = Asian Tigers,
corresponding to Table 8.
17Ramey and Ramey (1995) have used the same specication. We also tried the logarithm of the
variance in the mean equation, but this gave a much worse t.
18If we take the t-test literally the direct eect is not dierent from zero and therefore only the indirect
eect matters, which is always negative. In that case resources are a curse for any level of volatility.
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resource curse is always more severe for more volatile countries.
5.4.4 Natural resource rents, volatility and growth
Our regressions 6 quantify the eects of the GDP share of natural resource exports on
volatility and growth, but it seems relevant to also take account of production costs of
extracting natural resources. Regressions 7 therefore present the corresponding ML and
IV estimates with the GDP share of natural resource rents as an explanatory variable.
Again, growth performance is negatively aected by volatility of unanticipated output
growth even after allowing for the positive eect of investment shares and the negative
eect of population growth and initial income per capita on growth performance. Also,
the direct eects of natural resource rents on growth are statistically signicant and
negative (but insignicant once we allow for the endogeneity of investments). The inter-
action terms with nancial development and openness are signicant and positive (also
once we allow for endogenous investments) while nancial development and openness
now have a negative direct eect on growth. This indicates that nancial development
and openness are especially growth enhancing for resource-rich economies and that nat-
ural resource rents boost growth provided countries are open and nancially developed.
Figure 6 shows that for already moderate degrees of nancial development the marginal
eect of the rent share on growth is positive rather than negative. Resource depen-
dence has a positive eect on growth in open economies and a negative eect for closed
economies.19 Hence, countries that are open to international trade and have a high
degree of nancial development turn the resource curse into a blessing.
Turning to the determinants of volatility, we see that the GDP share of point-source
resource rents and the distance from the navigable coast or rivers have a signicant pos-
itive eect on volatility and thus a negative eect on growth. Rents on diuse resources
do not seem to impact volatility and growth. Still, there is a signicant negative eect
of openness and nancial development on volatility of unanticipated output growth and
thus a positive eect on growth.
Unfortunately, our set of instruments does not perform as well when we use resource
rents which is re
ected in large standard errors in regression 7c and an insignicant
eect of the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index in the rst stage regression 7b, even
though the Hansen test supports our claim that the instruments are exogenous. The
F-test in the rst-stage is also very small and remains small in regression 7d where only
the investment share is used. However, qualitatively the estimates are very similar in
19The line shifts to the left for full openness and more to the right the less open a country was to
trade in 1970.
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nature to the regressions where resource export revenues were used.
Summing up and probing deeper into the determinants of volatility, we nd that
countries that are closed to international trade, have badly functioning nancial markets,
are landlocked and have a high share of natural resource rents have higher volatility in
unanticipated growth in output per capita and therefore worse growth prospects. These
results suggest, in contrast to the previous literature, that volatility of commodity prices
is a key feature of the resource curse.
5.4.5 Impact of volatility of various commodity export shares on macroe-
conomic volatility
With regression 6a as the benchmark, regression 6e in Table 4 tries to see if marginal
eect of initial resource dependence on volatility is weaker if a country starts o from
a higher level of nancial development as well. This seems not to be the case. How-
ever, it is more likely that nancial services give countries the means to deal with the
large world price shocks and will reduce the eect of resource wealth 
uctuations on
output volatility. Financial development may limit the pass-through of volatile resource
income into general output volatility through insurance and easing of borrowing con-
straints. The second half of Table 5 therefore focuses on ML estimates of regressions
with 
uctuations in the GDP shares of resource exports as an additional explanatory
variable in the variance equation. Since resource quantities are relatively inelastic, most
of the revenue movement will originate in world prices. Regression 9a indicates that
adding the volatility of the GDP share of both point-source and diuse resources to the
variance equation signicantly helps to explain the volatility of unanticipated output
growth. Regression 9b indicates that, inspired by Fat as and Mihov (2005), adding the
volatility of the GDP share of government spending (capturing policy shocks and spend-
ing bonanzas following windfall revenues) also signicantly improves our estimate of the
volatility of unanticipated growth. Furthermore, regression 9c shows that especially the
volatility of food export share, the volatility of fuel export share and the volatility of
ores & metals export share contribute to the volatility of unanticipated output growth.
The volatility eect of natural resources is thus not limited to oil-producing countries,
but also includes for example copper, coee, banana and tobacco exporters. The quali-
tative results of the estimated equation for annual growth are not much aected, except
that the estimated negative eect of volatility of unanticipated output growth on mean
annual growth is almost three times smaller and closer to the black-box estimate with
individual country dummies (despite being much more parsimonious). Although we did
not nd evidence for a signicant interaction term between nancial development and
initial point-source resource dependence in the variance equation, we nd in regression
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9d that well-functioning capital markets greatly reduce the eect that shocks in the
resource share have on volatility. Consistent with the model of section 2, a stable share
of natural resources in GDP does not increase volatility by itself, but rapid 
uctuations
in the share through prices create liquidity constraints and harm growth. Financial de-
velopment gives a country the means to deal with sudden changes in resource revenues.
This holds even after we control for terms-of-trade shocks.
5.4.6 Impact of ethnic tensions and economic restrictions on volatility
and growth
Table 5 presents some further renements and robustness tests of our results. Since
ethnic polarization as dened by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b) is a good pre-
dictor of civil con
ict, it may also be a good predictor of volatility. We want to check
whether resources still have an independent eect on volatility when we allow for an
eect of ethnic polarization. Furthermore, this measure takes its highest value if a
country is equally divided into two groups. Such a situation may increase instability
if natural resources are present as well. Regression 10a indicates indeed that ethnic
polarization signicantly improves the estimate of the volatility of unanticipated output
growth, but does not have an independent direct eect on growth. The interaction term
shows that there is also a signicant positive interaction with resource dependence: the
more polarized a country, the more resources lead to volatile economies through con
ict
and rent-seeking government policy. Regression 10b shows that ethnic polarization is
no longer important once the volatility of the export shares of point-source and diuse
resources, and the volatility of the GDP share of government spending are used as ex-
planatory variables of volatility. Resources are not necessarily bad, but anything that
magnies already volatile prices, such as public spending booms and busts (possibly
related to civil tensions), seems to harm long-run growth prospects.
Table 5 also tests for the impact of economic restrictions to examine whether nan-
cial and trade liberalization boosts or depresses growth. We replace the single open-
ness dummy with four measures of restrictions from the Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Restrictions (IMF, 2006). Regression 11a indicates that capital ac-
count restrictions have a somewhat negative direct impact on growth. However, this is
swamped by the negative eect of capital account restrictions on volatility and thus the
positive eect on growth, especially for countries with a high degree of natural resource
dependence. Capital account restrictions may thus help to curb volatility and increase
growth performance, especially in resource-rich countries.20 Access to international
20Kose et al (2003) nd that increased gross nancial 
ows and absence of capital account restrictions
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capital markets may have a pro-cyclical element, which tends to generate higher output
volatility especially in resource-rich, developing economies. Current account restrictions
have no signicant direct eect on growth, but do contribute to volatility especially
in resource-rich countries and thus hamper growth. Regression 11a also indicates that
the surrender of export receipts is associated with higher volatility and lower growth.
Multiple exchange practices lower volatility and increase growth, since they are a form
of exchange control and curb volatile capital in- and out
ows. Regression 11b drops
the interaction terms and includes the 
uctuations in revenues and government spend-
ing as well as terms-of-trade shocks. The eect of the four restrictions is qualitatively
unchanged.
5.5 Robustness of Results
5.5.1 Detrimental eect of volatility greater in OECD sample?
Ramey and Ramey (1995) found evidence that the detrimental eect of volatility on
growth was actually slightly larger in OECD countries. This is surprising, because
OECD countries have a much higher level of development of institutions and nancial
markets. Table 6 explores how our results hold for the much smaller OECD sample.
The rst column repeats regression 6a with the full sample of countries but summarizes
the resources into one variable. The third column shows that we also nd a somewhat
stronger eect of volatility on growth in OECD countries. This does not mean, however,
that volatility is a bigger problem in these developed countries. The standard error has
also increased by enough to make both results indistinguishable from each other, and the
predicted sample volatility for OECD countries is at least half that of the full sample.
The net eect on growth is thus close to half what it is for the full set of countries,
and much higher for the non-OECD countries. Regression 12d OECD indicates that the
signicance of this dierence actually disappears when we further condition volatility on
government spending volatility, ethnic tensions, and volatility of the terms of trade as is
done for the full sample in 12b. In fact, for the developed OECD countries there appear
to be no negative eect of output volatility. They are suciently open to international
trade and nancially developed to balance the adverse eects of government spending
booms and busts and 
uctuations in the terms of trade.
An interesting nding is that resource dependence does not increase volatility, but
rather decreases it in OECD countries. Countries such as Norway and The Netherlands
with signicant resource exports have very stable institutions which may be able to turn
lead to an increase in the relative volatility of consumption.
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around any resource curse into a blessing. This is further supported by the positive
direct eect of resources on growth in the mean equation of regression 12c of Table 6.
Consistent with the result that nancial development can alleviate the resource curse,
natural resources can be a blessing for countries with the institutional means to spend
the proceeds wisely.
5.5.2 Robustness: short-run panel perspective and xed-eects esti-
mation
We allow volatility to be time dependent by building a ve-year panel. Instead of using
1970 values of explanatory variables, we use values for 1970, 1975, 1980, and so on, in
regressions 13, and non-overlapping ve-year means in regressions 14-16, for each year
within the respective 5-year period. However, for both the dependent variable and its
lag, we still use yearly observations to yield ve errors for each ve-year period over
which to calculate the volatility. For example, the ten growth rates between 1970 and
1980 are regressed on ve repeated initial values of 1970 and ve initial values of 1975,
or regressed on ve repeated means calculated over the years 1970-75, and ve means
calculated over the years 1975-1980. In both cases it is the standard deviation over
the errors of period t to t + 5. It is true that this is a short time period for a standard
deviation, but on the other hand it allows institutions and other determinants of growth
and volatility to change over time. We estimate the following panel data specication:
log(yit) = it + Xit + Zit + dt + it; 2
it = exp(Zit
 + ct) and (5.8)
it  N(0;2
it); i = 1;:::;N: t = 1;:::;T:
Zit now includes time-varying data on nancial development, resource dependence,
and so on, which also allows volatility to vary over time. As various countries become
more open to the world economy over the years, this allows us to address the question
whether countries as a consequence become less volatile. This allows for a richer story
than the hypothesis tested so far, namely that countries which were open in 1970 were
less volatile in the 33 years thereafter. Furthermore, we can factor out the eect of
unobserved xed eects on growth. To do this, we apply the within-transformation
(subtracting the mean of each variable over the period 1970-2003 per country from itself)
on all variables and re-estimate the panel with maximum likelihood. The coecients
can then be interpreted as the eect of a change in the variable relative to its country-
mean over time. it is not de-meaned itself, but represents the volatility of de-meaned
growth shocks. One possible drawback is that xed-eects estimation also factors out
important long-run characteristics of countries such as average nancial development and
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natural resource abundance. This is why xed-eects regressions are not our preferred
specication. Table 7 reports the panel estimates of the eects of volatility, natural
resource dependence, nancial development and openness (as well as investment rates,
schooling, population growth and initial income per capita) on growth in GDP per
capita. We nd signicant negative eects of volatility on growth in all cases, although
short-run volatility over and above long-run volatility (which is absorbed by the xed
eects) is somewhat less signicant. We see the most notable dierences between the
pooled regressions 13a and 14a, and the xed-eects regressions 13b and 14b in the
variance equation.21 Most of the eects from the previous tables are still present in the
pooled regressions. After controlling for country xed eects (e.g., a country's average
level of nancial development), we see that an increase in nancial development does
not signicantly decrease volatility over a short run period of ve years. The strongest
remaining eect is that of volatility of changes in the terms of trade. This also aects
short-run increases in volatility. The dierence between regressions 15, 12b and 12d
OECD of Table 5 is remarkable. Countries that were nancially developed in 1970 could
dampen the eect of long-run terms of trade volatility on volatility of unanticipated
output growth, but the eect works the other way around in a short-run, xed-eects
regression both in the full sample and in the OECD sample. Short-run terms of trade
volatility may coincide with credit booms, such as during the Asian crisis. In any case,
the sample means for these variables (at the bottom of Table 7) are very small which
shows that these short-run eects are less important than they appear. The eect of
a short-run increase in the value of natural resource exports has on the other hand no
direct eect on volatility, but still interacts negatively with nancial development.
5.6 Accounting for growth performance: Africa versus the
Asian Tigers
To get a feeling for what our estimates of the determinants of growth in GDP per capita
imply in practice, it is interesting to perform some counterfactual exercises. We perform
these exercises based on our preferred equation 6a of Table 3. It is insightful to compare
the African countries with the Asian Tigers22, since they have similar starting positions
(in 1970). We therefore compare in Table 8 resource-rich and landlocked Africa with
the Asian Tigers. Resource-rich countries are those in the global top 25 and natural
21The observed xed eects of distance to the nearest navigable river or coast and long run government
spending volatility are factored out by the within transformation. Government spending did not vary
enough across 5-year periods to be able to include it in regressions 14b, and 15b-17. We also left out
ethno-linguistic polarization as it limits the sample and would also be absorbed by xed eects.
22The Asian Tigers in our sample are: South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.
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resource exports valuing on average more than 17.31% of GDP during 1970-2003. Since
the resource-rich countries of Africa were poorer in 1970 than the Asian Tigers, they
grow faster and catch up, everything else equal. We see from the top panel of Table 7
that this growth dierential amounts to 0.87%-point per year (the dierence in initial
GDP per capita times the coecient). Allowing for the positive direct growth eects of
higher natural resource dependence in Africa, we see that the growth dierential with
the Tigers becomes 1.31%-point. Now if those African countries would invest as much
in physical and human capital as the Asian Tigers, they would add a further 0.65%-
and 0.46%-points, respectively to their annual growth rate. If resource-rich Africa's
population growth rate were to be reduced in line with the Tigers, Africa would gain yet
another 0.43%-point annual growth. These three factors combined yield an extra bonus
to potential growth of 1.54%-point. However, the key message is how much potential
growth is lost due to the high volatility of unanticipated output growth in resource-
rich Africa compared with the Asian Tigers: a whopping 2.98%-point extra growth per
annum! The main reasons for the high volatility of these resource-rich countries in
Africa compared with the Asian Tigers are their heavy dependence on natural resources
(increasing volatility by 0.41%-point, translating into a 0.52%-point loss in growth, their
lack of openness (1.71%-point), their badly developed nancial markets (0.58%-point)
and their distance from navigable waterways (1.07%-point).23
The bottom panel of Table 8 compares landlocked Africa with the Tigers. The results
are similar, although the prospects of these countries are perhaps even more miserable.
Still, as landlocked Africa starts o from a worse starting position than resource-rich
Africa, it catches up more quickly and thus grows 1.41%-point faster than the Tigers.
Accounting for landlocked Africa being more dependent on resources than the Tigers,
would raise this growth dierential to 1.74%-point. Now bringing mainly investment in
physical and human capital but also population growth in line with the Tigers would add
an extra 1.47%-point growth per annum. This oers some hope. However, if landlocked
Africa were to be able to bring down its volatility of unanticipated output in line with
that of the Tigers, it would boost growth by a further 1.97%-point per annum. The
potential growth bonus is thus 3.44%-point. If this were feasible, landlocked Africa's
negative growth dierential with the Tigers of -3.82%-points could have been reduced
to a little as -0.38%-points. The countries Malawi and Zambia are resource rich and
landlocked. They also have relatively high volatility and poorly developed nancial
23Each number is obtained by keeping all other variables constant and using the Asian Tiger's number
for the respective variable. The eect on growth is then calculated using the coecient on volatility in
the mean equation. They therefore re
ect the growth eect of changing only one variable to the Asian
Tiger's 1970 level.
Poelhekke, Steven (2008), Urban Growth Across Three Continents: The Blessing of Human Capital and the Curse of Volatility 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/18439Chapter 5. Volatility & Natural Resource Curse 125
systems. Not surprisingly, they have a lot to gain.
We conclude that a big push to economic growth occurs if the volatility of unantici-
pated output growth in Africa is brought down to the level of the Asian Tigers. The big
contributing factors to Africa's volatility are its volatile stream of mainly point-source
natural resource revenues, its lack of fully developed nancial markets and openness to
international trade, and its disadvantages of being relatively more landlocked than the
Asian Tigers.
5.7 Conclusion
We have shown that the curse of natural resources is foremost a problem of volatility.
The high volatility of world prices of natural resources causes severe volatility of output
per capita growth in countries that depend heavily on them. The resulting volatility of
unanticipated output growth has a robust negative eect on long-run growth itself and
can therefore rightly be termed a curse. This is not limited to oil-producing countries,
but also applies to exporters of copper, coee, foods, amongst others. which include
many of the world's worst performing countries. Also, ethnic tensions, which are often
fueled by resource wealth, and current account restrictions increase volatility. The latter
eect is especially strong in resource-rich countries. Government spending bonanzas af-
ter windfall resource revenues also increase volatility to the detriment of growth, because
revenue drops inevitably follow.
Volatility can fortunately be substantially reduced provided that countries have a
sound nancial system to cope with large and sudden 
uctuations in resource income.
Fewer capital account restrictions, openness, and physical access to world trade also
lower volatility. Countries can turn the curse even into a blessing, because we nd
evidence for a positive direct eect of natural resource dependence on growth after
controlling for volatility. The key to a turn-around for many resource-rich countries is
nancial development, ensuring openness and mitigating the eect of being landlocked,
because the indirect negative eect of resource dependence on growth, via volatility, is
much larger than any direct positive eect. While it may be dicult to lower price
volatility of resources themselves, it should be feasible to deal with volatility in a more
ecient way. Future research should focus on ways to overcome the political temptations
of short-run resource wealth to create the nancial and political institutions needed to
reduce volatility, soften the impact of volatility on growth, and prevent poverty.
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Appendicies
5.A Data sources
Variable Name Denition Source
GDP/capita
growth rate
Ln dierence in real GDP per capita, Laspeyres PWT 6.2 from He-
ston et al. (2006)
Investment share of
GDP
Gross xed capital formation as % of GDP PWT 6.2 from He-




Ln dierence in total population PWT 6.2 from He-
ston et al. (2006)
log per capita GDP Ln real GDP per capita PWT 6.2 from He-
ston et al. (2006)
Human capital Average schooling years in the population (age 25+) Barro & Lee (2000)
Point-source re-
sources
F.o.b. value of exported fuels + ores & metals as a percentage of
GDP
WDI (2006)
Diuse resources F.o.b. value of exported foods and agricultural raw materials as
a percentage of GDP
WDI (2006)
Fuels F.o.b. value of exports as a percentage of GDP. Corresponds
to SITC section 3 (mineral fuels). Volatility refers to standard
deviation of the yearly shares of GDP.
WDI (2006)
Ores & Metals F.o.b. value of exports as a percentage of GDP. Commodities
in SITC divisions 27, 28, and 68 (nonferrous metals). Volatility




F.o.b. value of exports as a percentage of GDP. Corresponds
to SITC section: 2 (crude materials except fuels) excluding di-
visions 22, 27 (crude fertilizers and minerals excluding coal,
petroleum, and precious stones), and 28 (metalliferous ores and
scrap). Volatility refers to standard deviation of the yearly shares
of GDP.
WDI (2006)
Foods F.o.b. value of exports as a percentage of GDP. Commodities
in SITC sections: 0 (food and live animals), 1 (beverages and
tobacco), and 4 (animal and vegetable oils and fats) and SITC
division 22 (oil seeds, oil nuts, and oil kernels). Volatility refers
to standard deviation of the yearly shares of GDP.
WDI (2006)
Resource rents (total sale value total production costs)/GDP, current US$ World Bank (2007)
and WDI (2006)
for bauxite, copper, nickel, tin, zinc, lead, phosphates, iron ore,
silver, gold (ores); brown coal, hard coal, oil, natural gas (fuels)
Monthly world
commodity prices
Monthly averages of free-market price indices for all food, agri-
cultural raw materials, minerals, ores & metals, crude petroleum





Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) WDI (2006)








standard deviation of yearly share of government expenditure of
GDP
PWT 6.2 from hes-
ton et al. (2006)
sd ToT index
growth
standard deviation of yearly terms-of-trade index growth rate,
where the terms-of-trade index is dened as the vaue of total ex-
ports over total imports
PWT 6.2 from hes-
ton et al. (2006)
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Index of ethno-linguistic polarization (0: many small groups, to






Index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (0 to 1), the probability
that two randomly selected individuals from a given country will






yes = 1 IMF (2006)
Current Account
Restrictions
yes = 1 IMF (2006)
Capital Account
Restrictions
yes = 1 IMF (2006)
Surrender of Ex-
port receipts
yes = 1 IMF (2006)
5.B Tables
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Table 5.2: Natural Resource Curse and Regional Volatility
Dependent Variable yearly GDP growth per capita 1970-2003
(constant 2000 international dollars, PWT 6.2) 1 2 3 4 5
Mean equation Resource Export Revenues Rents
Av. investment share of GDP 70-03 0.108*** 0.079*** 0.063*** 0.053*** 0.083***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020)
Av. population growth rate 70-03 -0.472*** -0.337*** -0.411*** -0.460*** -0.624***
(0.118) (0.112) (0.127) (0.158) (0.141)
log per capita GDP 1970 -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Human capital 1970 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Volatility (i) -0.110** -0.089* -0.126** -0.243** -0.240***
(0.049) (0.047) (0.058) (0.113) (0.087)
1st lag GDP per capita growth 0.264*** 0.264*** 0.240*** 0.207***
(0.015) (0.032) (0.028) (0.031)
Point-source resources 1970 -0.071** -0.035
(0.035) (0.041)
Point-source rent share 1970 -0.202***
(0.044)
Diused resources 1970 -0.000 0.010 0.033**
(0.018) (0.020) (0.014)
Financial development 1970 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Openness dummy 1970 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Point-source resources * openness 70 0.003 0.012
(0.086) (0.073)
Point-source rent share * openness 70 0.177**
(0.085)
Point-source resources * Fin. Dev. 70 0.280 0.181
(0.215) (0.191)
Point-source rent share * Fin. Dev. 70 0.745***
(0.182)
Constant 0.110*** 0.084*** 0.100*** 0.117*** 0.106***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011)
Variance equation
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.557*** 2.618***
(0.207) (0.224)
Middle-East & North Africa 1.708*** 1.675***
(0.258) (0.305)
Latin America & Caribbean 1.583*** 1.561***
(0.176) (0.178)
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 1.410*** 1.350***
(0.036) (0.050)
East Asia & Pacic 1.010*** 0.852***
(0.195) (0.221)
South Asia 0.444** 0.356**
(0.182) (0.165)
Western Europe 0.192 0.256
(0.153) (0.163)
North America Reference region
(least volatile)
Constant -3.823*** -3.947*** -6.630*** -7.788*** -7.747***
(0.118) (0.121) (0.024) (0.033) (0.041)
Country dummies in variance eq. yes yes yes no no
Observations 3448 3437 2185 2185 2014
Log likelihood 5898.5 5997.9 4226.6 4017.1 3759.4
Countries 103 103 65 65 60
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Clustered (by country) in regressions 2 to 5.
Poelhekke, Steven (2008), Urban Growth Across Three Continents: The Blessing of Human Capital and the Curse of Volatility 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/18439Chapter 5. Volatility & Natural Resource Curse 135
Table 5.3: Underlying Determinants of Volatility and the Natural Resource Curse
Dependent Variable yit Av.
inv/GDP
yit yit yit Av.
inv/GDP
yit yit
(constant 2000 international dollars, (6a) (6b) (6c) (6d) (7a) (7b) (7c) (7d)
PWT 6.2) ML 1st stage IV-ML IV-ML ML 1st stage IV-ML IV-ML
Mean equation Resource Export Revenues Resource Rents
Av. investment share of GDP 70-03 0.045* 0.119** 0.113* 0.094*** 0.137** 0.151**
(0.025) (0.056) (0.061) (0.019) (0.066) (0.071)
1st lag GDP per capita growth 0.221*** 0.053** 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.205*** 0.068*** 0.203*** 0.201***
(0.025) (0.021) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024) (0.028) (0.029)
Av. population growth rate 70-03 -0.478*** 0.258 -0.457***-0.460*** -0.692*** -0.236 -0.612*** -0.607***
(0.144) (0.832) (0.162) (0.157) (0.105) (0.964) (0.142) (0.142)
log per capita GDP 1970 -0.014*** -0.026** -0.013***-0.013*** -0.012*** -0.021 -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.012) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003)
Human capital 1970 0.002** 0.012*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.012*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Volatility (i) -0.971** -0.897* -0.937** -0.843*** -1.069* -1.055***
(0.378) (0.508) (0.415) (0.286) (0.584) (0.378)
Point-source resources 1970 0.050* 0.242*** 0.033 0.036
(0.030) (0.039) (0.041) (0.027)
Point-source rent share 1970 -0.188*** 0.543** -0.120 -0.132
(0.051) (0.229) (0.116) (0.085)
Financial development 1970 -0.018** 0.067* -0.021** -0.021*** -0.027*** 0.066* -0.031*** -0.031***
(0.007) (0.037) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.035) (0.010) (0.006)
Point-source rent % * Fin. Dev. 70 0.948*** -0.311 0.572*** 0.601***
(0.144) (1.691) (0.207) (0.179)
Openness dummy 1970 -0.006 0.058*** -0.010 -0.010* -0.009** 0.052** -0.014* -0.015**
(0.005) (0.018) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.022) (0.007) (0.006)
Point-source rent % * openness 70 0.208** -0.032 0.198* 0.201**
(0.101) (0.064) (0.102) (0.099)
Constant 0.170*** 0.151*** 0.157*** 0.149*** 0.162*** 0.158***
(0.030) (0.046) (0.032) (0.021) (0.043) (0.035)
Landlocked dummy -0.012 -0.007
(0.013) (0.012)
% Pop. in temperate climate 0.002 0.004
(0.026) (0.032)
Ethnic fractionalization index -0.073*** -0.059*
(0.026) (0.035)
Variance equation
Point-source resources 1970 1.621*** 1.655 1.657**
(0.589) (1.386) (0.657)
Point-source rent share 1970 2.449*** 2.568 2.575**
(0.935) (1.723) (1.272)
Diused resources 1970 0.801 0.982 0.980 0.154 0.260 0.261
(0.514) (1.952) (0.711) (0.783) (0.626) (0.649)
Financial development 1970 -1.290*** -1.299***-1.300*** -1.423*** -1.430*** -1.430***
(0.072) (0.457) (0.184) (0.209) (0.092) (0.167)
Openness dummy 1970 -0.693*** -0.681***-0.682*** -0.709*** -0.717*** -0.717***
(0.160) (0.129) (0.182) (0.242) (0.149) (0.085)
Distance to navigable river, coast 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -6.100*** 0.313*** -6.118***-6.117*** -5.974*** 0.281** -5.958*** -5.959***
(0.062) (0.090) (0.278) (0.070) (0.054) (0.116) (0.059) (0.073)
F-stat. on excl. instruments 6.46 11.85 2.44 5.65
Hansen overid. J-stat. (p-value) 0.126 0.366
Observations 2084 2084 2084 2084 1980 1980 1980 1980
R2 . 0.72 . . . 0.67 . .
Log likelihood 3732.3 3927.4 3732.6 3731.9 3584.0 3538.4 3576.2 3576.4
Countries 62 62 62 62 59 59 59 59
Clustered (by country) standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. yit =yearly GDP growth
per capita 1970-2003.
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Table 5.4: Eects of GDP Shares of Natural Resources on Volatility and Growth
Dependent Variable yearly GDP growth
per capita 1970-2003
yearly GDP growth per capita 1970-2003
(constant 2000 international $, PWT 6.2) (6a) (6e) (9a) (9b) (9c) (9d) (9e)
Mean equation
1st lag GDP per capita growth 0.221*** 0.220*** 0.232*** 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.226*** 0.226***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Av. investment share of GDP 70-03 0.045* 0.045* 0.063** 0.065** 0.063** 0.065** 0.074***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Av. population growth rate 70-03 -0.478*** -0.478*** -0.461*** -0.346** -0.343** -0.358** -0.307**
(0.144) (0.145) (0.133) (0.152) (0.149) (0.139) (0.147)
log per capita GDP 1970 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.011***-0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Human capital 1970 0.002** 0.002** 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Volatility (i) -0.971** -1.022*** -0.427***-0.350**-0.334**-0.426***-0.388***
(0.378) (0.297) (0.129) (0.141) (0.148) (0.148) (0.127)
Point-source resources 1970 0.050* 0.054* 0.014 0.008 0.005 0.018 0.016
(0.030) (0.028) (0.023) (0.023) (0.029) (0.023) (0.022)
Financial development 1970 -0.018** -0.018*** -0.010* -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Openness dummy 1970 -0.006 -0.007* 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.170*** 0.174*** 0.121*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.115*** 0.104***
(0.030) (0.027) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015)
Variance equation
Point-source resources 1970 1.621*** 2.125*** -0.426 -0.720 -0.493 -0.563 -1.247***
(0.589) (0.596) (0.488) (0.634) (0.645) (0.862) (0.337)
Diused resources 1970 0.801 0.807 -0.897*** -0.133 -1.076 0.167 0.483
(0.514) (0.497) (0.323) (0.638) (0.974) (0.430) (0.378)
Financial development 1970 -1.290*** -1.266*** -1.063*** -0.858***-0.842*** -0.754*** -0.594***
(0.072) (0.121) (0.136) (0.096) (0.226) (0.166) (0.153)
Openness dummy -0.693*** -0.700*** -0.467*** -0.536*** -0.487** -0.545*** -0.215**
(0.160) (0.160) (0.180) (0.174) (0.207) (0.164) (0.095)
Distance to navigable river, coast 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Initial point res. * Fin. Dev. -2.780
(2.049)
Point based export share volatility 9.303*** 9.528*** 15.837*** 14.491***
(0.774) (1.286) (1.141) (0.588)
Diused export share volatility 10.907*** 3.899* 1.841* 3.737***
(1.491) (2.004) (1.047) (1.377)
Government share volatility 70-03 10.525***10.406*** 9.786*** 8.372***
(1.179) (3.260) (2.709) (1.510)
Agricultural R.M. res. share vol. 70-03 0.631
(3.023)
Food resource share vol. 70-03 10.916***
(1.690)
Ores & metals res. share vol. 70-03 6.626***
(2.543)
Fuels res. share vol. 70-03 9.513***
(1.719)
Fin. dev. * point-source volatility -34.343***-29.620***
(6.542) (3.295)
sd ToT growth, 70-03 4.321***
(0.181)
Constant -6.100*** -6.093*** -6.517*** -6.751***-6.826*** -6.711*** -7.401***
(0.062) (0.067) (0.030) (0.035) (0.057) (0.075) (0.020)
Observations 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084
Log Likelihood 3732.3 3732.5 3792.2 3814.4 3815.2 3819.0 3842.8
Countries 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Clustered (by country) standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 5.5: Ethnic Tensions, Economic Restrictions and the Resource Curse
Ethnic tensions (10a) (10b) Economic Restrictions (11a) (11b)
Mean equation Mean equation
1st lag GDP per capita growth 0.219*** 0.229*** 1st lag GDP per capita growth 0.220*** 0.228***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
Av. investment share of GDP 70-03 0.053** 0.069*** Av. investment share of GDP 70-03 0.077*** 0.081***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.018) (0.019)
Av. population growth rate 70-03 -0.451*** -0.244 Av. population growth rate 70-03 -0.426*** -0.394***
(0.153) (0.160) (0.130) (0.114)
log per capita GDP 1970 -0.013*** -0.010*** log per capita GDP 1970 -0.012*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Human capital 1970 0.001** 0.001 Human capital 1970 0.002*** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Volatility (i) -0.686***-0.320*** Volatility (si) -0.490***-0.337***
(0.212) (0.121) (0.153) (0.114)
Initial point-source resources 70 0.019 0.008 Initial point-source resources 70 0.064*** 0.037**
(0.037) (0.028) (0.021) (0.019)
Financial development 1970 -0.014** -0.007 Financial development 1970 -0.012** -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Openness dummy 70 -0.002 0.002 Current Account Restrictions (yes=1) 0.004* 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Ethnic Polarization 0.002 -0.003 Capital Account restrictions (yes=1) -0.005* -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.143*** 0.098*** Constant 0.125*** 0.105***
(0.023) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012)
Variance equation Variance equation
Point-source resources 1970 -4.785*** -1.348** Point-source resources 1970 5.314*** 0.016
(0.395) (0.542) (0.340) (0.455)
Diuse resources 1970 0.863 0.213 Diuse resources 1970 2.082** 0.121
(0.611) (0.523) (0.862) (0.878)
Financial development 1970 -1.140*** -0.683*** Financial development 1970 -1.232*** -0.582***
(0.113) (0.095) (0.197) (0.132)
Openness dummy 1970 -0.624*** -0.187
(0.097) (0.139)
Distance to navigable river or coast 0.001*** 0.000** Distance to navigable river or coast 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ethnic Polarization 0.402*** 0.056 Ethnic Polarization 0.965*** 0.296***
(0.088) (0.127) (0.122) (0.058)
Point-source exp. share vol. 70-03 8.834*** Point-source exp. share vol. 70-03 7.811***
(1.327) (0.542)
Diuse export share vol. 70-03 5.827** Diuse export share vol. 70-03 10.504***
(2.601) (1.118)
Government share vol. 70-03 8.725*** Government share vol. 70-03 3.752*
(2.072) (2.179)
sd TOT index growth 4.537*** sd TOT index growth 4.166***
(0.483) (0.322)
Constant -6.406*** -7.491*** Constant -7.303*** -7.813***
(0.043 (0.034) (0.027) (0.048)
Point-source res. 70 * Eth. Pol. 8.536*** Multiple Exchange Practices (yes=1) -0.759*** -0.438**
(0.369 (0.186) (0.178)
Current Account Restrict. (yes=1) 0.426*** 0.511***
(0.105) (0.069)
Capital Account restrict. (yes=1) -0.294*** -0.311***
(0.045) (0.070)
Surrender of Export receipts (yes=1) 0.384*** 0.242***
(0.081) (0.082)
Cur. Acc. Restrict. * Point Res. 70 4.877***
(1.080)
Cap. Acc. Restrict. * Point Res. 70 -2.508***
(0.634)
Observations 2084 2084 Observations 2013 2013
Log likelihood 3748.2 3840.1 Log likelihood 3622.6 3707.2
Countries 62 62 Countries 60 60
Clustered (by country) standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 5.6: Robustness: OECD Sample
Dependent Variable yearly GDP growth per capita 1970-2003
(constant 2000 international dollars, PWT 6.2) (12a) (12b) (12c OECD) (12d OECD)
Full Sample
Mean equation
Av. investment share of GDP 70-03 0.044* 0.064** -0.015 -0.013
(0.025) (0.027) (0.016) (0.015)
1st lag GDP per capita growth 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.284*** 0.263***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.045) (0.047)
Av. population growth rate 70-03 -0.490*** -0.326** -0.361** -0.323**
(0.120) (0.136) (0.161) (0.141)
log per capita GDP -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.024*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Human capital 1970 0.002** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Volatility (i) -0.841*** -0.320* -1.086** 0.235
(0.266) 0.129 (0.504) (0.256)
Financial development 1970 -0.016** -0.006 -0.006 0.008***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003)
Openness dummy 1970 -0.007 0.001 -0.000 0.010***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Total resources 1970 0.019 0.009 -0.044 0.036**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.044) (0.016)
Constant 0.159*** 0.101*** 0.265*** 0.191***
(0.026) (0.017) (0.026) (0.032)
Variance equation
Financial development 1970 -1.615*** -1.039*** -1.311*** -0.713***
(0.086) (0.103) (0.076) (0.067)
Openness dummy 1970 -0.841*** -0.496*** -0.648*** -0.257***
(0.189) (0.101) (0.068) (0.058)
Distance to nearest navigable river or coast 0.001*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total resources 1970 1.038*** 0.123 -7.787*** -4.356***
(0.352) (0.392) (0.776) (1.070)
Government spending volatility 70-03 9.674*** 20.044***
(2.250) (4.775)
Ethnolinguistic Polarization index 0.201*** -0.762***
(0.050) (0.105)
sd ToT index growth 70-03 5.963*** 8.037***
(0.265) (0.543)
Constant -6.050*** -7.356*** -6.112*** -7.700***
(0.048) (0.026) (0.048) (0.038)
Volatility within sample 0.044 0.021
(s.d.) (0.016) (0.006)
Year dummies in mean equation yes yes yes yes
Observations 2024 2024 782 759
Countries 62 62 23 23
Log Likelihood 3723.5 3793.7 1947.2 1914.4
Clustered (by country) standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5.7: Robustness: Panel-ML Estimates of Volatility and the Natural Resource
Curse
Dependent Variable yearly GDP growth per capita 1970-2003
(constant 2000 international $, (13a) (13b) (14a) (14b) (15) (15 OECD) (16)
PWT 6.2) Within Within Within Within Within
independent variables are independent variables are
5-yearly initial values 5-yearly non-overlapping averages
Mean equation
Investment share of GDP 0.034* 0.008 0.076*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.021 0.100***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.032) (0.031) (0.051) (0.030)
1st lag GDP per capita growth 0.266*** 0.101*** 0.251*** 0.090*** 0.097*** 0.270*** 0.098***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.047) (0.029)
Population growth rate -0.356** 0.276 -0.307* -0.021 -0.085 0.296 -0.107
(0.167) (0.229) (0.161) (0.262) (0.252) (0.307) (0.252)
log per capita GDP -0.012*** -0.019** -0.010*** -0.005 -0.008 -0.012 -0.008
(0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Human capital 0.001** -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Volatility (it) -0.269*** -0.747** -0.249** -0.967* -0.994***-0.434***-0.823***
(0.098) (0.362) (0.110) (0.503) (0.345) (0.161) (0.284)
Financial development -0.001 -0.015 -0.002 -0.024 -0.029** -0.106*** -0.021*
(0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.020) (0.014) (0.040) (0.012)
Openness dummy 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.007 -0.007* 0.006
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
Total resource share 0.015 -0.024 0.019 -0.013 -0.011 0.004 -0.019
(0.015) (0.035) (0.016) (0.047) (0.023) (0.005) (0.028)
Constant 0.096*** 0.047*** 0.105*** 0.037* 0.052*** -0.008 0.047***
(0.027) (0.016) (0.025) (0.021) (0.016) (0.010) (0.013)
Variance equation
Financial development -0.697*** -0.601 -0.663*** -0.783 -1.408*** -1.251** -0.064
(0.059) (0.510) (0.084) (0.640) (0.380) (0.506) (0.543)
Openness dummy -0.256*** -0.080 -0.380*** -0.264 -0.249 0.600** -0.270
(0.098) (0.319) (0.124) (0.267) (0.230) (0.287) (0.241)
Distance to navigable river or coast 0.000 - 0.000 - - - -
(0.000) (0.000)
Total resources 2.436*** 0.428 2.550*** 0.478 0.561 -3.259 1.401
(0.239) (2.632) (0.479) (2.921) (1.384) (4.565) (2.014)
5-yearly sd ToT index growth 5.269*** 3.586*** 4.590*** 2.760** 1.774** 3.976** 3.006***
(0.469) (1.204) (0.498) (1.144) (0.867) (2.019) (1.081)
Government share volatility 70-03 17.166*** - 17.208*** - - - -
(2.030) (3.466)
Fin. Dev. * sd ToT growth 4.578*** 15.369***
(1.070) (2.590)
Fin. Dev. * Total resources -7.691***
(2.565)
Constant -7.615*** -6.369*** -7.487***-6.282*** -6.301*** -7.833*** -6.302***
(0.036) (0.152) (0.199) (0.122) (0.129) (0.178) (0.084)
Observations 2261 2261 2497 2497 2591 849 2591
Countries 89 89 90 90 94 27 94
Log likelihood 4329.7 3989.9 4695.3 4301.6 4485.5 2119.1 4488.1
sample mean of Fin. Dev. 0.001 0.001
sample mean of sd ToT growth -0.0003 -0.001
sample mean of Fin.Dev.*sd ToT 0.0005 0.0002
Clustered (by country) standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Mean equations contain year
dummies. Variables in columns 2 and 4 are demeaned by country over time, where variance and standard errors are
degrees-of-freedom adjusted. Distance to nearest navigable river or coast and government spending volatility are
observed xed eects.
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Table 5.8: Counterfactual Experiments for Resource-Rich and Landlocked Africa













GDP per capita growth 1.49% 4.04% 0.25% -3.79%
Mean equation
1st lag GDP per capita growth 0.221*** 1.48% 4.00% 1.07% -2.94% 0.65%
Av. investment share of GDP 70-03 0.045* 17.26% 24.45% 14.96% -9.50% 0.43%
Av. population growth rate 70-03 -0.478*** 1.72% 1.86% 2.75% 0.89% 0.43%
log per capita GDP 1970 -0.014*** 8.362 7.747 7.129 -0.619 -0.87%
Human capital 1970 0.002** 4.14 4.049 1.476 -2.574 0.46%
Volatility (i) -0.971** 4.04% 3.43% 6.02% 2.59% 2.98%
Point-source resources 1970 0.05* 4.35% 4.32% 13.13% 8.80% -0.44%
Financial development 1970 -0.018** 29.07% 26.89% 14.43% -12.47% -0.22%
Variance equation
Point-source resources 1970 1.621*** 4.35% 4.32% 13.13% 8.80% -0.41% 0.52%
Diuse resources 1970 0.801 7.27% 11.08% 10.52% -0.56% 0.01% -0.02%
Financial development 1970 -1.29*** 29.07% 26.89% 14.43% -12.47% -0.47% 0.58%
Openness dummy 1970 -0.693*** 0.374 0.746 0 -0.746 -1.37% 1.71%
Distance to navigable river or coast 0.001*** 277.763 90.902 552.571 461.669 -0.86% 1.07%
Estimated volatility 4.04% 3.43% 6.02% 2.59%
Countries 62 4 6
Note: Resource-rich African counties are: Algeria. Congo. Rep.. Ghana. Malawi. Togo. Zambia. Asian Tigers are:
South Korea. Malaysia. Philippines and Thailand.












GDP per capita growth 1.49% 4.04% 0.22% -3.82%
Mean equation
1st lag GDP per capita growth 0.221*** 1.48% 4.00% 0.50% -3.51% 0.78%
Av. investment share of GDP 70-03 0.045* 17.26% 24.45% 12.13% -12.32% 0.56%
Av. population growth rate 70-03 -0.478*** 1.72% 1.86% 2.57% 0.71% 0.34%
log per capita GDP 1970 -0.014*** 8.362 7.747 6.744 -1.004 -1.41%
Human capital 1970 0.002** 4.14 4.049 0.874 -3.176 0.57%
Volatility (i) -0.971** 4.04% 3.43% 6.88% 3.45% 1.97%
Point-source resources 1970 0.05* 4.35% 4.32% 10.97% 6.65% -0.33%
Financial development 1970 -0.018** 29.07% 26.89% 12.05% -14.84% -0.27%
Variance equation
Point-source resources 1970 1.621*** 4.35% 4.32% 10.97% 6.65% -0.36% 0.45%
Diuse resources 1970 0.801 7.27% 11.08% 7.99% -3.09% 0.09% -0.11%
Financial development 1970 -1.29*** 29.07% 26.89% 12.05% -14.84% -0.63% 0.78%
Openness dummy 1970 -0.693*** 0.374 0.746 0 -0.746 -1.56% 1.95%
Distance to navigable river or coast 0.001*** 277.763 90.902 979.419 888.516 -1.76% 2.19%
Estimated volatility 4.04% 3.43% 6.88% 3.45%
Countries 62 4 5
Note: Landlocked Africa are: Central African Republic. Malawi. Mali. Niger. Zambia. Asian Tigers are: South
Korea. Malaysia. Philippines and Thailand.
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Figure 5.1: Volatile Countries Have Lower Annual Growth in GDP per Capita
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Figure 5.2: Resource-Rich Economies Are More Volatile
Poelhekke, Steven (2008), Urban Growth Across Three Continents: The Blessing of Human Capital and the Curse of Volatility 
European University Institute
 





























0 5 10 15 20 25
Agricultural Raw Materials





























0 5 10 15 20 25
Foods





























0 5 10 15 20 25
Ores & Metals





























0 5 10 15 20 25
Crude Petroleum
 c.d.f  Normal
Yearly Standard Deviation
of Monthly Price Indix Changes, 1970−2003






































































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Sub−Saharan Africa Latin America & Carib.
Middle East & North Africa East Asia & Pacific
Western Europe & North America South Asia
Figure 5.4: Declining Natural Resource Dependence in the Global Economy
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Volatility of unanticipated output growth, estimated 1970−2003
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Figure 5.6: Marginal Eect of GDP Share of Resource Rents on Growth





The main aim of this thesis was to take some steps towards a better understanding of
how and why cities rise and fall over time.
In developed countries a city's success depends largely on its ability to attract and
retain a large concentration of skilled workers. A higher initial concentration of skilled
workers tends to result in faster population growth and econometric testing gave strong
evidence that the direction of causality runs from skills to growth. The diverging concen-
tration of skilled workers across cities is not a self-reinforcing process. After controlling
for unobserved xed-over-time city characteristics I showed that cities with more ameni-
ties and, in particular, a low-skilled personal services sector do tend to gain more skilled
workers, both in the US and in Germany. Other amenities also matter, such as the
owner-occupied housing share (positive), and cultural diversity measured by both eth-
nicity and country of birth of immigrants (negative), and labor organizations (negative).
Industry externalities as captures by unrelated diversity (MAR), competition (Porter),
or related diversity (Jacobs) were not important, suggesting that any such industry
externalities are capitalized in prots rather than wages.
Skilled workers are a blessing for a city's future growth. They will not come by
themselves to a city, even if a city already has a signicant concentration. City councils
can do well if they focus on amenities, including those provided by the lower skilled
workforce. The latter is an interesting new sound in the popular discussion of how to
attract the `creative class'. Especially in many European countries, there is a tendency
that cheap services are unavailable, probably because of a relatively high minimum
wage. Future research should also include the housing market because the popular
historic centers of many European cities are increasingly expensive places to live in, and
are too expensive for less payed, less educated service workers.
Evidence from Germany has shown that well known estimates of the size of the
skills-growth eect are biased because endogeneity of the initial employment size is not
suciently accounted for when xed eects matter for both growth and initial city
characteristics. Adjusting the estimates using two data-sets on German metropolitan
areas and recently improved dynamic panel GMM techniques shows that the eect is
signicant but 30% smaller than previously thought.
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The blessings of skills may also come from other levels of educational attainment,
namely those with vocational training. I found robust evidence that technical college
graduates such as engineers interact positively with workers with vocational training
and reinforce the latter's positive eect on employment growth. This eect is slightly
decreasing over time however, while non-technical university graduates are becoming
more important. City success may depend on the right combination of skills and not
only on the percentage of college graduates. Micro-data at the rm level may shed more
light on this link in the future.
In developing countries growth of cities may even occur when job growth is absent.
Many countries urbanize surprisingly fast even though economic growth is slow or nega-
tive. Negative growth is unlikely to create urban jobs, it does not raise urban wages nor
does it increase earlier migrants' 
ow of remittances, which could all be powerful urban-
pull factors from the perspective of poor rural households. This development poses great
challenges to poor countries because public services and infrastructure investment lag
far behind what is required by a burgeoning urban population. The result is that up to
70% of urban inhabitants live in slums in poor conditions. This is the reason that the
cause of rapid urbanization can be seen as a curse.
Push factors are at least as important as pull factors, especially when the economic
circumstances are such that households cannot cope with negative shocks to income. Pe-
riods of aggregate volatility turn out to be strong predictors of urban growth, especially
when GDP per capita growth is negative. The source of volatility lies in rural activities
such as agriculture and natural resource production which are much more risky sectors
than urban manufacturing. World resource prices are highly volatile (which is more
important than rainfall), and nancial instruments such as credit to deal with aggregate
risk are all but absent in the countryside. Aggregate risk may be more important than a
sectoral shift from agriculture to manufacturing and the parallel transition to urbaniza-
tion for countries with poor economic performance. Unable to save or insure eectively,
households are forced to migrate to cities to avoid being hit by large negative shocks
as an ex-ante response to expected risk, because large shocks may wipe out any buer
savings entirely.
Rural development of credit institutions could decrease migration pressure on cities.
On the other hand, it might also be that agglomeration economies can bring opportu-
nities to fast urbanizing countries if these centers can be made attractive enough for
start-ups and foreign investment. Future research using micro data should shed more
light on these issues. For now, volatility is a curse for poor countries unless governments
can keep up with the in
ux of migrants.
The curse of volatility reaches further than urbanization alone. The last chapter has
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shown that volatility is also the underlying curse of being endowed with many natural
resources. The high volatility of world prices of natural resources causes severe volatility
of output per capita growth in countries that depend heavily on them. The resulting
volatility of unanticipated output growth has a robust negative eect on long-run growth
itself and can therefore rightly be termed a curse. This is not limited to oil-producing
countries, but also applies to exporters of copper, coee, and foods, amongst others,
which include many of the world's worst performing countries. Also, ethnic tensions,
which are often fueled by resource wealth, and current account restrictions, increase
volatility. The latter eect is especially strong in resource-rich countries. Government
spending bonanzas after windfall resource revenues also increase volatility to the detri-
ment of growth, because revenue drops inevitably follow.
Volatility can fortunately be substantially reduced provided that countries have a
sound nancial system to cope with large and sudden 
uctuations in resource income.
Fewer capital account restrictions, openness, and physical access to world trade also
lower volatility. Countries can turn the curse even into a blessing, because we nd
evidence for a positive direct eect of natural resource dependence on growth after
controlling for volatility. The key to a turn-around for many resource-rich countries is
nancial development, ensuring openness, and mitigating the eect of being landlocked,
because the indirect negative eect of resource dependence on growth, via volatility, is
much larger than any direct positive eect. While it may be dicult to lower price
volatility of resources themselves, it should be feasible to deal with volatility in a more
ecient way. Future research should focus on ways to overcome the political temptations
of short-run resource wealth to create the nancial and political institutions needed to
reduce volatility, soften the impact of volatility on growth, and prevent poverty.
The last two chapters form a consistent story of how countries can experience fast
urban growth and slow economic growth at the same time. In both cases aggregate
volatility is the curse. In principle poor countries should also be able to investment more
in skills and reap its benets, for example, by using natural resource wealth wisely. There
are unfortunately huge challenges ahead to develop nancial markets and especially the
institutions which make such markets fair and feasible. At the same time, development
of institutions may also turn excessively large cities into areas of opportunity. Such
concentrations of cheap labor should be appealing to globalizing rms once the cost of
doing business is lower.
The blessings of human capital for cities in developed countries are enjoyed by those
cities that manage to attract more skilled workers. Such competition between cities
need not be ecient if cities lose out after investing public money in amenities. There
may be scope for additional research on the aggregate eects of skills-agglomeration.
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